Thursday, December 29, 2011
巫青公开承认：我们是流氓！
一直以来，我们以各种侮辱性的字眼辱骂巫统，虽然那些侮辱性的字眼差不多就是那些被我们骂的人的同义词，但被人骂的人当然不会承认。今天，我们终于见证了有史以来最诚实的巫统党员——那就是槟城的巫青团！因为他们说：“要知道，你不要跟我们耍流氓，你要（耍流氓）的话，我们也是流氓。”
多么自豪，多么大义凌然！今天，他们重新诠释了“流氓”这个职业的代表价值——身为流氓，是一件多么值得光荣的事情啊！下次我们在街上遇到流氓骚扰的话，就这么对他们说吧：“你不要跟我们耍流氓，你要（耍流氓）的话，我也是流氓！”那些小混混要么吓得屁滚尿流，要么他乡遇故知地牵着你的手话家常兼请你吃饭看戏宵夜直落，多么豪迈的一句话！
此外，经过很久之前的星洲女记者被内安法令“保护”的案件之后，我们今天也重新认识了“照顾”这个词的意思。原来“nampak Adam, ambil dia dulu”这句话的意思，并不是要抓住他，而是要“照顾”他、“疼爱”他，巫青团实在是把我们华人“打是疼、骂是爱”这句话发挥得淋漓尽致。下次，如果诸君有时外出，要求邻居代为看顾孩子时，如果邻居说：“你放心，我会好好照顾你的孩子。”那你要小心了，最好还是把孩子带在身边吧，难保邻居会如何“照顾”你的孩子。
词汇有分成“褒义词”、“贬义词”和“中性词”三种情感色彩。以往的我在教导学生时，对这个词汇情感色彩总是轻描淡写地带过，因为这个单元实在是太容易了，但是，经过了我国那些以流氓自居并感到光荣的政棍颠倒之后，看来这个单元我还是直接跳过不教的好，因为我实在是不太能肯定某些词汇的情感色彩了。
Posted by 天妃 at 1:48 PM 2 comments
Labels: 议事厅
Monday, December 26, 2011
强奸民意的巫统淫贼
Majoriti NGO sokong UMNO, Barisan Nasional
KUALA LUMPUR 26 Dis. - Majoriti pertubuhan bukan kerajaan (NGO) di negara ini memberi sokongan padu kepada UMNO dan Barisan Nasional (BN) untuk terus mentadbir negara.
Ketua Penerangan UMNO, Datuk Ahmad Maslan berkata, menerusi satu kajian yang dilakukan oleh parti tersebut, majoriti daripada ribuan NGO di negara ini menyatakan sokongan kepada UMNO dan mahukan BN terus menerajui negara.
Bagaimanapun, katanya, kebanyakkan NGO tersebut tidak lantang bersuara sehingga menyebabkan rakyat beranggapan bahawa UMNO serta BN kehilangan sokongan daripada pertubuhan berkenaan yang merupakan antara senjata penting kepada sesebuah parti politik.
"Sepanjang tahun ini, saya telah bertemu dengan pelbagai NGO untuk berbincang mengenai negara dan kesinambungan pentadbiran UMNO serta BN.
"Mereka ini (NGO) menyokong kita (UMNO) tetapi mereka tidak lantang bersuara apabila timbul sesuatu isu membabitkan parti. Ini berbeza dengan NGO pembangkang yang lebih lantang bersuara walaupun jumlahnya sangat sedikit.
"Bagaimanapun, ia bukanlah masalah besar kerana inilah yang dinamakan silent majority, mereka mungkin tidak lantang bersuara tetapi mereka tetap menyokong UMNO serta BN. Ini yang kita mahukan," katanya pada sidang akhbar selepas merasmikan sidang muafakat 1Malaysia bersama 15 NGO di sini hari ini.
Hadir sama Pengerusi Ayahanda Malaysia, Halim Ali.
Dalam pada itu, berhubung kemelut dalaman parti pembangkang membabitkan Pas dan DAP, Ahmad menyifatkannya sebagai bukti kepada kegagalan pembangkang menguruskan parti sendiri serta tidak layak mentadbir negara.
"DAP tetap dengan pendirian mereka mahu menjadikan Malaysia sebagai negara sekular yang bertentangan dengan matlamat serta perjuangan Pas, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) pula adalah parti paling teruk dalam sejarah negara apabila banyak ahli asalnya telah berpaling daripada perjuangan.
"Kalau parti sendiri tidak dapat diuruskan dengan betul, sesama pemimpin bertelagah, bagaimana mahu mentadbir negara," ujarnya.
看吧，看吧，那些沉默的大多数，如果你们还不把自己的不满大声说出来，你们就像这些沉默的非政府组织一样，被巫统轮奸了。
巫统说了，根据他们也不知是上门调查还是上门威胁后的报告，马来西亚上千个非政府组织，都相信且支持国阵继续领导国家，虽然这些组织没有公开发表支持国阵的声明，但他们都是“沉默的大多数”，他们的心在暗地里是向着国阵的，这就够了。
领导国家的政府若是得民心，人民岂会羞于支持？就连金正日这样的独裁领袖都有一大众人民为他哭丧，也只有国阵这么厚颜无耻，才会把这“沉默的大多数”的沉默强抢过来，当作是对自己的支持。
对于我们这些公开表示对国阵不爽的人民来说，我们是逃过被强暴的耻辱了；对于那些还没表明立场，以“沉默的大多数”自居甚至自傲的人民来说，你们，是很享受这样的被奸经历呢，还是应该站出来，为自己的清白捍卫一下啊？
http://siewki86.blogspot.com/
Saturday, December 31, 2011
新加坡人选涨价的涨！ 马来西亚人选要转变政府的转字，转过来由民联执政！！！一定要转政府！！！
《联合早报》最能代表2011年汉字 “涨”名列榜首
即时新闻 2011-12-31 14:57
（新加坡31日讯）通货膨胀，物价上涨，让人们感到荷包“缩水”，“涨”因此成为读者投选最能代表2011年的汉字。
新加坡《联合早报》从今年开始，主办“字述一年”年度汉字投选活动，邀请读者一起选出他们心目中，最能描述过去一年的字。
该报遴选出10个比较有代表性的汉字，包括新、震、民、水、涨、房、债、平、冷、轨，并从12月中开始刊登这些字的介绍，包括每一个字的起源和说明，还有这些字所概括的新闻事件。
投选活动总共收到近4000张选票，其中“涨”字在手机简讯、面子书和邮寄表格三种投选方式中都领先，以近四成的得票率成为胜出汉字。其他字的排名依次是震、民、水、轨、债、新、平、房、冷。
最多读者参与的手机简讯投选中，“震”和“水”分别排在第二和第三名。对通过面子书方式投选的较年轻读者，“民”和“水”则比较受欢迎。
投选“涨”字的29岁读者林冠中在面子书留言说，房价、车价、油价、交通费、水电费、ERP、生活费，什么都在涨，就连反对党的支持率也在今年涨了不少，所以他认为“涨”字最能代表即将过去的2011年。
VVVVVVVVV
马来西亚人要转，，转过来由民联执政。
所有马来西亚人，要转变，要转变，换政府， 转政府！！
大家一起来换政府，同心协力，换掉，改变，转变！
这就是转的意义。
一起转过来由民联执政！！！！！！！！！
即时新闻 2011-12-31 14:57
（新加坡31日讯）通货膨胀，物价上涨，让人们感到荷包“缩水”，“涨”因此成为读者投选最能代表2011年的汉字。
新加坡《联合早报》从今年开始，主办“字述一年”年度汉字投选活动，邀请读者一起选出他们心目中，最能描述过去一年的字。
该报遴选出10个比较有代表性的汉字，包括新、震、民、水、涨、房、债、平、冷、轨，并从12月中开始刊登这些字的介绍，包括每一个字的起源和说明，还有这些字所概括的新闻事件。
投选活动总共收到近4000张选票，其中“涨”字在手机简讯、面子书和邮寄表格三种投选方式中都领先，以近四成的得票率成为胜出汉字。其他字的排名依次是震、民、水、轨、债、新、平、房、冷。
最多读者参与的手机简讯投选中，“震”和“水”分别排在第二和第三名。对通过面子书方式投选的较年轻读者，“民”和“水”则比较受欢迎。
投选“涨”字的29岁读者林冠中在面子书留言说，房价、车价、油价、交通费、水电费、ERP、生活费，什么都在涨，就连反对党的支持率也在今年涨了不少，所以他认为“涨”字最能代表即将过去的2011年。
VVVVVVVVV
马来西亚人要转，，转过来由民联执政。
所有马来西亚人，要转变，要转变，换政府， 转政府！！
大家一起来换政府，同心协力，换掉，改变，转变！
这就是转的意义。
一起转过来由民联执政！！！！！！！！！
Monday, December 26, 2011
現代的人不僅生活緊張，就連生活方式與過去有很大的改變，例如經常吹冷氣、吃冰品或涼飲、缺乏運動等，使得人體的正常體溫有下降的趨勢。 體溫與人體的免疫功能息息相關
體溫低易導致免疫力下降
作者﹕杜宇
【簡體版】 【打印機版】 【字號】大 中 小
多數人沒有認識到正常體溫下降的嚴重性。體溫過低會導致免疫力下降外，由於身體變冷還會引發各種器官異常，如促使心肌梗塞、腦梗塞及其他威脅生命的重症發生。
現代的人不僅生活緊張，就連生活方式與過去有很大的改變，例如經常吹冷氣、吃冰品或涼飲、缺乏運動等，使得人體的正常體溫有下降的趨勢。
體溫與人體的免疫功能息息相關，體溫的些微波動都關係著人的生死。
一般而言，成人的平均體溫在36.5℃~36.8℃左右。人類體溫處於36.5℃~37℃時是最健康的狀態，但是現在人們的正常體溫大多已經不足36.5℃。有些疾病與體內的寒氣有關，「冷會促使疾病的發生」。
女性體溫下降易衍生疾病
女性有月經週期，此時較易引起體溫下降；此外內分泌失調也會導致體溫過低，從而引起血管收縮擴張異常，血液迴圈機能下降人體開始發冷，中醫學稱為「氣血不和」。
病會先從身體寒冷的部位侵入，使皮膚開始乾燥、長痘痘，頭髮乾枯掉髮，身體積水浮腫，肩膀僵硬，腰疼，頭疼等。雖然體寒是體質上的問題沒有致死的危險，卻有可能導致免疫力下降引發哮喘、腎炎等。
老人低溫35℃是危症前兆
在寒冷的冬天，老人也容易出現手腳冰冷，甚至體溫低的情況，此時兒女們要特別注意，這有可能是疾病前兆。當體溫低於35℃持續時間超過24小時，如未及時採取保暖措施很容易心跳驟停而猝死。
預防老年人體溫過低，有道是「熱自頭上散、寒從腳下起」，所以首先要注意保暖。此外，室溫需保持在15℃以上，同時加強飲食營養，讓身體有充足的熱量和水分，或者是請中醫師針對老人的體質做中藥調理。值得注意的是勿食生冷刺激食品。
抗寒6妙招 防止體溫散失
想要預防體溫過低就要防止體熱的大量散失，並提高身體對寒冷的適應能力。
1. 勿長期暴露在戶外低溫的環境。
2. 寒冷季節勿浸泡在低溫的水中。
3. 穿著注意保暖防寒。
4. 飲用提高體溫的熱性食物，例如：薑母茶、蘋果汁、胡蘿蔔汁。
5. 養成泡熱水澡或泡腳的習慣。
6. 運用自然療法，如指壓、水壓療法、淋巴按摩等，讓體溫維持穩定。@◇
（本文作者為中醫師）
作者﹕杜宇
【簡體版】 【打印機版】 【字號】大 中 小
多數人沒有認識到正常體溫下降的嚴重性。體溫過低會導致免疫力下降外，由於身體變冷還會引發各種器官異常，如促使心肌梗塞、腦梗塞及其他威脅生命的重症發生。
現代的人不僅生活緊張，就連生活方式與過去有很大的改變，例如經常吹冷氣、吃冰品或涼飲、缺乏運動等，使得人體的正常體溫有下降的趨勢。
體溫與人體的免疫功能息息相關，體溫的些微波動都關係著人的生死。
一般而言，成人的平均體溫在36.5℃~36.8℃左右。人類體溫處於36.5℃~37℃時是最健康的狀態，但是現在人們的正常體溫大多已經不足36.5℃。有些疾病與體內的寒氣有關，「冷會促使疾病的發生」。
女性體溫下降易衍生疾病
女性有月經週期，此時較易引起體溫下降；此外內分泌失調也會導致體溫過低，從而引起血管收縮擴張異常，血液迴圈機能下降人體開始發冷，中醫學稱為「氣血不和」。
病會先從身體寒冷的部位侵入，使皮膚開始乾燥、長痘痘，頭髮乾枯掉髮，身體積水浮腫，肩膀僵硬，腰疼，頭疼等。雖然體寒是體質上的問題沒有致死的危險，卻有可能導致免疫力下降引發哮喘、腎炎等。
老人低溫35℃是危症前兆
在寒冷的冬天，老人也容易出現手腳冰冷，甚至體溫低的情況，此時兒女們要特別注意，這有可能是疾病前兆。當體溫低於35℃持續時間超過24小時，如未及時採取保暖措施很容易心跳驟停而猝死。
預防老年人體溫過低，有道是「熱自頭上散、寒從腳下起」，所以首先要注意保暖。此外，室溫需保持在15℃以上，同時加強飲食營養，讓身體有充足的熱量和水分，或者是請中醫師針對老人的體質做中藥調理。值得注意的是勿食生冷刺激食品。
抗寒6妙招 防止體溫散失
想要預防體溫過低就要防止體熱的大量散失，並提高身體對寒冷的適應能力。
1. 勿長期暴露在戶外低溫的環境。
2. 寒冷季節勿浸泡在低溫的水中。
3. 穿著注意保暖防寒。
4. 飲用提高體溫的熱性食物，例如：薑母茶、蘋果汁、胡蘿蔔汁。
5. 養成泡熱水澡或泡腳的習慣。
6. 運用自然療法，如指壓、水壓療法、淋巴按摩等，讓體溫維持穩定。@◇
（本文作者為中醫師）
Friday, December 23, 2011
欧阳丁清拿第一
芦骨区州议员欧阳丁清真的超赞！
拿了第一！！！
芦骨区州议员欧阳丁清真的值得当地人支持，下届大选，人民还是会选他。
芦骨区州议员欧阳丁清--服务好， 愿意帮助人，人民父母官，就是要服务，付出，以民为本！！！
森美兰州是需要更多的民联州议员， 所以，森美兰人应该在下届大选选民联！
是时候，森美兰由民联管理了！
森美兰人一定要勇敢投出转变人生，这边一成不变的痛苦！！！
转变就是人生，就是真理！！！！
欧阳丁清、邱凯濂及沈明泉协助人民就是好榜样！！！
欧阳丁清（左起）、邱凯濂及沈明泉协助人民填写申请一个马来西亚人民援助金表格。
欧阳丁清服务中心 即起助申请援助金
2011-12-15 14:33
欧阳丁清（左起）、邱凯濂及沈明泉协助人民填写申请一个马来西亚人民援助金表格。
（波德申14日讯）芦骨区州议员欧阳丁清在波德申芦骨世嘉城的服务中心，即日起接受及协助人民填写申请一个大马500令吉援助金表格。
相信这亦是我国或森州首个行动党的一个马来西亚人民援助金服务中心。
欧阳丁清说，这是身为人民议员的工作与责任范畴，协助群众处理申请表格，尤其一些上了年纪而不了解及不懂得如何填报表格的人民。
他认为这不仅是国阵的工作或责任，民联议员也可以协助人民处理这类工作，毕竟一些人仍不了解如何申请500令吉援助金，而且不知该如何填报资料。
欧阳丁清服务中心一个马来西亚人民援助金申请处查询联络电话06-651 6098，时间早上9时至下午5时30分，周一到周五，周六早上9时至下午1时。
VVVVVVVVV
民联议员，就是要服务，要走动，动才能胜！！！
拿了第一！！！
芦骨区州议员欧阳丁清真的值得当地人支持，下届大选，人民还是会选他。
芦骨区州议员欧阳丁清--服务好， 愿意帮助人，人民父母官，就是要服务，付出，以民为本！！！
森美兰州是需要更多的民联州议员， 所以，森美兰人应该在下届大选选民联！
是时候，森美兰由民联管理了！
森美兰人一定要勇敢投出转变人生，这边一成不变的痛苦！！！
转变就是人生，就是真理！！！！
欧阳丁清、邱凯濂及沈明泉协助人民就是好榜样！！！
欧阳丁清（左起）、邱凯濂及沈明泉协助人民填写申请一个马来西亚人民援助金表格。
欧阳丁清服务中心 即起助申请援助金
2011-12-15 14:33
欧阳丁清（左起）、邱凯濂及沈明泉协助人民填写申请一个马来西亚人民援助金表格。
（波德申14日讯）芦骨区州议员欧阳丁清在波德申芦骨世嘉城的服务中心，即日起接受及协助人民填写申请一个大马500令吉援助金表格。
相信这亦是我国或森州首个行动党的一个马来西亚人民援助金服务中心。
欧阳丁清说，这是身为人民议员的工作与责任范畴，协助群众处理申请表格，尤其一些上了年纪而不了解及不懂得如何填报表格的人民。
他认为这不仅是国阵的工作或责任，民联议员也可以协助人民处理这类工作，毕竟一些人仍不了解如何申请500令吉援助金，而且不知该如何填报资料。
欧阳丁清服务中心一个马来西亚人民援助金申请处查询联络电话06-651 6098，时间早上9时至下午5时30分，周一到周五，周六早上9时至下午1时。
VVVVVVVVV
民联议员，就是要服务，要走动，动才能胜！！！
Tuesday, December 20, 2011
big ang pau from konsortium, ex-date is 3/1/2012, so, buy before this date.
Company Name Konsortium Logistik Bhd
Ex-Date
03/01/2012
Amount 45.7 sen
Par Value RM 1.00
Payment Date 26/01/2012
Entitlement Subject
First Interim and Special Dividend
20.15 sen Tax Exempt and 25.55 sen Less 25% Tax
worth to buy as dividens are so huge, sweet, sweetlah.
Ex-Date
03/01/2012
Amount 45.7 sen
Par Value RM 1.00
Payment Date 26/01/2012
Entitlement Subject
First Interim and Special Dividend
20.15 sen Tax Exempt and 25.55 sen Less 25% Tax
worth to buy as dividens are so huge, sweet, sweetlah.
Friday, December 16, 2011
第八届中国—东盟博览会“魅力之城”各显神通， 游客在“魅力之城”马来西亚柔佛展区尽情舞蹈
[生活秀场] 中国-东盟博览会收录（1）马来西亚舞狮表演
第八届中国—东盟博览会“魅力之城”各显神通
2011年10月24日09:31 来源：人民网-广西频道
人民网南宁10月24日电 （记者连波）逐浪中国海南的浪漫海滨、徜徉马来西亚柔佛的林荫古道、品尝泰国孔敬的奇珍美食……连日来，第八届中国—东盟博览会“魅力之城”展区人气爆棚，数万名海内外游客纷纷涌入11国“魅力之城”，争先领略来自中国与东盟的无限人文风情。
10月23日上午，记者刚踏进“魅力之城”展区就被欢快的乐声吸引了目光。在“魅力之城”马来西亚柔佛展区里，7名身着传统服饰的青年男女踏歌起舞，时而轻灵，时而婀娜的舞蹈让里外三层的观众们直呼“过瘾”。尽兴之余，舞蹈演员们微笑着走下了舞台，盛情邀请现场观众登台共舞。踏着动感的节拍，50岁的吉林游客卢大妈在台上跳得不亦乐乎：“第一次参观博览会，真是大开眼界了！”
一曲跳罢，来自马来西亚柔佛的舞蹈演员们成了热情观众争相合影的对象。“中国的观众很快乐、很活泼，我所感受到的博览会处处都是欢乐笑语。”第一次到广西参与博览会表演的马来西亚小伙Yusof开心的说。除了精彩的歌舞，Yusof告诉记者，他和同伴们还为各国观众准备了马来西亚舞狮表演。
在“魅力之城”泰国孔敬，整个展厅被鲜艳的兰花点缀一新，在泰国美女的引领下，记者如同走进了被鲜花簇拥的奇妙世界。展厅里，来自孔敬的大厨们正忙着现场烹饪，木瓜沙拉、烤扒鸡、糯米饭……各种令人垂涎的泰国美食赚尽了观众们的褒赞。“第一次逛博览会，第一次尝到泰国美食，感觉真是不错。”南宁市民王女士今年特地带着一家五口逛博览会，东盟国家的魅力着实令她倾倒。
在柬埔寨拉达那基里省的奇迹王国里，“未婚女孩之屋”和“未婚男孩之屋”一高一低鲜明对比；在印尼西巴布亚省展区，原始木雕制作风情万种；在文莱的庭院里，身穿节日盛装的少女们正用灿烂的笑容迎接四海宾朋……作为今年“魅力之城”中唯一的中国城市，海南展区屹立的硕大屏幕则将国际旅游岛的海洋风光淋漓尽致的展现在了观众面前。
据了解，本届博览会“魅力之城”展区总展示面积1748平方米，比去年增加214平方米。今年的“魅力之城”分别是：中国的海南省、文莱的斯里巴加湾、柬埔寨的拉达那基里省、印尼的西巴布亚省、老挝的占巴塞省、马来西亚的柔佛州、缅甸的内比都、菲律宾的普林塞萨港、新加坡的新加坡城、泰国的孔敬和越南的会安市。
http://bbs.gxsky.com/thread-9675563-1-1.html
您现在的位置：首页 > 新闻 > 正文
马来西亚舞狮队助威博览会
2011-10-26 10:28 来源：广西日报 作者：黄 信
10月24日上午，阵阵欢呼声和掌声不断在南宁国际会展中心综合楼前的广场响起，只见一组“狮子”伴着鼓声，在高桩上跳跃自如，原来是马来西亚舞狮队在激情演出。22日至25日，这支名为关圣宫的舞狮队每天都在会展中心进行演出。
伴随着激昂的鼓声，威武的“狮子”继续舞动起来。在向观众打招呼后，随即在桩上“飞跃”，桩的最高点超过2米，桩与桩的距离大约0.5－2米。每开始一次跳跃，观众都为他们捏一把汗；而每完成一次跳跃，场下马上一片沸腾，掌声、欢呼声不断。
“狮子”还多次高扬起前脚向观众问好，并不时抖动麟毛，向观众眨眼睛、扭扭屁股，动作可爱又滑稽。舞狮运动要求队员同时具备高超的技术、高度的运动协调性和精湛的杂技技巧，现场观看的人们忍不住惊呼：“真是了不得！”
演出过程中，“狮子”还不忘与观众互动，从口中“吐”出神秘礼物撒向观众，观众纷纷为收到马来西亚特产这份礼物而兴奋欢呼。结合“魅力之城”柔佛州展区的民族舞蹈表演，他们把马来西亚的文化和民族风情带到中国，与观众共庆第八届中国-东盟博览会。
关圣宫舞狮队的教练用一口流利的中文向众人介绍，关圣宫龙狮队共有3个队，此次有两队共14人到南宁演出。“我们是首次受邀到南宁演出，感到很荣幸！希望通过这次机会给观众带来惊喜和快乐，也希望今后能有更多类似的机会来广西，让更多的广西观众了解我们。”
教练还自豪地告诉记者，在华人众多的马来西亚，舞狮一直是广受欢迎的一项民间活动。关圣宫龙狮队是马来西亚一流的舞狮团体，极富青春活力，并对舞狮文化有着独到的理解和诠释。他们频繁地参与国内国际比赛，多次荣获国际及马来西亚大奖。10月26日他们将前往新加坡参加国际舞狮大赛。
“你看那个打擂鼓的小男孩，身子都不及那些桩高，但却打得那么精彩。”观众不断赞叹道。记者了解到，舞狮队的这位小队员今年刚上小学六年级，年龄虽小，但却十分热爱舞狮，并有不凡的表现。“狮子”在他的擂鼓声中精彩地完成了演出套路，配合得天衣无缝。
舞狮是一项源于中国的古老体育运动项目，它以激动人心、体现出果敢精神的运动特征逐渐为西方社会所接受，并渐渐在一些西方国家流行起来。马来西亚华人众多，由于华人致力传播中华文化，因而富有舞狮传统。他们把舞狮定为全国性的运动项目。为把舞狮推向世界，列为奥运会的比赛项目，多年来马来西亚不遗余力地向世界各地推广舞狮运动，有“舞狮王国”的美誉。
http://news.xinmin.cn/rollnews/2011/10/26/12490542.html
第八届中国—东盟博览会“魅力之城”各显神通
2011年10月24日09:31 来源：人民网-广西频道
人民网南宁10月24日电 （记者连波）逐浪中国海南的浪漫海滨、徜徉马来西亚柔佛的林荫古道、品尝泰国孔敬的奇珍美食……连日来，第八届中国—东盟博览会“魅力之城”展区人气爆棚，数万名海内外游客纷纷涌入11国“魅力之城”，争先领略来自中国与东盟的无限人文风情。
10月23日上午，记者刚踏进“魅力之城”展区就被欢快的乐声吸引了目光。在“魅力之城”马来西亚柔佛展区里，7名身着传统服饰的青年男女踏歌起舞，时而轻灵，时而婀娜的舞蹈让里外三层的观众们直呼“过瘾”。尽兴之余，舞蹈演员们微笑着走下了舞台，盛情邀请现场观众登台共舞。踏着动感的节拍，50岁的吉林游客卢大妈在台上跳得不亦乐乎：“第一次参观博览会，真是大开眼界了！”
一曲跳罢，来自马来西亚柔佛的舞蹈演员们成了热情观众争相合影的对象。“中国的观众很快乐、很活泼，我所感受到的博览会处处都是欢乐笑语。”第一次到广西参与博览会表演的马来西亚小伙Yusof开心的说。除了精彩的歌舞，Yusof告诉记者，他和同伴们还为各国观众准备了马来西亚舞狮表演。
在“魅力之城”泰国孔敬，整个展厅被鲜艳的兰花点缀一新，在泰国美女的引领下，记者如同走进了被鲜花簇拥的奇妙世界。展厅里，来自孔敬的大厨们正忙着现场烹饪，木瓜沙拉、烤扒鸡、糯米饭……各种令人垂涎的泰国美食赚尽了观众们的褒赞。“第一次逛博览会，第一次尝到泰国美食，感觉真是不错。”南宁市民王女士今年特地带着一家五口逛博览会，东盟国家的魅力着实令她倾倒。
在柬埔寨拉达那基里省的奇迹王国里，“未婚女孩之屋”和“未婚男孩之屋”一高一低鲜明对比；在印尼西巴布亚省展区，原始木雕制作风情万种；在文莱的庭院里，身穿节日盛装的少女们正用灿烂的笑容迎接四海宾朋……作为今年“魅力之城”中唯一的中国城市，海南展区屹立的硕大屏幕则将国际旅游岛的海洋风光淋漓尽致的展现在了观众面前。
据了解，本届博览会“魅力之城”展区总展示面积1748平方米，比去年增加214平方米。今年的“魅力之城”分别是：中国的海南省、文莱的斯里巴加湾、柬埔寨的拉达那基里省、印尼的西巴布亚省、老挝的占巴塞省、马来西亚的柔佛州、缅甸的内比都、菲律宾的普林塞萨港、新加坡的新加坡城、泰国的孔敬和越南的会安市。
http://bbs.gxsky.com/thread-9675563-1-1.html
您现在的位置：首页 > 新闻 > 正文
马来西亚舞狮队助威博览会
2011-10-26 10:28 来源：广西日报 作者：黄 信
10月24日上午，阵阵欢呼声和掌声不断在南宁国际会展中心综合楼前的广场响起，只见一组“狮子”伴着鼓声，在高桩上跳跃自如，原来是马来西亚舞狮队在激情演出。22日至25日，这支名为关圣宫的舞狮队每天都在会展中心进行演出。
伴随着激昂的鼓声，威武的“狮子”继续舞动起来。在向观众打招呼后，随即在桩上“飞跃”，桩的最高点超过2米，桩与桩的距离大约0.5－2米。每开始一次跳跃，观众都为他们捏一把汗；而每完成一次跳跃，场下马上一片沸腾，掌声、欢呼声不断。
“狮子”还多次高扬起前脚向观众问好，并不时抖动麟毛，向观众眨眼睛、扭扭屁股，动作可爱又滑稽。舞狮运动要求队员同时具备高超的技术、高度的运动协调性和精湛的杂技技巧，现场观看的人们忍不住惊呼：“真是了不得！”
演出过程中，“狮子”还不忘与观众互动，从口中“吐”出神秘礼物撒向观众，观众纷纷为收到马来西亚特产这份礼物而兴奋欢呼。结合“魅力之城”柔佛州展区的民族舞蹈表演，他们把马来西亚的文化和民族风情带到中国，与观众共庆第八届中国-东盟博览会。
关圣宫舞狮队的教练用一口流利的中文向众人介绍，关圣宫龙狮队共有3个队，此次有两队共14人到南宁演出。“我们是首次受邀到南宁演出，感到很荣幸！希望通过这次机会给观众带来惊喜和快乐，也希望今后能有更多类似的机会来广西，让更多的广西观众了解我们。”
教练还自豪地告诉记者，在华人众多的马来西亚，舞狮一直是广受欢迎的一项民间活动。关圣宫龙狮队是马来西亚一流的舞狮团体，极富青春活力，并对舞狮文化有着独到的理解和诠释。他们频繁地参与国内国际比赛，多次荣获国际及马来西亚大奖。10月26日他们将前往新加坡参加国际舞狮大赛。
“你看那个打擂鼓的小男孩，身子都不及那些桩高，但却打得那么精彩。”观众不断赞叹道。记者了解到，舞狮队的这位小队员今年刚上小学六年级，年龄虽小，但却十分热爱舞狮，并有不凡的表现。“狮子”在他的擂鼓声中精彩地完成了演出套路，配合得天衣无缝。
舞狮是一项源于中国的古老体育运动项目，它以激动人心、体现出果敢精神的运动特征逐渐为西方社会所接受，并渐渐在一些西方国家流行起来。马来西亚华人众多，由于华人致力传播中华文化，因而富有舞狮传统。他们把舞狮定为全国性的运动项目。为把舞狮推向世界，列为奥运会的比赛项目，多年来马来西亚不遗余力地向世界各地推广舞狮运动，有“舞狮王国”的美誉。
http://news.xinmin.cn/rollnews/2011/10/26/12490542.html
Thursday, December 15, 2011
首相华裔政治秘书很难八面玲珑， 一夫当关，万箭穿心
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2011
看胡博士黯然神伤，看历史教训， 王乃志难八面玲珑！！！
很多人读奇怪，为什么一位那么成功的博士也无法“做好”首相政治秘书的职位？
胡博士是天才：
“他是猛人講師”
“他是神童学者”
胡逸山博士來自沙巴，自幼学业及各方面的成绩都非常标青；十四岁在建国中学毕业后，前往美国加州大学深造，先后取得5个学位，包括航空工程、机械工程、法学博士、工商管理碩士及德國文学学士。天才真好，在那么短的時间可以学习到物理、法学、商课、文学不同领域的学问(不禁想起白素的父亲白老大..)。。。
过后胡逸山博士也受邀担任联合国紧急通讯工作队科学及法律顾问。数年前为了双亲也为了回馈祖国，毅然回流本地，目前分别在精英大学担任高级研究学者，及沙巴大学讲课。除了学术界，胡逸山目前也常常针对时事及政策发表意见及文章。
许多人都会问一个问题，博士都无法把“首相的政治秘书（华裔）做好吗？？？
那么，王乃志会胜任吗？？？
其实，是很难，真的很难。
看回胡博士， 他上任时，许许多多人， 国阵的人， 华社都有期望。
一年一年过去，一个月一个月过去了。。。。。。。。。。。。大家没有看到。。。变化。
再看下去。。。也没有变化。
博士，很忙，真的，在报纸上可以看到他出席很多活动。。。。但是活动只是工作的一种，能为。。。华社带来变化吗？？？
很难。
我曾出席语文出版局在成功时代广场举行的一项活动，主角是首相夫人。我见到胡博士，还有许子根（也是主角之一）。。。还有以前在中国报的同事秋花（当时是 赛芝的新闻秘书吧）。。。
胡博士真的很忙， 华社活动要参加。。。。首相的要去，首相夫人的也要去。。。。。
所以，一个人能够做什么，可以改变什么？？？
小小改变都难啦！！！大改变根本是不可能！！
王乃志期望以一个人，就能有改变。。。。。。。。。。。我说那是发梦。
听听他最近说了什么:
"....王乃志认为网际网络完全改变了沟通与生活方式，可从中可了解现代人的个人喜好及想法，除了可用以追女生外，当然也可制造缘份，争取选票。
不过，王乃志表示自己过去两三年来忙碌于律师事务所大小事务，因此迄今仍没有面子书口户头。“如今回来了(政治领域)，我将会设立一个户头，了解现代年轻人的想法及需求；让年轻人知道追女生之余，也得追知识。”
宗教种族扰民 首相找平衡点
刚上任首相政治秘书第4天的王乃志不忘在讲座会上分享对首相纳吉的看法；他分析，过去数千年来引起社会动荡不安的因素不外乎是土地、宗教及种族，而我国就备受最后两项因素所困扰，因此首相纳吉一直从中寻觅平衡点，希望人民给予首相支持。
他认为，无论在朝野政党，保守主义者无所不在，即使在友党内也难免会面对此问题，领导者将面对保守主义者带来的压力及冲突。“在这种环境下坚持改革，难道这不是我们所需要的吗？”
“首相必须得到人民的支持，以庞大的民意及力量告诉保守主义份子：‘这个时代已经不同了，这才是人民所要’；惟有得到人民的支持，才能继续推动政改。”
这就是王先生所说的。。。。
我看了几次。。。。有点乱。。。。。。。
他说：。。。”过去数千年来引起社会动荡不安的因素不外乎是土地、宗教及种族，而我国就备受最后两项因素所困扰，因此首相纳吉一直从中寻觅平衡点，希望人民给予首相支持。“
怎样的平衡点？？？
再看下去：
他说： “首相必须得到人民的支持，以庞大的民意及力量告诉保守主义份子：‘这个时代已经不同了，这才是人民所要’；惟有得到人民的支持，才能继续推动政改。”
尤其是： “以庞大的民意及力量告诉保守主义份子：‘这个时代已经不同了。。。。”
王乃志如何去改变，去告诉保守主义份子呢？？？
（我望着头上的灯，有点。。。。茫茫然， 再看看天花板。。。。一片迷惘。。。。。）
看其言，听其话，知道。。。。。。他必失败收场！
如果以胡博士的才华，才能来看，来比， 强者如博士也 无疾恩而终。。。。。王先生将会如何呢？？？
一个字---“难”！！！
其实博士的曝光率还是蛮高的，王先生要学他的话。。。。。是可以的。
但是，那么忙，出席那么多活动，又如何可以带来改变呢？？？
博士忙着应付记者，搞PR，新年活动也出席，SATU MALAYSIA 活动要出席。。。。其实也没错！
但是， 这能够为华社带来改变吗？？？
作为政治秘书，尤其是首相的华裔政治秘书，要八面玲珑。 胡博士，做到了 “四面俱全”，但是还有四面做不到！！！
胡博士其实是好多人的偶像，大家希望他当一个最好的政治秘书，为华社带来新希望，可惜， 希望越高，失望也越大。
王先生其实可以说无法像胡博士那么“受欢迎”，也难怪，社会似乎也没有什么期望！！！
胡博士的黯然神伤，黯然离去，说明了首相华裔政治秘书由一个人去做，包死无疑。一定无法做得好！！！
像博士那么天才， 口得，说得，脑袋得， 知识爆棚， 场场活动也出席， 做工是100分， 但是，华社基本上失望，看不到改变。
王乃志， 还要来回吉隆坡--马六甲， 还要应酬，还有政务在身， 比 一条心的胡博士还“多姿多彩”。。。那就更难做到好了！！！
胡博士的黯然，其实也说明这个职位， 很难做得好！
像怎么重要的职位，一个人是无法胜任的， 八面玲珑根本不可能，简直就是笑话！！！！
要做到六六大顺，都难。。。。。
要耳听四方，我想胡博士也做不到，王乃志同样做不到！！！
能够做到的只是三花炼奶---有些甜，有些爽，有些味！！
老马年代， 到现在， 华裔政治秘书，新闻秘书。。。。。都让华社大跌眼镜。。。。无法让华社有信心！！
其实，盲点就是一个人根本无法完成任务，完成大任。
讲得不好听，基本的 正听，旁听，侧听，都很难传达。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。
还要协助实现华社心声心愿，简直是“水中月”啦！！！
其实。。。也很简单， 到 12月31日，看王乃志有何表现即知。。。。
不然， 看华人新年后（1月23日之后），才打分吧！
您再看看华社如今的看法。。。。冷的很。。。。冷待，冷眼看待。。。。。。。
要让华社有信心， 一个华裔政治秘书是不行的，博士才华出众，手腕了得。。。也黯然，也神伤！！
一个人是根本无法把华社那么多的问题，心愿传达。。。。还要应酬，交际，还要与新闻界，华商，华团打交道。。。。。。。
还要协助传达华团的问题，邀请首相开幕，剪綵。。。还要与首相全国跑。。。。。等下，还要迎接温家宝， 又有其他外交大官的活动。。。。。水灾，大灾难又要出席。。。。。华社的临教问题，教育问题。。。。多上多。。。。。各地大华团也要去邀请首相。。。。。。。。。。。。。记者，时不时来电挖料。。。。。你以为是三头六臂咩！！！！本身的问题不用理咩。。。。。
一个华裔首相政治秘书，其实，明眼人一看根本很难做得好。。。。。。。
在有限人力，有限时间下，要做得好，难上难！！！
像华裔首相政治秘书这种职位， 一个人是做不来的！！！要有要求，要让华社有信心，要让华社尊重，至少要两个到三个人来做，每个人有不同任务，负责不同的需要，才行呀！！！
胡博士黯然神伤， 大家从充满希望。。。。。到失望，到不抱希望。。。。。今天，王先生的处境是---一夫当关，而华社是根本不抱希望！！！
所以，大家看到华社是冷冷看待，一点也不出奇！！！！
VVVVVVVVVV
时事评论员胡逸山 受委纳吉华族政治秘书
(2009-06-28)
早报导读
[时事漫画] 大陆再强调 九二共识是协商“要害”
[中国早点] 明年看什么
[名家专评] 英成"欧洲剩女"和法德的"鱼兔婚姻"
[金融风暴] 欧元区若解体后果严重
名师支招：2周轻松搞定中学英语语法
（吉隆坡讯）马来西亚首相署消息证实，当地著名时事评论员胡逸山博士已受委为首相纳吉的华族政治秘书。
《星洲日报》报道，沙巴州首席部长慕沙阿曼向首相大力推荐胡逸山。目前胡逸山已开始执行首相政治秘书的工作。
现年35岁的胡逸山来自沙巴州亚庇，自幼学业及各方面的成绩都非常出色，14岁在建国中学毕业后，前往美国加州大学深造。他19岁考获三个学士（机械、航天工程及德国文学），接着两年內取得两个硕士（工学和国际工商管理），24岁获得法学博士，自小被赞誉为“神童”。
他目前是联合国紧急通讯工作队科学及法律顾问、沙巴大学和精英大学讲师，并经常在中文报章撰写时评文章，对国家政治与经济课题针砭时弊。
据悉，纳吉出任首相后，为监督国内各语文主流媒体的报道，设立了一支多人组成的媒体团队，纳吉原属意的华族政治秘书人选是大马翻译与创作协会长吴恒灿，但后来吴恒灿接手首要媒体集团（Media Prima group）顾问一职。
过去强烈批评国阵
一些评论界人士对上述消息感到很意外，因为胡逸山自3年前开始受邀上中文电视清谈节目作评论嘉宾后，也常常针对时事及政策写文章发表意见，而有留意他在电视上发表意见以及读过他的评论文章的人都会同意，他一直都在强烈地批判国阵的政策。
不过，他在《东方日报》最近推出的专题《卓越文化：全民寄望纳吉新团队》的访问中，已一改他以往一贯的批判口吻，对纳吉推崇有加。
《联合早报》
VVVVVVVVVV
林建德获任马来西亚新首相华裔政治秘书
http://www.enorth.com.cn 2003-11-05 14:52
马来西亚新首相巴达维的华裔政治秘书，将由马来西亚国际策略研究院研究员林建德博士出任。
据《光华日报》报道，39岁的林建德1992年至1997年期间，曾担任国际策略研究院总执行长兼主席丹斯里诺汀苏菲博士的研究员助理，研究范围包括东亚经济共策会、亚太经合论坛、东协、国际贸易与政治、国际政治经济，对国际政治与经济舞台拥有丰富的研究经验。
1998年，他考获英国牛津大学国际关系学博士学位。此外，他还于1999至2003年1月出任国际策略研究院高级分析员及客座研究员。
VVVVVVVVVVVV
传为迎接温家宝看板错误负责 胡逸山卸首相华裔政治秘书职
24-05-2011 13:20
特别报道！首相纳吉的华裔政治秘书胡逸山将在本月底结束任期，而外间传闻由于其表现不佳，加上迎接中国总理温家宝的看板出现语法错误，以致他卸下相关职务。
可靠消息告知《辣手网》，外间流传胡逸山（左图）卸下首相政治秘书一职，至于卸职原因则众说纷纭，其中一个说词则是他需为迎接温家宝造访大马的看板，华语语法出现严重「词不达意」一事负责，竟即该事件是压倒胡逸山的最后一根稻草。
胡逸山是在纳吉出任首相后，便成为其政治秘书，然而，他被指近来的表现被指不尽理想，尤其与华社的互动，加上迎接温家宝看板的错误，以致他一再面对批评。
首相的华裔政治秘书与新闻秘书，是在前首相马哈迪时期引用的，而这两个职位也一直保留至上任首相阿都拉，以及现任首相纳吉。
据悉，胡逸山目前正在休假，而他的任期至本月底结束，至于有机会「接棒」的人选则有3人。
吴恒灿或接任
据传最有可能接替胡逸山的人选是吴恒灿（右图），吴恒灿曾是民政党的领袖，目前则是由巫统控制的首要媒体集团主席的顾问。吴恒灿出线机率最高，主要是他目前与巫统的关系密切。
更有趣的是，吴恒灿是国内著名的翻译家，更是我国译创会会长，也曾是我国的华语规范理事会的成员，若真以他取代胡逸山，更能显得是与看板语法出错一事相关。另外两位人选则包括马华六甲市区前国会议员王乃志，以及前华裔青年运动活跃份子汪爱泉。
迎接温家宝看板词不达意
今年4月28日，温家宝于布城与纳吉见面，而出现在布城首相署外的迎接看板上，竟然出现「正式欢迎仪式，与他一起温家宝阁下的正式访问马来西亚」的字眼，进而被指有辱国体。
而相关事件也引起网民的嘲讽，首相署也表明欲找出错误的根源，並且需有人为此事负责任，虽传胡逸山需为此事负责任，但却仍未确定是否属实。
然而，胡逸山的华语造诣不错，之前也经常为报章撰写专栏，看板语法出错一事或未必全是他的责任，这更让坊间不排除他成了事件的「代罪羔羊」。
看胡博士黯然神伤，看历史教训， 王乃志难八面玲珑！！！
很多人读奇怪，为什么一位那么成功的博士也无法“做好”首相政治秘书的职位？
胡博士是天才：
“他是猛人講師”
“他是神童学者”
胡逸山博士來自沙巴，自幼学业及各方面的成绩都非常标青；十四岁在建国中学毕业后，前往美国加州大学深造，先后取得5个学位，包括航空工程、机械工程、法学博士、工商管理碩士及德國文学学士。天才真好，在那么短的時间可以学习到物理、法学、商课、文学不同领域的学问(不禁想起白素的父亲白老大..)。。。
过后胡逸山博士也受邀担任联合国紧急通讯工作队科学及法律顾问。数年前为了双亲也为了回馈祖国，毅然回流本地，目前分别在精英大学担任高级研究学者，及沙巴大学讲课。除了学术界，胡逸山目前也常常针对时事及政策发表意见及文章。
许多人都会问一个问题，博士都无法把“首相的政治秘书（华裔）做好吗？？？
那么，王乃志会胜任吗？？？
其实，是很难，真的很难。
看回胡博士， 他上任时，许许多多人， 国阵的人， 华社都有期望。
一年一年过去，一个月一个月过去了。。。。。。。。。。。。大家没有看到。。。变化。
再看下去。。。也没有变化。
博士，很忙，真的，在报纸上可以看到他出席很多活动。。。。但是活动只是工作的一种，能为。。。华社带来变化吗？？？
很难。
我曾出席语文出版局在成功时代广场举行的一项活动，主角是首相夫人。我见到胡博士，还有许子根（也是主角之一）。。。还有以前在中国报的同事秋花（当时是 赛芝的新闻秘书吧）。。。
胡博士真的很忙， 华社活动要参加。。。。首相的要去，首相夫人的也要去。。。。。
所以，一个人能够做什么，可以改变什么？？？
小小改变都难啦！！！大改变根本是不可能！！
王乃志期望以一个人，就能有改变。。。。。。。。。。。我说那是发梦。
听听他最近说了什么:
"....王乃志认为网际网络完全改变了沟通与生活方式，可从中可了解现代人的个人喜好及想法，除了可用以追女生外，当然也可制造缘份，争取选票。
不过，王乃志表示自己过去两三年来忙碌于律师事务所大小事务，因此迄今仍没有面子书口户头。“如今回来了(政治领域)，我将会设立一个户头，了解现代年轻人的想法及需求；让年轻人知道追女生之余，也得追知识。”
宗教种族扰民 首相找平衡点
刚上任首相政治秘书第4天的王乃志不忘在讲座会上分享对首相纳吉的看法；他分析，过去数千年来引起社会动荡不安的因素不外乎是土地、宗教及种族，而我国就备受最后两项因素所困扰，因此首相纳吉一直从中寻觅平衡点，希望人民给予首相支持。
他认为，无论在朝野政党，保守主义者无所不在，即使在友党内也难免会面对此问题，领导者将面对保守主义者带来的压力及冲突。“在这种环境下坚持改革，难道这不是我们所需要的吗？”
“首相必须得到人民的支持，以庞大的民意及力量告诉保守主义份子：‘这个时代已经不同了，这才是人民所要’；惟有得到人民的支持，才能继续推动政改。”
这就是王先生所说的。。。。
我看了几次。。。。有点乱。。。。。。。
他说：。。。”过去数千年来引起社会动荡不安的因素不外乎是土地、宗教及种族，而我国就备受最后两项因素所困扰，因此首相纳吉一直从中寻觅平衡点，希望人民给予首相支持。“
怎样的平衡点？？？
再看下去：
他说： “首相必须得到人民的支持，以庞大的民意及力量告诉保守主义份子：‘这个时代已经不同了，这才是人民所要’；惟有得到人民的支持，才能继续推动政改。”
尤其是： “以庞大的民意及力量告诉保守主义份子：‘这个时代已经不同了。。。。”
王乃志如何去改变，去告诉保守主义份子呢？？？
（我望着头上的灯，有点。。。。茫茫然， 再看看天花板。。。。一片迷惘。。。。。）
看其言，听其话，知道。。。。。。他必失败收场！
如果以胡博士的才华，才能来看，来比， 强者如博士也 无疾恩而终。。。。。王先生将会如何呢？？？
一个字---“难”！！！
其实博士的曝光率还是蛮高的，王先生要学他的话。。。。。是可以的。
但是，那么忙，出席那么多活动，又如何可以带来改变呢？？？
博士忙着应付记者，搞PR，新年活动也出席，SATU MALAYSIA 活动要出席。。。。其实也没错！
但是， 这能够为华社带来改变吗？？？
作为政治秘书，尤其是首相的华裔政治秘书，要八面玲珑。 胡博士，做到了 “四面俱全”，但是还有四面做不到！！！
胡博士其实是好多人的偶像，大家希望他当一个最好的政治秘书，为华社带来新希望，可惜， 希望越高，失望也越大。
王先生其实可以说无法像胡博士那么“受欢迎”，也难怪，社会似乎也没有什么期望！！！
胡博士的黯然神伤，黯然离去，说明了首相华裔政治秘书由一个人去做，包死无疑。一定无法做得好！！！
像博士那么天才， 口得，说得，脑袋得， 知识爆棚， 场场活动也出席， 做工是100分， 但是，华社基本上失望，看不到改变。
王乃志， 还要来回吉隆坡--马六甲， 还要应酬，还有政务在身， 比 一条心的胡博士还“多姿多彩”。。。那就更难做到好了！！！
胡博士的黯然，其实也说明这个职位， 很难做得好！
像怎么重要的职位，一个人是无法胜任的， 八面玲珑根本不可能，简直就是笑话！！！！
要做到六六大顺，都难。。。。。
要耳听四方，我想胡博士也做不到，王乃志同样做不到！！！
能够做到的只是三花炼奶---有些甜，有些爽，有些味！！
老马年代， 到现在， 华裔政治秘书，新闻秘书。。。。。都让华社大跌眼镜。。。。无法让华社有信心！！
其实，盲点就是一个人根本无法完成任务，完成大任。
讲得不好听，基本的 正听，旁听，侧听，都很难传达。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。
还要协助实现华社心声心愿，简直是“水中月”啦！！！
其实。。。也很简单， 到 12月31日，看王乃志有何表现即知。。。。
不然， 看华人新年后（1月23日之后），才打分吧！
您再看看华社如今的看法。。。。冷的很。。。。冷待，冷眼看待。。。。。。。
要让华社有信心， 一个华裔政治秘书是不行的，博士才华出众，手腕了得。。。也黯然，也神伤！！
一个人是根本无法把华社那么多的问题，心愿传达。。。。还要应酬，交际，还要与新闻界，华商，华团打交道。。。。。。。
还要协助传达华团的问题，邀请首相开幕，剪綵。。。还要与首相全国跑。。。。。等下，还要迎接温家宝， 又有其他外交大官的活动。。。。。水灾，大灾难又要出席。。。。。华社的临教问题，教育问题。。。。多上多。。。。。各地大华团也要去邀请首相。。。。。。。。。。。。。记者，时不时来电挖料。。。。。你以为是三头六臂咩！！！！本身的问题不用理咩。。。。。
一个华裔首相政治秘书，其实，明眼人一看根本很难做得好。。。。。。。
在有限人力，有限时间下，要做得好，难上难！！！
像华裔首相政治秘书这种职位， 一个人是做不来的！！！要有要求，要让华社有信心，要让华社尊重，至少要两个到三个人来做，每个人有不同任务，负责不同的需要，才行呀！！！
胡博士黯然神伤， 大家从充满希望。。。。。到失望，到不抱希望。。。。。今天，王先生的处境是---一夫当关，而华社是根本不抱希望！！！
所以，大家看到华社是冷冷看待，一点也不出奇！！！！
VVVVVVVVVV
时事评论员胡逸山 受委纳吉华族政治秘书
(2009-06-28)
早报导读
[时事漫画] 大陆再强调 九二共识是协商“要害”
[中国早点] 明年看什么
[名家专评] 英成"欧洲剩女"和法德的"鱼兔婚姻"
[金融风暴] 欧元区若解体后果严重
名师支招：2周轻松搞定中学英语语法
（吉隆坡讯）马来西亚首相署消息证实，当地著名时事评论员胡逸山博士已受委为首相纳吉的华族政治秘书。
《星洲日报》报道，沙巴州首席部长慕沙阿曼向首相大力推荐胡逸山。目前胡逸山已开始执行首相政治秘书的工作。
现年35岁的胡逸山来自沙巴州亚庇，自幼学业及各方面的成绩都非常出色，14岁在建国中学毕业后，前往美国加州大学深造。他19岁考获三个学士（机械、航天工程及德国文学），接着两年內取得两个硕士（工学和国际工商管理），24岁获得法学博士，自小被赞誉为“神童”。
他目前是联合国紧急通讯工作队科学及法律顾问、沙巴大学和精英大学讲师，并经常在中文报章撰写时评文章，对国家政治与经济课题针砭时弊。
据悉，纳吉出任首相后，为监督国内各语文主流媒体的报道，设立了一支多人组成的媒体团队，纳吉原属意的华族政治秘书人选是大马翻译与创作协会长吴恒灿，但后来吴恒灿接手首要媒体集团（Media Prima group）顾问一职。
过去强烈批评国阵
一些评论界人士对上述消息感到很意外，因为胡逸山自3年前开始受邀上中文电视清谈节目作评论嘉宾后，也常常针对时事及政策写文章发表意见，而有留意他在电视上发表意见以及读过他的评论文章的人都会同意，他一直都在强烈地批判国阵的政策。
不过，他在《东方日报》最近推出的专题《卓越文化：全民寄望纳吉新团队》的访问中，已一改他以往一贯的批判口吻，对纳吉推崇有加。
《联合早报》
VVVVVVVVVV
林建德获任马来西亚新首相华裔政治秘书
http://www.enorth.com.cn 2003-11-05 14:52
马来西亚新首相巴达维的华裔政治秘书，将由马来西亚国际策略研究院研究员林建德博士出任。
据《光华日报》报道，39岁的林建德1992年至1997年期间，曾担任国际策略研究院总执行长兼主席丹斯里诺汀苏菲博士的研究员助理，研究范围包括东亚经济共策会、亚太经合论坛、东协、国际贸易与政治、国际政治经济，对国际政治与经济舞台拥有丰富的研究经验。
1998年，他考获英国牛津大学国际关系学博士学位。此外，他还于1999至2003年1月出任国际策略研究院高级分析员及客座研究员。
VVVVVVVVVVVV
传为迎接温家宝看板错误负责 胡逸山卸首相华裔政治秘书职
24-05-2011 13:20
特别报道！首相纳吉的华裔政治秘书胡逸山将在本月底结束任期，而外间传闻由于其表现不佳，加上迎接中国总理温家宝的看板出现语法错误，以致他卸下相关职务。
可靠消息告知《辣手网》，外间流传胡逸山（左图）卸下首相政治秘书一职，至于卸职原因则众说纷纭，其中一个说词则是他需为迎接温家宝造访大马的看板，华语语法出现严重「词不达意」一事负责，竟即该事件是压倒胡逸山的最后一根稻草。
胡逸山是在纳吉出任首相后，便成为其政治秘书，然而，他被指近来的表现被指不尽理想，尤其与华社的互动，加上迎接温家宝看板的错误，以致他一再面对批评。
首相的华裔政治秘书与新闻秘书，是在前首相马哈迪时期引用的，而这两个职位也一直保留至上任首相阿都拉，以及现任首相纳吉。
据悉，胡逸山目前正在休假，而他的任期至本月底结束，至于有机会「接棒」的人选则有3人。
吴恒灿或接任
据传最有可能接替胡逸山的人选是吴恒灿（右图），吴恒灿曾是民政党的领袖，目前则是由巫统控制的首要媒体集团主席的顾问。吴恒灿出线机率最高，主要是他目前与巫统的关系密切。
更有趣的是，吴恒灿是国内著名的翻译家，更是我国译创会会长，也曾是我国的华语规范理事会的成员，若真以他取代胡逸山，更能显得是与看板语法出错一事相关。另外两位人选则包括马华六甲市区前国会议员王乃志，以及前华裔青年运动活跃份子汪爱泉。
迎接温家宝看板词不达意
今年4月28日，温家宝于布城与纳吉见面，而出现在布城首相署外的迎接看板上，竟然出现「正式欢迎仪式，与他一起温家宝阁下的正式访问马来西亚」的字眼，进而被指有辱国体。
而相关事件也引起网民的嘲讽，首相署也表明欲找出错误的根源，並且需有人为此事负责任，虽传胡逸山需为此事负责任，但却仍未确定是否属实。
然而，胡逸山的华语造诣不错，之前也经常为报章撰写专栏，看板语法出错一事或未必全是他的责任，这更让坊间不排除他成了事件的「代罪羔羊」。
马华敦拉萨镇区会主席周连琼揭发不法集团伎俩时，特地出示真假表格，呼吁公众须辨清真假，提高警惕避免堕入不法之徒圈套
冒现假援助金表格
头条图片 2011-12-14 17:37
为月入3000令吉以下而派的500令吉“一个大马人民援助金”，竟传出有伪假表格在市面流窜的消息，马华目前已接获至少三起投诉。
马华敦拉萨镇区会主席周连琼揭发不法集团伎俩时，特地出示真假表格，呼吁公众须辨清真假，提高警惕避免堕入不法之徒圈套!
头条图片 2011-12-14 17:37
为月入3000令吉以下而派的500令吉“一个大马人民援助金”，竟传出有伪假表格在市面流窜的消息，马华目前已接获至少三起投诉。
马华敦拉萨镇区会主席周连琼揭发不法集团伎俩时，特地出示真假表格，呼吁公众须辨清真假，提高警惕避免堕入不法之徒圈套!
馬華為壯大士氣、重新啟航，以及招收新血，馬華“風雨同路，與你同在”工委會訂於本月18日（星期日）舉辦集會及迎接新黨員議式，馬華總會長拿督斯里蔡細歷醫生將主持開幕及多位著名政治家受邀主講，歡迎公眾出席。
壯大士氣重新啟航‧馬華後日迎接新黨員
國內 2011-12-15 19:07
（吉隆坡15日訊）馬華為壯大士氣、重新啟航，以及招收新血，馬華“風雨同路，與你同在”工委會訂於本月18日（星期日）舉辦集會及迎接新黨員議式，馬華總會長拿督斯里蔡細歷醫生將主持開幕及多位著名政治家受邀主講，歡迎公眾出席。
有關活動將於將於本月18日（星期日）下午1時在隆芙大道8公里的Nouvell e酒店舉行，主講嘉賓包括陳智銘國會議員、安華前政治秘書依桑上議員及鄭有文講師。
主辦當局也將在現場招收新黨員，有意加入者可攜帶身份證副本和2張護照型相片申請。任何詳情請聯絡工委會主席黃楠洋（手機：019-3272366）或總協調陳浩坤（手機：013-7939999）。
另一方面，工委會當天也將設立拒台協助出席者申請“一個大馬援助金”，有意申請者請攜帶相關資料前往。
（星洲日報）
國內 2011-12-15 19:07
（吉隆坡15日訊）馬華為壯大士氣、重新啟航，以及招收新血，馬華“風雨同路，與你同在”工委會訂於本月18日（星期日）舉辦集會及迎接新黨員議式，馬華總會長拿督斯里蔡細歷醫生將主持開幕及多位著名政治家受邀主講，歡迎公眾出席。
有關活動將於將於本月18日（星期日）下午1時在隆芙大道8公里的Nouvell e酒店舉行，主講嘉賓包括陳智銘國會議員、安華前政治秘書依桑上議員及鄭有文講師。
主辦當局也將在現場招收新黨員，有意加入者可攜帶身份證副本和2張護照型相片申請。任何詳情請聯絡工委會主席黃楠洋（手機：019-3272366）或總協調陳浩坤（手機：013-7939999）。
另一方面，工委會當天也將設立拒台協助出席者申請“一個大馬援助金”，有意申請者請攜帶相關資料前往。
（星洲日報）
Wednesday, December 14, 2011
如果我們希望下一代能比上一代強，就要給他們空間、給他們自由、讓他們作主；真正的「創意」和「突破」，往往是這樣來的。
兒孫自有兒孫福
如果我們希望下一代能比上一代強，就要給他們空間、給他們自由、讓他們作主；真正的「創意」和「突破」，往往是這樣來的。
記得我以前在美國大學的國畫班上，有個美術系的學生，起初上課非常認真，一板一眼照我規定的去做；但是當他學會了國畫的基本筆法，就不再臨摹，而東一筆、西一筆地亂塗，我當時很為他惋惜，覺得他如果照傳統方法苦練，一定能成很好的國畫家。幾年之後，我接到他畫展的請帖，走進會場，才發覺自己錯了，他對了！因為他把中國畫的技巧，融入了他的繪畫當中，那確實不再是國畫，卻是「他」的畫！就藝術創作而言，什麼能比表現自己的獨特風格更重要呢。
從那天開始，我常想，中國式的教育，在嚴格的管束下，是不是忽略了孩子自己的感覺？
尤其是今天，孩子都少，都寵得像寶，「你該喝水了！免得流汗太多，上火。」「你該吃水果了，免得便秘！」「你該吃這個菜，少吃那個菜，因為這菜比較營養！」「你該脫一件衣服！天熱了！」「你應該換蓋厚被了，天涼了！」「你該念書了，是不是後天要考試？」想想看！有多少父母不是這樣叮囑孩子？
問題是，孩子也是人，他難道不知冷、不知餓？不曉得穿衣、吃飯？十幾年這樣「伺候」下來，那天生的本能，只怕反而變得遲鈍了！我們一方面用無微不至、不必孩子操心的方法去帶他，一方面又希望他能成為獨立思考、有為有守的人。這樣的教育，能成功嗎？
更嚴重的問題是，被這樣帶大的孩子，已經失去「作主」的能力；遇到問題，他不自己面對、解決，卻退到父母的身後，等「大人」幫忙。
連上大學，都可以看到許多「大孩子」，在比他矮一個頭的老媽帶領下註冊。跟這樣的「男生」或「女生」談戀愛，你能放心嗎？
你能確定他說出的話代表他自己，他作的「允諾」必然會實現嗎？
基於這個原因，我在兒子還很小的時候，就製造機會，要他作主。他要買電腦，我教他自己看資料、打電話，討價還價。碰到問題，我要他自己打免費諮詢專線，一項項跟人討論。有時候，他來問我，我甚至故意裝傻：「對不起！老爸不懂！你自己看著辦，自己決定吧！」
我也早早為他開了信用卡和銀行戶頭，存了一筆不算少的錢進去，然後對他說：「如果我發現你亂花，以後就別指望我給你更多錢。相反的，如果我發現你很懂理財，則可能以後把大筆的錢交給你管！」我發現，他愈獲得尊重，愈會自重。尤其要緊的，是他學會了自負盈虧，也學會了負責。
當我念研究所時，有位教授說得好，「研究所教你作學問的方法，但不教你思考。思考，是你自己的事。」
我覺得這何必等研究所？當孩子小的時候，我們已經應該教他；至少我們可以教他怎麼思考，而不直接幫他作答。
每個人有他自己的看法，他是獨立的個人，憑什麼要求人人的答案一樣呢？
只要他思考的方法正確，看法不偏激，又經過他自己的反覆辯證，就應該被尊重。自己的決定，自己負責，這是天經地義的事！
就算他錯了，失敗了！也是他自己的失敗，必須由他自己汲取教訓。
他有他的世界，要面對他的戰鬥，再強的父母，也不可能保護子女一輩子啊！你愈希望他禁得起打擊，愈要教他早早用自己的腳去站立。
文章取自劉墉
如果我們希望下一代能比上一代強，就要給他們空間、給他們自由、讓他們作主；真正的「創意」和「突破」，往往是這樣來的。
記得我以前在美國大學的國畫班上，有個美術系的學生，起初上課非常認真，一板一眼照我規定的去做；但是當他學會了國畫的基本筆法，就不再臨摹，而東一筆、西一筆地亂塗，我當時很為他惋惜，覺得他如果照傳統方法苦練，一定能成很好的國畫家。幾年之後，我接到他畫展的請帖，走進會場，才發覺自己錯了，他對了！因為他把中國畫的技巧，融入了他的繪畫當中，那確實不再是國畫，卻是「他」的畫！就藝術創作而言，什麼能比表現自己的獨特風格更重要呢。
從那天開始，我常想，中國式的教育，在嚴格的管束下，是不是忽略了孩子自己的感覺？
尤其是今天，孩子都少，都寵得像寶，「你該喝水了！免得流汗太多，上火。」「你該吃水果了，免得便秘！」「你該吃這個菜，少吃那個菜，因為這菜比較營養！」「你該脫一件衣服！天熱了！」「你應該換蓋厚被了，天涼了！」「你該念書了，是不是後天要考試？」想想看！有多少父母不是這樣叮囑孩子？
問題是，孩子也是人，他難道不知冷、不知餓？不曉得穿衣、吃飯？十幾年這樣「伺候」下來，那天生的本能，只怕反而變得遲鈍了！我們一方面用無微不至、不必孩子操心的方法去帶他，一方面又希望他能成為獨立思考、有為有守的人。這樣的教育，能成功嗎？
更嚴重的問題是，被這樣帶大的孩子，已經失去「作主」的能力；遇到問題，他不自己面對、解決，卻退到父母的身後，等「大人」幫忙。
連上大學，都可以看到許多「大孩子」，在比他矮一個頭的老媽帶領下註冊。跟這樣的「男生」或「女生」談戀愛，你能放心嗎？
你能確定他說出的話代表他自己，他作的「允諾」必然會實現嗎？
基於這個原因，我在兒子還很小的時候，就製造機會，要他作主。他要買電腦，我教他自己看資料、打電話，討價還價。碰到問題，我要他自己打免費諮詢專線，一項項跟人討論。有時候，他來問我，我甚至故意裝傻：「對不起！老爸不懂！你自己看著辦，自己決定吧！」
我也早早為他開了信用卡和銀行戶頭，存了一筆不算少的錢進去，然後對他說：「如果我發現你亂花，以後就別指望我給你更多錢。相反的，如果我發現你很懂理財，則可能以後把大筆的錢交給你管！」我發現，他愈獲得尊重，愈會自重。尤其要緊的，是他學會了自負盈虧，也學會了負責。
當我念研究所時，有位教授說得好，「研究所教你作學問的方法，但不教你思考。思考，是你自己的事。」
我覺得這何必等研究所？當孩子小的時候，我們已經應該教他；至少我們可以教他怎麼思考，而不直接幫他作答。
每個人有他自己的看法，他是獨立的個人，憑什麼要求人人的答案一樣呢？
只要他思考的方法正確，看法不偏激，又經過他自己的反覆辯證，就應該被尊重。自己的決定，自己負責，這是天經地義的事！
就算他錯了，失敗了！也是他自己的失敗，必須由他自己汲取教訓。
他有他的世界，要面對他的戰鬥，再強的父母，也不可能保護子女一輩子啊！你愈希望他禁得起打擊，愈要教他早早用自己的腳去站立。
文章取自劉墉
flood at Tun Razak Road and idiot smart tunnel----shames of the nation, forever
Chaos as floods strike KL's Jalan Tun Razak
Traffic in downtown Kuala Lumpur is in a gridlock due to flash floods along Jalan Tun Razak during rush hour following heavy downpour.
The floods had left the entrance to the National Library inundated with flood waters. It is understood that the waters also reached theBernama headquarters nearby.
Jalan Tun Razak is a major traffic artery that leads to the major urban areas of Cheras, Sungai Besi, Kajang and Seremban.
The area is not known to be prone to flooding. Just last week, downtown Kajang was hit by heavy flash floods - the worse since 1971.
Meanwhile, Bernama reports that in Jalan Semarak, 23 children, aged between three months and nine years, as well as three nursery teachers, had to be rescued by the Fire and Rescue squad after the Bonus River overflowed and caused the nursery to be submerged under 1.5 metres of flood water.
A Kuala Lumpur Fire and Rescue Department spokesperson said rescue squads from Jelatek and Jinjang fire stations were deployed to take the children out of the premises using a boat.
“Twenty students of a multimedia college located next to the nursery were also evacuated to a higher ground,” he said. A nursery teacher, Rodiah Yahya, 28, when met said flood waters rose in just a matter of minutes and forced her to confine the children on the upper level of the nursery to prevent untoward incidents.
“The flood waters reached the chest level. Luckily, we have confined the children on the second floor. We also managed to rescue some of our stuff and after waiting for half an hour, the firemen finally came to our rescue,” she said.
Meanwhile, part of Jalan Tun Razak near the National Library were also inundated by flood waters causing thousands of vehicles to be stuck in massive traffic jams.
Acting Kuala Lumpur Traffic chief Supt Rusli Mohd Noor said other roads affected by the flash floods were Jalan Kuching, whole area of Taman Wahyu, Dato Onn roundabout near Bank Rakyat and Air Panas People’s Housing Project (PPR) areas. However, he said all roads were accessible after the flood waters subsided at 7pm.
*************************************************
The 13th December 2011 starts a beginning of a new chapter in the life of Sultan Abdul Halim as the 14th Agong. A second time round for Tuanku. A sincere, humble and respected Royalty deserve such honour.
As a citizen of this country, I pray that Tuanku will continue to be strong willed and courageous to put your foot down against the tyrants who are bent on controlling the people through rushed bills, unlawful laws, racial and religion disharmony.
As we celebrate this memorable day, we are also given the strongest hint by Allah on what to expect soon. The flooding of Jalan Tun Razak.
As we all know we have built a very expensive tunnel named Smart Tunnel (RM2.8 billion), and it cost us RM20 million maintenance per year. This tunnel is the brain child of Mahathir Kutty. Now knowing Mahathir and his 300% commission, we can expect something terrible soon due to cutting cost of materials used in the construction of this smart tunnel and poor maintenance (this will be reveal soon.)
Now you want to know why it is called Smart tunnel? You see every time it rains it closes at both ends of the tunnel. Reason given is that this particular tunnel hates rain. So the minute it rains the tunnel closes by itself. So if you happen to be unlucky that day, you are sure of being hole up in the tunnel with no oxygen to breathe. So basically you are considered buried alive. So matilah. That is why many people like me, do not use the smart tunnel.
http://malaysiaflipflop.blogspot.com/2011/12/one-start-new-beginning-another-starts.html
Traffic in downtown Kuala Lumpur is in a gridlock due to flash floods along Jalan Tun Razak during rush hour following heavy downpour.
The floods had left the entrance to the National Library inundated with flood waters. It is understood that the waters also reached theBernama headquarters nearby.
Jalan Tun Razak is a major traffic artery that leads to the major urban areas of Cheras, Sungai Besi, Kajang and Seremban.
The area is not known to be prone to flooding. Just last week, downtown Kajang was hit by heavy flash floods - the worse since 1971.
Meanwhile, Bernama reports that in Jalan Semarak, 23 children, aged between three months and nine years, as well as three nursery teachers, had to be rescued by the Fire and Rescue squad after the Bonus River overflowed and caused the nursery to be submerged under 1.5 metres of flood water.
A Kuala Lumpur Fire and Rescue Department spokesperson said rescue squads from Jelatek and Jinjang fire stations were deployed to take the children out of the premises using a boat.
“Twenty students of a multimedia college located next to the nursery were also evacuated to a higher ground,” he said. A nursery teacher, Rodiah Yahya, 28, when met said flood waters rose in just a matter of minutes and forced her to confine the children on the upper level of the nursery to prevent untoward incidents.
“The flood waters reached the chest level. Luckily, we have confined the children on the second floor. We also managed to rescue some of our stuff and after waiting for half an hour, the firemen finally came to our rescue,” she said.
Meanwhile, part of Jalan Tun Razak near the National Library were also inundated by flood waters causing thousands of vehicles to be stuck in massive traffic jams.
Acting Kuala Lumpur Traffic chief Supt Rusli Mohd Noor said other roads affected by the flash floods were Jalan Kuching, whole area of Taman Wahyu, Dato Onn roundabout near Bank Rakyat and Air Panas People’s Housing Project (PPR) areas. However, he said all roads were accessible after the flood waters subsided at 7pm.
*************************************************
The 13th December 2011 starts a beginning of a new chapter in the life of Sultan Abdul Halim as the 14th Agong. A second time round for Tuanku. A sincere, humble and respected Royalty deserve such honour.
As a citizen of this country, I pray that Tuanku will continue to be strong willed and courageous to put your foot down against the tyrants who are bent on controlling the people through rushed bills, unlawful laws, racial and religion disharmony.
As we celebrate this memorable day, we are also given the strongest hint by Allah on what to expect soon. The flooding of Jalan Tun Razak.
As we all know we have built a very expensive tunnel named Smart Tunnel (RM2.8 billion), and it cost us RM20 million maintenance per year. This tunnel is the brain child of Mahathir Kutty. Now knowing Mahathir and his 300% commission, we can expect something terrible soon due to cutting cost of materials used in the construction of this smart tunnel and poor maintenance (this will be reveal soon.)
Now you want to know why it is called Smart tunnel? You see every time it rains it closes at both ends of the tunnel. Reason given is that this particular tunnel hates rain. So the minute it rains the tunnel closes by itself. So if you happen to be unlucky that day, you are sure of being hole up in the tunnel with no oxygen to breathe. So basically you are considered buried alive. So matilah. That is why many people like me, do not use the smart tunnel.
http://malaysiaflipflop.blogspot.com/2011/12/one-start-new-beginning-another-starts.html
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
Standar pelayanan rumah sakit di Indonesia perlu ditingkatkan. Makin baik pelayanan, makin enggan pula masyarakat Indonesia berobat ke luar negeri
Sultan Hamengkubuwono X: Jadikan Pasien RS Seperti Keluarga
OLEH OLIVIA LEWI PRAMESTI | 12-12-2011 | http://ngi.cc/nD6 | KESEHATAN
Standar pelayanan rumah sakit di Indonesia perlu ditingkatkan. Makin baik pelayanan, makin enggan pula masyarakat Indonesia berobat ke luar negeri.
"Saat ini keinginan masyarakat Indonesia berobat ke luar negeri sangat tinggi. Ketidakpuasan akan layanan dalam negeri sangat terlihat di sini,"papar Gubernur DIY, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X dalam acara peresmian pelayanan diagnostik invasif dan intervensi non bedah jantung vaskuler dan jembatan penghubung RSIP Dr. Sardjito-FK UGM, Senin (12/12), di RS. Sardjito, Yogyakarta.
Sultan mengatakan, saat ini pelayanan RS luar negeri yang menjadi rujukan masyarakat Indonesia adalah Singapura, Malaysia, dan Cina. Melihat hal tersebut, lanjut Sultan, Indonesia mesti belajar dari pelayanan yang diberikan oleh negara - negara tersebut.
Pendekatan personal, kata Sultan, adalah satu kunci keberhasilannya. Merawat pasien seperti keluarga sendiri menjadikan pasien memberikan kepercayaan pada tenaga medis. Para dokter pun perlu memberikan keleluasaan kepada pasien untuk berkomunikasi atas penyakitnya.
"Pendekatan personal perlu dibarengi pula dengan pemutakhiran peralatan medis serta penanganan medis yang baik,"papar Sultan.
Sultan menambahkan aspek lain yang mempengaruhi kepercayaan masyarakat akan layanan RS Indonesia adalah keramahtamahan, empati yang tinggi, medical treatment yang memuaskan, serta dukungan asuransi untuk warga miskin. Dirinya melanjutkan, untuk mencapai standar kualitas RS yang baik, maka dibutuhkan kerjasama dan transparansi stakeholder dalam meningkatkan mutu pasien.
OLEH OLIVIA LEWI PRAMESTI | 12-12-2011 | http://ngi.cc/nD6 | KESEHATAN
Standar pelayanan rumah sakit di Indonesia perlu ditingkatkan. Makin baik pelayanan, makin enggan pula masyarakat Indonesia berobat ke luar negeri.
"Saat ini keinginan masyarakat Indonesia berobat ke luar negeri sangat tinggi. Ketidakpuasan akan layanan dalam negeri sangat terlihat di sini,"papar Gubernur DIY, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X dalam acara peresmian pelayanan diagnostik invasif dan intervensi non bedah jantung vaskuler dan jembatan penghubung RSIP Dr. Sardjito-FK UGM, Senin (12/12), di RS. Sardjito, Yogyakarta.
Sultan mengatakan, saat ini pelayanan RS luar negeri yang menjadi rujukan masyarakat Indonesia adalah Singapura, Malaysia, dan Cina. Melihat hal tersebut, lanjut Sultan, Indonesia mesti belajar dari pelayanan yang diberikan oleh negara - negara tersebut.
Pendekatan personal, kata Sultan, adalah satu kunci keberhasilannya. Merawat pasien seperti keluarga sendiri menjadikan pasien memberikan kepercayaan pada tenaga medis. Para dokter pun perlu memberikan keleluasaan kepada pasien untuk berkomunikasi atas penyakitnya.
"Pendekatan personal perlu dibarengi pula dengan pemutakhiran peralatan medis serta penanganan medis yang baik,"papar Sultan.
Sultan menambahkan aspek lain yang mempengaruhi kepercayaan masyarakat akan layanan RS Indonesia adalah keramahtamahan, empati yang tinggi, medical treatment yang memuaskan, serta dukungan asuransi untuk warga miskin. Dirinya melanjutkan, untuk mencapai standar kualitas RS yang baik, maka dibutuhkan kerjasama dan transparansi stakeholder dalam meningkatkan mutu pasien.
“Adalah jelas bahawa CPB2011 yang digubal secara ‘cincai’ mempunyai sifat-sifat ‘big borther’ (gelaran dipopularkan oleh George Orwell dalam novelnya, ’1984′) untuk mengawasi pergerakan setiap rakyat,”
Kreativiti komputer, internet bukan hanya daripada mereka yang berijazah sahaja
12 December 2011
KUALA LUMPUR, 12 DIS – Kerajaan Malaysia memilih langkah mundur dengan cadangan mahu ‘mengikat’ pakar-pakar komputer dengan Rang Undang-undang Lembaga Juru Komputer Profesional 2011 (CPB2011) yang akan mengawal mereka.
Setiausaha Publisiti DAP Kebangsaan Tony Pua berkata, rang undang-undang itu bertentangan dengan jJaminan kebebasan Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC).
Katanya, jaminan MSC telah menjanjikan peluang pekerjaan tanpa sekatan kepada sesiapa sahaja yang berkebolehan dan juga tiada sekatan internet.
Menurutnya, Seksyen 3(3) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 juga menegaskan bahawa tiada satu peruntukan pun yang membenarkan sebarang penapisan maklumat berlaku.
“Sejak berdekad-dekad teknologi informasi dan industri perkomputeran telah beroperasi tanpa sebarang kontroversi, isu-isu atau pun rintangan.
“Adalah jelas bahawa CPB2011 yang digubal secara ‘cincai’ mempunyai sifat-sifat ‘big borther’ (gelaran dipopularkan oleh George Orwell dalam novelnya, ’1984′) untuk mengawasi pergerakan setiap rakyat,” katanya dalam satu kenyataan.
Pua berkata, CPB2011 akan membantutkan hak dan pengetahuan pakar perkomputeran dengan memaksa mereka mendaftar diri dengan Infrastruktur Maklumat Negara Kritikal (CNII).
“CNII ditakrifkan sebagai ‘aset-aset, sistem-sistem dan fungsi-fungsi penting kepada negara yang mana kemusnahannya boleh menyebabkan kesan sangat buruk kepada kekuatan ekonomi, imej, pertahanan dan keselamatan, keupayaan kerajaan untuk berfungsi atau kesihatan dan keselamatan rakyat.
“Apa yang lebih menakutkan ialah CPB2011 juga meliputi semua laman web, portal atau aplikasi teknologi yang berkemungkinan memburukkan ‘imej negara,’ dan yang dianggap mengganggu ‘keupayaan kerajaan untuk berfungsi’,” katanya dalam satu kenyataan.
Pua yang juga Ahli Parlimen Petaling jaya Utara berkata demikian sebagai respon kepada draf CPB2011 yang disediakan oleh Kementerian Sains, Teknologi, dan Inovasi (MOSTI).
MOSTI dalam satu kenyataan 9 Disember lalu menyatakan CPB2011 tidak bermatlamat untuk menyekat atau mengawal atur perkhidmatan perkomputeran dan ia cuma terhad kepada CNII.
Bagaimana pun, Pua berkata, CPB2011 bakal memberi kerosakan buruk yang berleluasa kerana wujudnya elemen memaksa melalui pendaftaran.
DAP menentang CPB2011 atas prinsip bahawa kejuruteraan perisian secara asas memerlukan kebebasan, kepintaran dan kreativiti yang tidak semestinya boleh diperolehi daripada mereka yang mempunyai ijazah.
Sewaktu merasmikan Konvensyen DAP Pulau Pinang semalam, Setiausaha Agung DAP Lim Guan Eng mempersoalkan cadangan kerajaan yang cuba mengawal kebebasan kreativiti pakar teknologi maklumat.
“Adakah para pakar dan ikon dalam industri IT seperti Steve Jobs (Apple), Bill Gates (Microsoft) dan Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook) boleh berjaya jika terwujud undang-undang yang sebegini?
“Tindakan yang langsung tidak masuk akal dan bersifat mundur ini lantas menimbulkan soalan adakah kerajaan BN ingin mengawal maklumat dan penggunaan internet?” soal beliau. – Roketkini.com
12 December 2011
KUALA LUMPUR, 12 DIS – Kerajaan Malaysia memilih langkah mundur dengan cadangan mahu ‘mengikat’ pakar-pakar komputer dengan Rang Undang-undang Lembaga Juru Komputer Profesional 2011 (CPB2011) yang akan mengawal mereka.
Setiausaha Publisiti DAP Kebangsaan Tony Pua berkata, rang undang-undang itu bertentangan dengan jJaminan kebebasan Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC).
Katanya, jaminan MSC telah menjanjikan peluang pekerjaan tanpa sekatan kepada sesiapa sahaja yang berkebolehan dan juga tiada sekatan internet.
Menurutnya, Seksyen 3(3) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 juga menegaskan bahawa tiada satu peruntukan pun yang membenarkan sebarang penapisan maklumat berlaku.
“Sejak berdekad-dekad teknologi informasi dan industri perkomputeran telah beroperasi tanpa sebarang kontroversi, isu-isu atau pun rintangan.
“Adalah jelas bahawa CPB2011 yang digubal secara ‘cincai’ mempunyai sifat-sifat ‘big borther’ (gelaran dipopularkan oleh George Orwell dalam novelnya, ’1984′) untuk mengawasi pergerakan setiap rakyat,” katanya dalam satu kenyataan.
Pua berkata, CPB2011 akan membantutkan hak dan pengetahuan pakar perkomputeran dengan memaksa mereka mendaftar diri dengan Infrastruktur Maklumat Negara Kritikal (CNII).
“CNII ditakrifkan sebagai ‘aset-aset, sistem-sistem dan fungsi-fungsi penting kepada negara yang mana kemusnahannya boleh menyebabkan kesan sangat buruk kepada kekuatan ekonomi, imej, pertahanan dan keselamatan, keupayaan kerajaan untuk berfungsi atau kesihatan dan keselamatan rakyat.
“Apa yang lebih menakutkan ialah CPB2011 juga meliputi semua laman web, portal atau aplikasi teknologi yang berkemungkinan memburukkan ‘imej negara,’ dan yang dianggap mengganggu ‘keupayaan kerajaan untuk berfungsi’,” katanya dalam satu kenyataan.
Pua yang juga Ahli Parlimen Petaling jaya Utara berkata demikian sebagai respon kepada draf CPB2011 yang disediakan oleh Kementerian Sains, Teknologi, dan Inovasi (MOSTI).
MOSTI dalam satu kenyataan 9 Disember lalu menyatakan CPB2011 tidak bermatlamat untuk menyekat atau mengawal atur perkhidmatan perkomputeran dan ia cuma terhad kepada CNII.
Bagaimana pun, Pua berkata, CPB2011 bakal memberi kerosakan buruk yang berleluasa kerana wujudnya elemen memaksa melalui pendaftaran.
DAP menentang CPB2011 atas prinsip bahawa kejuruteraan perisian secara asas memerlukan kebebasan, kepintaran dan kreativiti yang tidak semestinya boleh diperolehi daripada mereka yang mempunyai ijazah.
Sewaktu merasmikan Konvensyen DAP Pulau Pinang semalam, Setiausaha Agung DAP Lim Guan Eng mempersoalkan cadangan kerajaan yang cuba mengawal kebebasan kreativiti pakar teknologi maklumat.
“Adakah para pakar dan ikon dalam industri IT seperti Steve Jobs (Apple), Bill Gates (Microsoft) dan Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook) boleh berjaya jika terwujud undang-undang yang sebegini?
“Tindakan yang langsung tidak masuk akal dan bersifat mundur ini lantas menimbulkan soalan adakah kerajaan BN ingin mengawal maklumat dan penggunaan internet?” soal beliau. – Roketkini.com
大馬、歐洲及澳洲環境組織及活躍人士今日要求大馬政府逮捕砂拉越州首長丹斯里泰益瑪目及他的13名涉嫌捲入巨款貪污案的親戚。
環境組織吁政府逮捕砂州首長
大馬 2011-12-13 15:39
（吉隆坡13日訊）大馬、歐洲及澳洲環境組織及活躍人士今日要求大馬政府逮捕砂拉越州首長丹斯里泰益瑪目及他的13名涉嫌捲入巨款貪污案的親戚。
這些組織包括綠色和平（Greenpeace）及布魯諾曼梳基金會（Swiss-based Bruno Manser Fund），它們皆向政府發表一封信函，要求政府立即逮捕自1981年就成為砂拉越首長的泰益瑪目。
這封由17個非政府組織及活躍分子簽署的信函，除了指控泰益瑪目非法佔有公共基金和土地，還指他濫用職權、欺詐、洗黑錢及有成立非法組織的陰謀。（星洲互動）
大馬 2011-12-13 15:39
（吉隆坡13日訊）大馬、歐洲及澳洲環境組織及活躍人士今日要求大馬政府逮捕砂拉越州首長丹斯里泰益瑪目及他的13名涉嫌捲入巨款貪污案的親戚。
這些組織包括綠色和平（Greenpeace）及布魯諾曼梳基金會（Swiss-based Bruno Manser Fund），它們皆向政府發表一封信函，要求政府立即逮捕自1981年就成為砂拉越首長的泰益瑪目。
這封由17個非政府組織及活躍分子簽署的信函，除了指控泰益瑪目非法佔有公共基金和土地，還指他濫用職權、欺詐、洗黑錢及有成立非法組織的陰謀。（星洲互動）
Monday, December 12, 2011
北京、上海、香港等21城市消協組織對三大電訊商的霸王行為集體批評，指擅自扣費「無異於明搶暗盜」。 很多消費者常發現手機被莫名其妙地扣費，一查才知道被運營商擅自開通了增值服務。
21城市抨擊電訊商搶錢
兩岸 2011-12-13 10:34
北京、上海、香港等21城市消協組織對三大電訊商的霸王行為集體批評，指擅自扣費「無異於明搶暗盜」。
很多消費者常發現手機被莫名其妙地扣費，一查才知道被運營商擅自開通了增值服務。
「手機報1個月免費體驗」……贈送服務到期後，未經同意即延續服務並扣費，或擅自開通收費服務項目，這是昨天21城市消協組織重點抨擊的一個霸王行為。
21城市消協組織在城市消費維權論壇上點評指出，消費者必須明確定制後服務才成立，未經確認就擅自扣費涉嫌侵犯知情權、自主選擇權和公平交易權，「無異於明搶暗盜」，扣費行為應是無效。
消協負責人還認為，如果服
除了擅自扣費，其他兩個霸王行為是：對預付費手機設置話費有效期、充值卡餘額不退。
21城市消協組織認為，移動、聯通、電信這3大電訊運營商利用強勢地位侵犯消費者權益依然存在，「屢說不改」。
（新京報）
VVVVVVVV
马来西亚的电讯商。。。。。
也是称王称霸。。。。。。。。。。。。。。
开放吧
让更多电讯公司，全球的电讯公司来马来西亚开设电讯公司。。。。。。。。。。。
对目前的几家电讯公司。。。。。。。。。。。很讨厌。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。
独霸。。。。吃定消费者！！！！！！！
兩岸 2011-12-13 10:34
北京、上海、香港等21城市消協組織對三大電訊商的霸王行為集體批評，指擅自扣費「無異於明搶暗盜」。
很多消費者常發現手機被莫名其妙地扣費，一查才知道被運營商擅自開通了增值服務。
「手機報1個月免費體驗」……贈送服務到期後，未經同意即延續服務並扣費，或擅自開通收費服務項目，這是昨天21城市消協組織重點抨擊的一個霸王行為。
21城市消協組織在城市消費維權論壇上點評指出，消費者必須明確定制後服務才成立，未經確認就擅自扣費涉嫌侵犯知情權、自主選擇權和公平交易權，「無異於明搶暗盜」，扣費行為應是無效。
消協負責人還認為，如果服
除了擅自扣費，其他兩個霸王行為是：對預付費手機設置話費有效期、充值卡餘額不退。
21城市消協組織認為，移動、聯通、電信這3大電訊運營商利用強勢地位侵犯消費者權益依然存在，「屢說不改」。
（新京報）
VVVVVVVV
马来西亚的电讯商。。。。。
也是称王称霸。。。。。。。。。。。。。。
开放吧
让更多电讯公司，全球的电讯公司来马来西亚开设电讯公司。。。。。。。。。。。
对目前的几家电讯公司。。。。。。。。。。。很讨厌。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。
独霸。。。。吃定消费者！！！！！！！
校車超載撞車----学生车公会要求30年以上学生车可以继续行驶。。。。是草菅人命吗？？？？？？？
娃娃車9人座擠64人 撞車釀20亡
超載故障違規 大陸交通頻帶血
大陸今年交通事故頻傳，今再傳幼稚園校車超載撞車，至少20名幼兒命喪九泉。回顧溫州動車事故、上海地鐵追撞，不是信號故障就是違規發《詳全文》
甘肅娃娃車卡車相撞 19死
大陸甘肅省16日上午發生一起疑似超載的幼稚園校車與卡車相撞事故，截至發稿為止已有19人死亡，其中17名為幼兒。《詳全文》
黑校車 陸農村兒童別無選擇
對中國大陸農村的兒童來說，步行上學太遠，又缺乏基礎公共交通工具，本應是福利的校車無法遍及鄉間。除非放棄受教育的權利《詳全文》
甘肅超載校車車禍 20人死亡 44人受傷
甘肅省正寧縣一幼稚園校車發生車禍，目前總計有20人遇難18人受重傷。該幼稚園車在接到孩童後，行駛過程中與一輛卡車相撞，造成20人遇難《詳全文》
http://n.yam.com/focus/china/33493/
以上是中国所发生的事故！！！！！！！！！
马来西亚的学生车。。。。。。。。。。。
很不安全？？？
政府应该发出更多选上车准证。。。。。。。
让更多更多的人驾驶学生车。。。。。。。。。。。。。。
超載故障違規 大陸交通頻帶血
大陸今年交通事故頻傳，今再傳幼稚園校車超載撞車，至少20名幼兒命喪九泉。回顧溫州動車事故、上海地鐵追撞，不是信號故障就是違規發《詳全文》
甘肅娃娃車卡車相撞 19死
大陸甘肅省16日上午發生一起疑似超載的幼稚園校車與卡車相撞事故，截至發稿為止已有19人死亡，其中17名為幼兒。《詳全文》
黑校車 陸農村兒童別無選擇
對中國大陸農村的兒童來說，步行上學太遠，又缺乏基礎公共交通工具，本應是福利的校車無法遍及鄉間。除非放棄受教育的權利《詳全文》
甘肅超載校車車禍 20人死亡 44人受傷
甘肅省正寧縣一幼稚園校車發生車禍，目前總計有20人遇難18人受重傷。該幼稚園車在接到孩童後，行駛過程中與一輛卡車相撞，造成20人遇難《詳全文》
http://n.yam.com/focus/china/33493/
以上是中国所发生的事故！！！！！！！！！
马来西亚的学生车。。。。。。。。。。。
很不安全？？？
政府应该发出更多选上车准证。。。。。。。
让更多更多的人驾驶学生车。。。。。。。。。。。。。。
上海及深圳股市今天雙雙開低震盪走跌，滬股午盤收2261.15點，挫1.33%；深股午盤收9256.47點，下跌1.27%。
（中央社台北13日電）受美股收黑拖累，投資人觀望心態濃，上海及深圳股市今天雙雙開低震盪走跌，滬股午盤收2261.15點，挫1.33%；深股午盤收9256.47點，下跌1.27%。
綜合大陸媒體報導，上海證券交易所綜合股價指數中午收盤2261.15點，跌30.39點，跌幅1.33%，成交量人民幣264.7億元。
深圳證券交易所成份股價指數中午收9256.47點，跌119.54點，下挫1.27%，成交量人民幣247.9億元。
大陸招商證券指出，市場低迷，短期空頭氣氛濃，預估後市仍維持震盪探底，建議投資者保持謹慎，等待經濟基本面逐漸明朗。
綜合大陸媒體報導，上海證券交易所綜合股價指數中午收盤2261.15點，跌30.39點，跌幅1.33%，成交量人民幣264.7億元。
深圳證券交易所成份股價指數中午收9256.47點，跌119.54點，下挫1.27%，成交量人民幣247.9億元。
大陸招商證券指出，市場低迷，短期空頭氣氛濃，預估後市仍維持震盪探底，建議投資者保持謹慎，等待經濟基本面逐漸明朗。
新加坡政府上週出重拳為房市降溫，致使週末房地產銷售果然打了冷顫。 華業集團與新加坡置地在勿洛蓄水池畔共同發展的翠溢嶺（Archipelago），前個週末首次開放預覽熱銷100多間公寓，降溫措施後的首個週末再度預覽時，只再賣11個單位（約1000新幣尺價），兩個週末的反應幾乎有天淵之別。
新加坡降溫措施推出後‧私宅銷售普遍減少
國際財經 2011-12-13 12:11
（新加坡13日訊）新加坡政府上週出重拳為房市降溫，致使週末房地產銷售果然打了冷顫。
華業集團與新加坡置地在勿洛蓄水池畔共同發展的翠溢嶺（Archipelago），前個週末首次開放預覽熱銷100多間公寓，降溫措施後的首個週末再度預覽時，只再賣11個單位（約1000新幣尺價），兩個週末的反應幾乎有天淵之別。
華業集團發言人指出，雖然有降溫措施，上週末示範單位的參觀人潮依然超過200人，並賣出不少三至五臥房式單位，銷售成績並不令人失望。
降溫措施出台一天后，華業集團就決定給予代理更高的傭金，以推動銷售。售出一至二臥房式的代理，將在原有傭金的基礎上再獲5000元（新幣，下同）；賣出三至四臥房式單位的代理，可獲得額外1萬元傭金；賣出四臥房式以上單位者將可額外賺得1萬5000元傭金。
該發展商受詢時表示並不打算削價以吸引買家。發言人說︰“重要的是，發展商不應該動搖市場信心。華業集團從不把定價向市場看齊，而是定在非常可負擔的水平。”
翠溢嶺位於勿洛蓄水池畔，共有577間公寓。
發言人也透露，剛剛賣出的11間公寓的買家都是本地人和一些首次購屋的永久居民，因此不受新措施的影響，不過上週末沒有外國人進場。（聯合早報網）
國際財經 2011-12-13 12:11
（新加坡13日訊）新加坡政府上週出重拳為房市降溫，致使週末房地產銷售果然打了冷顫。
華業集團與新加坡置地在勿洛蓄水池畔共同發展的翠溢嶺（Archipelago），前個週末首次開放預覽熱銷100多間公寓，降溫措施後的首個週末再度預覽時，只再賣11個單位（約1000新幣尺價），兩個週末的反應幾乎有天淵之別。
華業集團發言人指出，雖然有降溫措施，上週末示範單位的參觀人潮依然超過200人，並賣出不少三至五臥房式單位，銷售成績並不令人失望。
降溫措施出台一天后，華業集團就決定給予代理更高的傭金，以推動銷售。售出一至二臥房式的代理，將在原有傭金的基礎上再獲5000元（新幣，下同）；賣出三至四臥房式單位的代理，可獲得額外1萬元傭金；賣出四臥房式以上單位者將可額外賺得1萬5000元傭金。
該發展商受詢時表示並不打算削價以吸引買家。發言人說︰“重要的是，發展商不應該動搖市場信心。華業集團從不把定價向市場看齊，而是定在非常可負擔的水平。”
翠溢嶺位於勿洛蓄水池畔，共有577間公寓。
發言人也透露，剛剛賣出的11間公寓的買家都是本地人和一些首次購屋的永久居民，因此不受新措施的影響，不過上週末沒有外國人進場。（聯合早報網）
Up to last week over 1,700 people have called on Minister for Agriculture, Joe Ludwig, to stop Australia’s export of greyhounds.
Animals Australia joins greyhound export fight
13/12/2011 10:30:00Alexandra Lages
Font size:
After Grey2K USA, the second largest animal protection organisation in Australia, Animals Australia, has also sent a letter to the Macau Canidrome calling for ex-racing dogs to be sent to a new home, instead of being put down.
Animals Australia senior campaigner Jeroen van Kernebeek told Macau Daily Times that a letter was sent to the director of the Canidrome, Ng Chi Sing, on December 2.
In addition, the organisation has started an online campaign (http://www.animalsaustralia.org/take_action/save-greyhounds-from-export) to ask the Australian Government to ban the export of greyhounds, including to Macau.
Up to last week over 1,700 people have called on Minister for Agriculture, Joe Ludwig, to stop Australia’s export of greyhounds.
Race dogs are not given a chance to live a second life beyond racing in Macau. According to estimates, a total of 383 healthy greyhounds were put to death at the Canidrome last year.
Choi U Fai, head of the Municipal and Civic Affairs Bureau’s animal control division, had said that the Canidrome euthanises some 30 dogs each month, one per day.
In the letter, Animals Australia expresses its concern over the treatment of greyhounds in Macau and their culling when their racing days are over. The organisation urged the Canidrome to find a second home for ex-racing dogs.
“The lack of a rehoming programme in any form of these young healthy dogs is inexcusable,” Animals Australia executive director Glenys Oogies wrote.
Oogies stressed that the organisation is opposed to the Canidrome’s approach, “as is the majority of the Australian community”.
Currently Grey2K and Greyhound Rescue, a non-profit organisation in Australia that finds new homes for greyhounds, launched an adoption campaign of one Canidrome dog called Brooklyn (http://www.grey2kusa.org/rescuebrooklyn/).
This campaign came after the Macau Society for the Protection of Animals (ANIMA) joined forces with Grey2K USA, the largest greyhound protection organisation in the United States, to find a second life for greyhounds that are exported from Australia to the local Canidrome.
After a visit to Macau in October, Charmaine Settle from the Board of Directors of Grey2K USA vowed to contact other animal welfare protection groups in order to increase awareness of what happens at the Macau Canidrome.
13/12/2011 10:30:00Alexandra Lages
Font size:
After Grey2K USA, the second largest animal protection organisation in Australia, Animals Australia, has also sent a letter to the Macau Canidrome calling for ex-racing dogs to be sent to a new home, instead of being put down.
Animals Australia senior campaigner Jeroen van Kernebeek told Macau Daily Times that a letter was sent to the director of the Canidrome, Ng Chi Sing, on December 2.
In addition, the organisation has started an online campaign (http://www.animalsaustralia.org/take_action/save-greyhounds-from-export) to ask the Australian Government to ban the export of greyhounds, including to Macau.
Up to last week over 1,700 people have called on Minister for Agriculture, Joe Ludwig, to stop Australia’s export of greyhounds.
Race dogs are not given a chance to live a second life beyond racing in Macau. According to estimates, a total of 383 healthy greyhounds were put to death at the Canidrome last year.
Choi U Fai, head of the Municipal and Civic Affairs Bureau’s animal control division, had said that the Canidrome euthanises some 30 dogs each month, one per day.
In the letter, Animals Australia expresses its concern over the treatment of greyhounds in Macau and their culling when their racing days are over. The organisation urged the Canidrome to find a second home for ex-racing dogs.
“The lack of a rehoming programme in any form of these young healthy dogs is inexcusable,” Animals Australia executive director Glenys Oogies wrote.
Oogies stressed that the organisation is opposed to the Canidrome’s approach, “as is the majority of the Australian community”.
Currently Grey2K and Greyhound Rescue, a non-profit organisation in Australia that finds new homes for greyhounds, launched an adoption campaign of one Canidrome dog called Brooklyn (http://www.grey2kusa.org/rescuebrooklyn/).
This campaign came after the Macau Society for the Protection of Animals (ANIMA) joined forces with Grey2K USA, the largest greyhound protection organisation in the United States, to find a second life for greyhounds that are exported from Australia to the local Canidrome.
After a visit to Macau in October, Charmaine Settle from the Board of Directors of Grey2K USA vowed to contact other animal welfare protection groups in order to increase awareness of what happens at the Macau Canidrome.
丈夫从外面回家，鸣笛示意太太把庭院的另一辆车驾出来，当其太太退车时，却没有注意两岁的儿子走出庭院，结果惨遭母亲撞死。
母亲退车撞死儿子
全国 2011-12-12 18:14
（古来12日讯）丈夫从外面回家，鸣笛示意太太把庭院的另一辆车驾出来，当其太太退车时，却没有注意两岁的儿子走出庭院，结果惨遭母亲撞死。
这起悲剧发生于昨晚11时许，男事主陈小汉（译音，年约40岁）驾车回到家门，鸣笛示意太太把庭院内的另一辆轿车驾出来，让他把轿车驾到庭院。
当事主的太太把轿车倒退出庭院，没有留意到两岁的儿子已经跑出庭院，结果惨被撞及，当场死亡。
据说，小死者的脸部严重磨损，死状恐怖。由于事发突然，事主的太太伤心过度，其家人已经暂时把她安顿到别处，暂离伤心地。
笨珍警区主任查利曼受询时说，此案并不含刑事成分，警方是援引1987年陆路交通法令第41（1）（a）条文调查此案。
他说，涉案的母亲至今未报案，警方了解她很悲痛，所以给予宽限，但已扣押涉案轿车，以送往电脑验车中心检查。
全国 2011-12-12 18:14
（古来12日讯）丈夫从外面回家，鸣笛示意太太把庭院的另一辆车驾出来，当其太太退车时，却没有注意两岁的儿子走出庭院，结果惨遭母亲撞死。
这起悲剧发生于昨晚11时许，男事主陈小汉（译音，年约40岁）驾车回到家门，鸣笛示意太太把庭院内的另一辆轿车驾出来，让他把轿车驾到庭院。
当事主的太太把轿车倒退出庭院，没有留意到两岁的儿子已经跑出庭院，结果惨被撞及，当场死亡。
据说，小死者的脸部严重磨损，死状恐怖。由于事发突然，事主的太太伤心过度，其家人已经暂时把她安顿到别处，暂离伤心地。
笨珍警区主任查利曼受询时说，此案并不含刑事成分，警方是援引1987年陆路交通法令第41（1）（a）条文调查此案。
他说，涉案的母亲至今未报案，警方了解她很悲痛，所以给予宽限，但已扣押涉案轿车，以送往电脑验车中心检查。
Friday, December 9, 2011
The Dutch government formally apologised Friday to the families of victims of a 1947 massacre on Indonesia's Java island, on the 64th anniversary of the executions by its colonial army. Dutch troops swooped into a village in the town of Rawagede during Indonesia's fight for independence and executed men and boys as their families and neighbours looked on....
Netherlands apologises for 1947 Indonesia massacre
AFP
Friday, Dec 09, 2011
RAWAGEDE, Indonesia - The Dutch government formally apologised Friday to the families of victims of a 1947 massacre on Indonesia's Java island, on the 64th anniversary of the executions by its colonial army.
Dutch troops swooped into a village in the town of Rawagede during Indonesia's fight for independence and executed men and boys as their families and neighbours looked on.
Dutch officials say 150 people were killed, but a support group and the local community say the death toll was 431.
"In this context and on behalf of the Dutch government, I apologise for the tragedy that took place in Rawagede on the 9th of December, 1947," the Netherlands ambassador to Indonesia Tjeerd de Zwaan said.
He then repeated the apology in the Indonesian language, to the applause of hundreds of people attending the ceremony, some of whom broke down in tears.
In a landmark ruling, a Hague-based civil court in September found the Dutch state responsible for the executions and ruled in favour of seven widows and a survivor of the massacre who brought the case to court.
The court rejected the Dutch argument that no claim could be lodged because of an expiry in the statute of limitations in Dutch law of five years, saying it was "unacceptable".
This same argument is used by the Indonesian government to avoid trial over the torture and killings of an estimated 500,000 communists and their sympathisers in 1965-66 as the Suharto dictatorship emerged.
The ambassador said the massacre was a clear example of how Dutch-Indonesian relations could go "so wrong", and assured the community that the apology had the broad support of the Dutch people.
"I hope that by reflecting together on what happened that day we will also be able to turn together to the future and all its opportunities for close productive cooperation between the two countries," he said.
AFP
Friday, Dec 09, 2011
RAWAGEDE, Indonesia - The Dutch government formally apologised Friday to the families of victims of a 1947 massacre on Indonesia's Java island, on the 64th anniversary of the executions by its colonial army.
Dutch troops swooped into a village in the town of Rawagede during Indonesia's fight for independence and executed men and boys as their families and neighbours looked on.
Dutch officials say 150 people were killed, but a support group and the local community say the death toll was 431.
"In this context and on behalf of the Dutch government, I apologise for the tragedy that took place in Rawagede on the 9th of December, 1947," the Netherlands ambassador to Indonesia Tjeerd de Zwaan said.
He then repeated the apology in the Indonesian language, to the applause of hundreds of people attending the ceremony, some of whom broke down in tears.
In a landmark ruling, a Hague-based civil court in September found the Dutch state responsible for the executions and ruled in favour of seven widows and a survivor of the massacre who brought the case to court.
The court rejected the Dutch argument that no claim could be lodged because of an expiry in the statute of limitations in Dutch law of five years, saying it was "unacceptable".
This same argument is used by the Indonesian government to avoid trial over the torture and killings of an estimated 500,000 communists and their sympathisers in 1965-66 as the Suharto dictatorship emerged.
The ambassador said the massacre was a clear example of how Dutch-Indonesian relations could go "so wrong", and assured the community that the apology had the broad support of the Dutch people.
"I hope that by reflecting together on what happened that day we will also be able to turn together to the future and all its opportunities for close productive cooperation between the two countries," he said.
THE CRUEL LAWS
The Petition
Note ABOUT the ACT4DEM PETITION to the
Government of Thailand and ASEAN
for the
ABOLITION of the Thai law of lèse majesté (ARTICLE 112 of the Criminal Code)
and the
RELEASE of all LM and POLITICAL PRISONERS
This petition has been initiated by organisations and people who are increasingly concerned about the future of democracy in Thailand.
Following the bloody military crackdown in Thailand in April – May 2010 that killed 93 people and wounded nearly 2000, lèse majesté laws have been increasingly used to silence the rising dissatisfaction with the justice system in Thailand. After the 2006 military coup the number of people charged with LM rose abruptly from less than 10 per year to 100 and in 2010 it had topped 500.
Today nobody knows how many hundreds of people are charged or being charged with LM– not even the lawyers. If not already in jail, almost all civil society leaders who opposed the Abhisit Government are now facing charges of lèse majesté.
Breaking strict taboo in Thai society, this petition addresses one of the root causes of the Thai Crisis: the impact of lèse majesté on the development of democracy.
The petition is open for signing by organisations and individuals all around the world.
The petition will remain open and on-going until all political prisoners in Thailand have been released and Article 112 has been abolished. The sovereignty of Thailand rests in the hands of the people. The struggle of the people to throw off the webs of corruption that limit and stifle their abilities to realise their democratic rights needs international solidarity now.
We are aiming to gather 11,135 signatures, the number of extra-judicial killings and political assassinations since 1947 revealed by our research. We estimate this is about one third of the actual number killed.
40 organisations and more than 1000 individuals have signed already (28.11. 2011).
We aim to deliver the petition to Thai Government and the ASEAN on 10 December 2011 - International Human Rights Day.
Please sign the petition.
Thank You.
Action for People’s Democracy in Thailand (ACT4DEM)
* * * * * * * * * *
Some information about some of the few known LM prisoners and their cases:
Daranee Charnchoengsilpakul, a media woman turned anti-coup activist, has been in jail since August 2009. She faces severe health problems and is being denied proper treatment. She remains defiant.
Tanthawut Taweewarodomkul, a Red Shirt website designer and single father, was ambushed at his home by a gang of police and jailed immediately – in April 2010. The police claim that the ‘UDD-USA’ website he administered was ‘A threat to the monarchy’. From prison he wrote to his 10 year-old son that: “What Dad wishes You to know is that he is most troubled by not being with you. Web (the son’s name) must know that Dad has not killed anybody, not cheated anybody, not sold any drugs and not deceived anybody. Dad worked as best he could with the skills he had to help his friends, and for doing this he was arrested.”
Surachai Sae-Dan, a Red Siam leader is 68, suffering from many illnesses and now on hunger strike against his maltreatment in prison. He was jailed on 22 February 2011. In writing his will from prison he has told his young followers . . ‘Never give up, never loose hope. Keep fighting.”
Somyot Pruksakemsuk, a well-known labour activist and editor of Red Power, was arrested at the Thai-Cambodia border on 30 April 2011. In his letter from prison entitled ‘Victim of the Unjust’ he states ‘I shall fight for freedom until my last breath. I may agree to shed my freedom, but not my humanity.’ Somyot has faced serious abuse and has been continuously transferred to prisons in different parts of Thailand.
Lerpong Wichaikhammat (Joe Gordon) a Thai-US pensioner in Thailand for health treatment, was ambushed by a gang of 20 DSI agents in Northeast Thailand, charged for posting a Thai version of ‘The Thai King never smiles’ on a web-board in 2008 – 2009, and thrown into prison on 24 May 2011.
Ampon Tangnoppakul, a 61-year-old grandfather, was sentenced to 20-years in prison on November 23, 2011, for allegedly sending four SMS messages critical of the queen to Somkiat Klongwattanasak, the personal secretary of former prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva. Ampon, who is suffering from laryngeal cancer and has been unable to access proper treatment during his time in detention, strenuously denies sending the messages.
* * * * * * * * *
For FULL DETAILS about the PETITION, click here
For FULL DETAILS about the LM 112 Campaign, click here
http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/the-abolition-of-the-thai-law-of-lese-majeste/
http://www.picbadges.com/free-thailand-from-lese-majeste/1687398/
http://www.picbadges.com/stop-the-lese-majeste-law/1236230/?ref=wdgt3
http://www.stoplesemajeste.blogspot.com/?zx=6e77803334d1da49
http://stoplesemajeste.blogspot.com/2009/01/srirasmi-topless-party-video.html
arrests continue
Somsak letter reveals 3 new arrests
"King Bhumibol owns many patents after his years of having others do research; he initiates, others do." @Aim_NT
"We love the King but are wondering what he had to say about all the people getting locked up in his name? (LM sec 112 & Computer Crimes Act) @Nganadeeleg
"Man, how come nobody tweets about how they wish they could be reborn for all eternity as the dust under MY feet?" @thai101
"The manipulation of #WeLoveTheKing has just begun. Royalists want the world to notice - but notice what?" @PravitR
"No Royal pardon for lese majeste "offenders"? No surprise. No reconciliation. Nothing has changed. His Majesty the King cannot be criticized" @igorc166
Issue 306
Few had expected the stubborn Thai king to make a birthday speech that would help Thailand's factions reconcile their differences, but Bhumibol's total indifference towards the suffering of Uncle SMS shocked everyone.
Today, the hearts and thoughts of Thai people were not with their selfish old king, but with another grandfather, who was sitting in the prison cell which will be his home for the next twenty years.
Do you think Bhumibol supports lese majeste law?
Yes
No
Maybe
Don't know
A letter written by Somsak Jeamteerasakul and published in New Mandala reveals that Thailand's government is continuing to arrest lese majeste suspects in secret.
According to Somsak, "2-3 persons in the academic education circles" have been charged with lese majeste offences and summonded to appear in court in the last two months alone.
Somsak Jeamteerasakul
As part of her election promise, Yingluck Shanawatra said she hoped there would be fewer lese majeste arrests, however observers note that the number of secret lese majeste arrests are on the increase.
http://galeon.com/buuut88/4444gg.htm
RECOMMENDED SITES
The Daily Skipper
http://www.thedailyskipper.blogspot.com
StopLeseMajeste Blog
http://www.stoplesemajeste.blogspot.com
NorporchorUSA
http://www.norporchorusa.com
StopLeseMajeste Videos
http://freenuinow.etop.tv
Free Joe Gordon
http://www.freejoegordon.com
The King Never Smiles
http://bit.ly/oxvdUE
InternetFreedoms
http://internetfreedom.us/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=9250&sid=76d3160acd29988a3d1a9397a5db935e
http://www.livestream.com/diediechakri
Somsak letter reveals 3 new arrests
"King Bhumibol owns many patents after his years of having others do research; he initiates, others do." @Aim_NT
"We love the King but are wondering what he had to say about all the people getting locked up in his name? (LM sec 112 & Computer Crimes Act) @Nganadeeleg
"Man, how come nobody tweets about how they wish they could be reborn for all eternity as the dust under MY feet?" @thai101
"The manipulation of #WeLoveTheKing has just begun. Royalists want the world to notice - but notice what?" @PravitR
"No Royal pardon for lese majeste "offenders"? No surprise. No reconciliation. Nothing has changed. His Majesty the King cannot be criticized" @igorc166
Issue 306
Few had expected the stubborn Thai king to make a birthday speech that would help Thailand's factions reconcile their differences, but Bhumibol's total indifference towards the suffering of Uncle SMS shocked everyone.
Today, the hearts and thoughts of Thai people were not with their selfish old king, but with another grandfather, who was sitting in the prison cell which will be his home for the next twenty years.
Do you think Bhumibol supports lese majeste law?
Yes
No
Maybe
Don't know
A letter written by Somsak Jeamteerasakul and published in New Mandala reveals that Thailand's government is continuing to arrest lese majeste suspects in secret.
According to Somsak, "2-3 persons in the academic education circles" have been charged with lese majeste offences and summonded to appear in court in the last two months alone.
Somsak Jeamteerasakul
As part of her election promise, Yingluck Shanawatra said she hoped there would be fewer lese majeste arrests, however observers note that the number of secret lese majeste arrests are on the increase.
http://galeon.com/buuut88/4444gg.htm
RECOMMENDED SITES
The Daily Skipper
http://www.thedailyskipper.blogspot.com
StopLeseMajeste Blog
http://www.stoplesemajeste.blogspot.com
NorporchorUSA
http://www.norporchorusa.com
StopLeseMajeste Videos
http://freenuinow.etop.tv
Free Joe Gordon
http://www.freejoegordon.com
The King Never Smiles
http://bit.ly/oxvdUE
InternetFreedoms
http://internetfreedom.us/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=9250&sid=76d3160acd29988a3d1a9397a5db935e
http://www.livestream.com/diediechakri
U.S. citizen sentenced for insulting Thai king By New York Times
U.S. citizen sentenced for insulting Thai king
By
New York Times
Posted: 12/08/2011 09:02:01 PM PST
Updated: 12/08/2011 09:26:34 PM PST
BANGKOK -- A Thai court on Thursday sentenced a U.S. citizen to two and a half years in prison for insulting King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the latest case in the government's crackdown on criticism of the monarchy.
Joe Gordon, who was born in Thailand but has lived in the United States for the past three decades, was convicted of translating and posting to the Internet portions of a book, "The King Never Smiles," which is published by Yale University Press and banned in Thailand.
The number of so-called lese-majeste cases has sharply increased in Thailand in recent years, a period of political turmoil and divisions about the future of the monarchy.
Gordon's case is unusual because he was living in the United States when he uploaded chapters of the book onto the Internet.
Elizabeth Pratt, the consul general of the U.S. Embassy who attended the sentencing, said that the United States was "troubled" with the verdict, but she stopped short of calling for Gordon to be freed.
"We are very concerned about the severity of the sentence that has been imposed on Joe Gordon," she said. "We continue to have full respect for the Thai monarchy, and we also want to support the right to freedom of expression, which is an internationally recognized human right."
Gordon, 54, initially denied the charges but in October pleaded guilty.
He will request a royal pardon, said his lawyer, Arnon Nampa.
The sentence would have been more harsh
Advertisement
had Gordon pleaded not guilty, Arnon said. Before the sentencing, Gordon was repeatedly denied bail.
"You have to choose between the rule of law or freedom," Arnon said in an interview after the verdict was handed down. "Because if he had wanted to continue fighting the case, he would have been in jail for at least another year without bail."
Judge Tawan Rodcharoen said the court had shown leniency because Gordon pleaded guilty.
The sentence, which would have been five years, was cut in half, the judge said.
Gordon, whose Thai name is Lerpong Wichaicommart, was arrested in May during a visit to his hometown in northeastern Thailand.
Wearing an orange prison uniform and shackled with leg irons, he hesitated Thursday when answering reporters' questions.
"In Thailand, they put people in prison even if they don't have proof," he said. "I am not going to fight. I don't believe" -- he stopped himself.
A prison official sitting next to Gordon whispered to him in Thai.
"Don't say anything else about this," said the prison official, Wiroj Nuyom. "It might affect your royal pardon. And you might be in trouble."
"The King Never Smiles," written by a journalist, Paul M. Handley, is a detailed biography of King Bhumibol. The book argues that the king has led a restoration of royal power in Thailand that has impeded the development of democracy.
The king, who has been hospitalized for more than two years with various ailments, marked his 84th birthday Monday in a gilded ceremony marked by fanfare and adulation.
After more than six decades on the throne, many Thais have an unquestioning loyalty toward the king.
Ardent supporters of the monarchy have led an online campaign to stamp out criticism, an effort that has been accompanied by a crackdown on royal insults by government Internet censors.
"If you don't like His Majesty the King, I would suggest this -- get out of here," one YouTube user, LimitedSaur, said in a video. "You'd better live somewhere else but Thailand."
http://www.mercurynews.com/nation-world/ci_19502294
By
New York Times
Posted: 12/08/2011 09:02:01 PM PST
Updated: 12/08/2011 09:26:34 PM PST
BANGKOK -- A Thai court on Thursday sentenced a U.S. citizen to two and a half years in prison for insulting King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the latest case in the government's crackdown on criticism of the monarchy.
Joe Gordon, who was born in Thailand but has lived in the United States for the past three decades, was convicted of translating and posting to the Internet portions of a book, "The King Never Smiles," which is published by Yale University Press and banned in Thailand.
The number of so-called lese-majeste cases has sharply increased in Thailand in recent years, a period of political turmoil and divisions about the future of the monarchy.
Gordon's case is unusual because he was living in the United States when he uploaded chapters of the book onto the Internet.
Elizabeth Pratt, the consul general of the U.S. Embassy who attended the sentencing, said that the United States was "troubled" with the verdict, but she stopped short of calling for Gordon to be freed.
"We are very concerned about the severity of the sentence that has been imposed on Joe Gordon," she said. "We continue to have full respect for the Thai monarchy, and we also want to support the right to freedom of expression, which is an internationally recognized human right."
Gordon, 54, initially denied the charges but in October pleaded guilty.
He will request a royal pardon, said his lawyer, Arnon Nampa.
The sentence would have been more harsh
Advertisement
had Gordon pleaded not guilty, Arnon said. Before the sentencing, Gordon was repeatedly denied bail.
"You have to choose between the rule of law or freedom," Arnon said in an interview after the verdict was handed down. "Because if he had wanted to continue fighting the case, he would have been in jail for at least another year without bail."
Judge Tawan Rodcharoen said the court had shown leniency because Gordon pleaded guilty.
The sentence, which would have been five years, was cut in half, the judge said.
Gordon, whose Thai name is Lerpong Wichaicommart, was arrested in May during a visit to his hometown in northeastern Thailand.
Wearing an orange prison uniform and shackled with leg irons, he hesitated Thursday when answering reporters' questions.
"In Thailand, they put people in prison even if they don't have proof," he said. "I am not going to fight. I don't believe" -- he stopped himself.
A prison official sitting next to Gordon whispered to him in Thai.
"Don't say anything else about this," said the prison official, Wiroj Nuyom. "It might affect your royal pardon. And you might be in trouble."
"The King Never Smiles," written by a journalist, Paul M. Handley, is a detailed biography of King Bhumibol. The book argues that the king has led a restoration of royal power in Thailand that has impeded the development of democracy.
The king, who has been hospitalized for more than two years with various ailments, marked his 84th birthday Monday in a gilded ceremony marked by fanfare and adulation.
After more than six decades on the throne, many Thais have an unquestioning loyalty toward the king.
Ardent supporters of the monarchy have led an online campaign to stamp out criticism, an effort that has been accompanied by a crackdown on royal insults by government Internet censors.
"If you don't like His Majesty the King, I would suggest this -- get out of here," one YouTube user, LimitedSaur, said in a video. "You'd better live somewhere else but Thailand."
http://www.mercurynews.com/nation-world/ci_19502294
I have just finished reading Paul Handley’s biography of Thailand’s King Bhumiphol. The book is banned in Thailand and there are even reports that access to the web site of the book’s publisher has been blocked by Thai internet service providers.
*The King Never Smile*
05/04/2010 at 10:50 am (บทความ)
I have just finished reading Paul Handley’s biography of Thailand’s King Bhumiphol.
The book is banned in Thailand and there are even reports that access to the web site of the book’s publisher has been blocked by Thai internet service providers. There is certainly much in the book that would cause grave offence to Thais, especially given the current outpouring of love and respect that has marked the sixtieth anniversary of the King’s reign. I have heard some Thais here in Australia dismiss the book as “biased” or as containing a lot of “gossip”.
Handley is, no doubt, critical of what he sees as the persistently anti-democratic tendencies of the monarchy in Thailand. And there is a sprinkling of salacious gossip about the royal family. But the criticisms are placed in the context of a detailed political history of Thailand since the early decades of the twentieth century.
This political history strikes me as an important contribution to Thai scholarship and, while there is much room for debate about specific findings, there are many insights which contribute to an understanding of Thailand’s current political mess.
And, yes, there is some gossip (though most of Handley’s material seems to come from well documented sources). But, from an Australian perspective, this seems rather mild, especially when compared to the extraordinary dissection of our own royal family’s woes.
Over the past few months in Thailand there has been much discussion about the importance of democratic institutions beyond the electoral process. Should those institutions cater for free publication of political opinion,
Even if that opinion involves criticism of a figure as revered as the King? What role do lèse-majesté laws have to play in a modern democracy? To me it is clear that there is enormous respect for the King throughout Thailand. Banning an informed, if critical, political commentary on his reign seems to involve an underestimation of the strength and resilience of this sentiment.
New Mandala
Wikipedia
Yalepress
ThaiTKNS
Red More Thai version
ศ.นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์ วิจารณ์ The King Never Smiles (ฉบับเต็ม)
1. ก่อนอื่นต้องขออภัยผู้เขียน (พอล แฮนด์ลีย์) ไว้ในที่นี้ด้วย เพราะไม่อยู่ในที่นี้ การวิจารณ์นี้อาจมาจากความเข้าใจผิดในเนื้อหาที่นำเสนอ โดยผู้เขียนไม่อาจชี้แจงได้
2. ก่อนหน้าเหตุการณ์ 14 ตุลา 2516 รัฐศาสตร์ไทยไม่มีอะไรจะพูดมากนักเกี่ยวกับบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ นอกจากเป็นที่เคารพสักการะของปวงชนฉะนั้นจึงเป็นศูนย์รวมจิตใจของประชาชน ทำให้ประเทศไทยรักษาความเป็นอันหนึ่งอันเดียวกันไว้ได้
ท่ามกลางความแตกแยกแตกต่างนานาชนิดในประเทศไทยอันที่จริง นับตั้งแต่ 2490 เป็นต้นมา หรือโดยเฉพาะหลัง 2500 เป็นต้นมา ได้ปรากฏบทบาททางสังคมและวัฒนธรรมของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์อย่างเข้มข้นมากขึ้นตามลำดับอยู่แล้ว
แต่รัฐศาสตร์ไทยก็ไม่ได้สนใจจะอธิบายบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์แตกต่างไปจากที่กล่าวแล้ว (ทั้งนี้ยังไม่พูดถึงบทบาททางเศรษฐกิจขององค์กรธุรกิจที่เนื่องอยู่กับสถาบันฯ ซึ่งขยายตัวอย่างรวดเร็วมาพร้อมกัน)การที่พระบาทสมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัวฯทรงสามารถยุติการนองเลือดในเหตุการณ์ 14 ตุลา
สร้างความอัศจรรย์ใจแก่ผู้คนนอกประเทศไทยอย่างมาก รวมทั้งนักวิชาการไทยคดีศึกษาหลายท่าน แต่รัฐศาสตร์ไทยก็ไม่มีคำอธิบายอันใดเพิ่มเติมเกี่ยวกับบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ ทั้งนี้อาจเป็นเพราะพระราชอำนาจที่ทรงยุติการนองเลือดนั้น
ยังสามารถใช้กรอบคำอธิบายเดิมได้อยู่ กล่าวคือโดยอาศัยฐานะที่ทรงเป็นศูนย์รวมของชาติ เป็นสถาบันที่ได้รับความเคารพสักการะมาแต่อดีต เป็นเงื่อนไขที่เปิดให้ทรงสามารถยุติการนองเลือดได้ เป็นบทบาทเดิมที่มีอยู่แล้ว คือรักษาความเป็นอันหนึ่งอันเดียวกันของชาติ
ท่ามกลางความแตกแยกขัดแย้งซึ่งทำให้เกิดความรุนแรงและวิกฤตทางการเมืองสิ่งที่น่าประหลาดก็คือ รัฐศาสตร์ไทยยอมรับมานานแล้วว่า หลัง 2475 มาจนถึง 2590เป็นอย่างน้อย สถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ไทยมีสถานะตกต่ำลงอย่างมาก
ทั้งเพราะความพยายามของคณะราษฎรหรือบางคนในคณะราษฎรที่จะจำกัดบทบาทของสถาบันฯลง และเพราะพระมหากษัตริย์ทั้งสองรัชกาลยังทรงพระเยาว์อยู่ ฉะนั้นการกลับมามีความสำคัญถึงสามารถยุติการนองเลือดใน พ.ศ. 2516 ได้ จึงต้องมาจากความเปลี่ยนแปลงบางอย่างของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ด้วย
ไม่ใช่การสืบเนื่องตามปรกติแน่ แต่ก็ไม่มีความพยายามจะอธิบายกระบวนการกลับฟื้นคืนความสำคัญของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์อย่างเป็นระบบในทางวิชาการหากมีการกระทำเช่นนั้น ก็จะทำให้เห็นพลวัตของสถาบันฯซึ่งจะช่วยทบทวนกรอบคำอธิบายบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ซึ่งใช้กันอยู่ได้อย่างไรก็ตาม
นับตั้งแต่เหตุการณ์ 6 ตุลา 2519 เป็นต้นมา กรอบคำอธิบายที่เคยใช้มาแต่เดิมดูเหมือนไม่สามารถอธิบายบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันฯได้ง่ายอีกแล้ว พูดอีกอย่างหนึ่งก็คือ ไม่สามารถเอาข้อเท็จจริงที่เกิดขึ้นยัดลงไปในทฤษฎีหรือกรอบคำอธิบายที่ใช้กันมาแต่เดิมได้
(แม้แต่เฉพาะข้อเท็จจริงที่ปรากฏแก่สาธารณชน ไม่นับข้อเท็จจริงที่ไม่รู้กันแพร่หลาย)ยกเว้นแต่ไม่พูดถึงสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์เลย หรือแยกข้อเท็จจริงออกจากตัวทฤษฎีหรือกรอบคำอธิบาย กลายเป็นสองอย่างที่ไม่เกี่ยวกันควรกล่าวด้วยว่า ในระยะเวลาหลัง 6 ตุลา 2519 เป็นต้นมา
มีงานบทความวิชาการของนักรัฐศาสตร์ทั้งไทยและเทศอยู่บ้าง (ส่วนใหญ่เทศ เพราะบรรยากาศของเสรีภาพทางวิชาการไม่เปิดกว้างในประเทศไทย) ที่จะโดยตั้งใจหรือไม่ก็ตาม ตั้งคำถามกรอบคำอธิบายเดิมเกี่ยวกับบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์
เช่นการวิเคราะห์ปัจจัยทางสังคม, เศรษฐกิจ,การเมือง ซึ่งนำมาสู่เหตุการณ์ 6 ตุลา แม้ไม่ได้วิพากษ์กรอบคำอธิบายโดยตรง แต่โดยนัยะก็ทำให้เห็นว่าไม่สามารถใช้เพื่อเข้าใจบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ได้อย่าง
http://secrecynews.wordpress.com/2010/04/05/the-king-never-smile/
05/04/2010 at 10:50 am (บทความ)
I have just finished reading Paul Handley’s biography of Thailand’s King Bhumiphol.
The book is banned in Thailand and there are even reports that access to the web site of the book’s publisher has been blocked by Thai internet service providers. There is certainly much in the book that would cause grave offence to Thais, especially given the current outpouring of love and respect that has marked the sixtieth anniversary of the King’s reign. I have heard some Thais here in Australia dismiss the book as “biased” or as containing a lot of “gossip”.
Handley is, no doubt, critical of what he sees as the persistently anti-democratic tendencies of the monarchy in Thailand. And there is a sprinkling of salacious gossip about the royal family. But the criticisms are placed in the context of a detailed political history of Thailand since the early decades of the twentieth century.
This political history strikes me as an important contribution to Thai scholarship and, while there is much room for debate about specific findings, there are many insights which contribute to an understanding of Thailand’s current political mess.
And, yes, there is some gossip (though most of Handley’s material seems to come from well documented sources). But, from an Australian perspective, this seems rather mild, especially when compared to the extraordinary dissection of our own royal family’s woes.
Over the past few months in Thailand there has been much discussion about the importance of democratic institutions beyond the electoral process. Should those institutions cater for free publication of political opinion,
Even if that opinion involves criticism of a figure as revered as the King? What role do lèse-majesté laws have to play in a modern democracy? To me it is clear that there is enormous respect for the King throughout Thailand. Banning an informed, if critical, political commentary on his reign seems to involve an underestimation of the strength and resilience of this sentiment.
New Mandala
Wikipedia
Yalepress
ThaiTKNS
Red More Thai version
ศ.นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์ วิจารณ์ The King Never Smiles (ฉบับเต็ม)
1. ก่อนอื่นต้องขออภัยผู้เขียน (พอล แฮนด์ลีย์) ไว้ในที่นี้ด้วย เพราะไม่อยู่ในที่นี้ การวิจารณ์นี้อาจมาจากความเข้าใจผิดในเนื้อหาที่นำเสนอ โดยผู้เขียนไม่อาจชี้แจงได้
2. ก่อนหน้าเหตุการณ์ 14 ตุลา 2516 รัฐศาสตร์ไทยไม่มีอะไรจะพูดมากนักเกี่ยวกับบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ นอกจากเป็นที่เคารพสักการะของปวงชนฉะนั้นจึงเป็นศูนย์รวมจิตใจของประชาชน ทำให้ประเทศไทยรักษาความเป็นอันหนึ่งอันเดียวกันไว้ได้
ท่ามกลางความแตกแยกแตกต่างนานาชนิดในประเทศไทยอันที่จริง นับตั้งแต่ 2490 เป็นต้นมา หรือโดยเฉพาะหลัง 2500 เป็นต้นมา ได้ปรากฏบทบาททางสังคมและวัฒนธรรมของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์อย่างเข้มข้นมากขึ้นตามลำดับอยู่แล้ว
แต่รัฐศาสตร์ไทยก็ไม่ได้สนใจจะอธิบายบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์แตกต่างไปจากที่กล่าวแล้ว (ทั้งนี้ยังไม่พูดถึงบทบาททางเศรษฐกิจขององค์กรธุรกิจที่เนื่องอยู่กับสถาบันฯ ซึ่งขยายตัวอย่างรวดเร็วมาพร้อมกัน)การที่พระบาทสมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัวฯทรงสามารถยุติการนองเลือดในเหตุการณ์ 14 ตุลา
สร้างความอัศจรรย์ใจแก่ผู้คนนอกประเทศไทยอย่างมาก รวมทั้งนักวิชาการไทยคดีศึกษาหลายท่าน แต่รัฐศาสตร์ไทยก็ไม่มีคำอธิบายอันใดเพิ่มเติมเกี่ยวกับบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ ทั้งนี้อาจเป็นเพราะพระราชอำนาจที่ทรงยุติการนองเลือดนั้น
ยังสามารถใช้กรอบคำอธิบายเดิมได้อยู่ กล่าวคือโดยอาศัยฐานะที่ทรงเป็นศูนย์รวมของชาติ เป็นสถาบันที่ได้รับความเคารพสักการะมาแต่อดีต เป็นเงื่อนไขที่เปิดให้ทรงสามารถยุติการนองเลือดได้ เป็นบทบาทเดิมที่มีอยู่แล้ว คือรักษาความเป็นอันหนึ่งอันเดียวกันของชาติ
ท่ามกลางความแตกแยกขัดแย้งซึ่งทำให้เกิดความรุนแรงและวิกฤตทางการเมืองสิ่งที่น่าประหลาดก็คือ รัฐศาสตร์ไทยยอมรับมานานแล้วว่า หลัง 2475 มาจนถึง 2590เป็นอย่างน้อย สถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ไทยมีสถานะตกต่ำลงอย่างมาก
ทั้งเพราะความพยายามของคณะราษฎรหรือบางคนในคณะราษฎรที่จะจำกัดบทบาทของสถาบันฯลง และเพราะพระมหากษัตริย์ทั้งสองรัชกาลยังทรงพระเยาว์อยู่ ฉะนั้นการกลับมามีความสำคัญถึงสามารถยุติการนองเลือดใน พ.ศ. 2516 ได้ จึงต้องมาจากความเปลี่ยนแปลงบางอย่างของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ด้วย
ไม่ใช่การสืบเนื่องตามปรกติแน่ แต่ก็ไม่มีความพยายามจะอธิบายกระบวนการกลับฟื้นคืนความสำคัญของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์อย่างเป็นระบบในทางวิชาการหากมีการกระทำเช่นนั้น ก็จะทำให้เห็นพลวัตของสถาบันฯซึ่งจะช่วยทบทวนกรอบคำอธิบายบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ซึ่งใช้กันอยู่ได้อย่างไรก็ตาม
นับตั้งแต่เหตุการณ์ 6 ตุลา 2519 เป็นต้นมา กรอบคำอธิบายที่เคยใช้มาแต่เดิมดูเหมือนไม่สามารถอธิบายบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันฯได้ง่ายอีกแล้ว พูดอีกอย่างหนึ่งก็คือ ไม่สามารถเอาข้อเท็จจริงที่เกิดขึ้นยัดลงไปในทฤษฎีหรือกรอบคำอธิบายที่ใช้กันมาแต่เดิมได้
(แม้แต่เฉพาะข้อเท็จจริงที่ปรากฏแก่สาธารณชน ไม่นับข้อเท็จจริงที่ไม่รู้กันแพร่หลาย)ยกเว้นแต่ไม่พูดถึงสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์เลย หรือแยกข้อเท็จจริงออกจากตัวทฤษฎีหรือกรอบคำอธิบาย กลายเป็นสองอย่างที่ไม่เกี่ยวกันควรกล่าวด้วยว่า ในระยะเวลาหลัง 6 ตุลา 2519 เป็นต้นมา
มีงานบทความวิชาการของนักรัฐศาสตร์ทั้งไทยและเทศอยู่บ้าง (ส่วนใหญ่เทศ เพราะบรรยากาศของเสรีภาพทางวิชาการไม่เปิดกว้างในประเทศไทย) ที่จะโดยตั้งใจหรือไม่ก็ตาม ตั้งคำถามกรอบคำอธิบายเดิมเกี่ยวกับบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์
เช่นการวิเคราะห์ปัจจัยทางสังคม, เศรษฐกิจ,การเมือง ซึ่งนำมาสู่เหตุการณ์ 6 ตุลา แม้ไม่ได้วิพากษ์กรอบคำอธิบายโดยตรง แต่โดยนัยะก็ทำให้เห็นว่าไม่สามารถใช้เพื่อเข้าใจบทบาททางการเมืองของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ได้อย่าง
http://secrecynews.wordpress.com/2010/04/05/the-king-never-smile/
君主制に未来はあるか？
Paul M. Handley, The King Never Smiles (Yale University Press, 2006)
(『一冊の本』2007 年 11 月号 pp.26-7)
山形浩生
要約： 一見、揺るぎない王制を敷いているかに見えるタイの王さまも、実はかなり波瀾万丈の生涯を送っており、もともと王位がめぐってくるはずがなかったのが各種の事故で現職に至る。兄の謎の死、各種クーデターによる失脚と復位の連続、権力の控えめな利用によるキャスティングボート保持戦略などが有効に機能してかれの現在の不動の地位がある。隣国カンボジアのシアヌークとは大違いだ。だがこれからは？
民主主義の世の中にあって、王さまや皇帝や天皇の位置づけはとてもむずかしく、その愛憎半ばするような人気の一端も、そのいかにもあいまいなポジショニングにもあるのだろう。なぜ王様は王様なの？ なぜ天皇は天皇なの？ そう言われて、まともに答えられる人はいない。だってまともな答えってないんだもの。昔なら、戦乱の世を平定したとかいう実績があって、その実績（および各種神話的な正当化）をもとにした一族の統治能力への期待がある。それが、王様を王様たらしめているものだ（建前上は）。だけれど、いまの世界各地に残る王家や皇帝一族にはその意味での「実績」がなかなかない。王様がお飾りやシンボル以上の存在であるところはまれだ。君主が本当の意味で統治しているのは、ブータンやアラブ首長国連邦の首長たちくらいかな。
その中で、タイの王家というのはがんばっている。国内のタイレストランに行くだけでも、現在のラーマ九世王がいかに敬愛されているかは感じられるだろう。それは決してお人柄とかそんなものだけではない。政治的にも大きな存在感を持ち、また各種の慈善や貧困開発プロジェクトなどを通じ、国民ともかなりの直接的な接触を持って「治めている」王様だ。タイで数年ごとに風物詩のように繰り返されるクーデターもどきにおいても、最後は王さまが出てきて沙汰を下す。法律や民主主義のお題目がどうあれ、実質的な意味での最終的な主権は明らかに王さまにある。
この本は、そのラーマ九世ことプミボン・アドゥンヤデート王の伝記となる。そしてこの本でわかることは、ラーマ九世は単に世襲で玉座についただけの存在ではないということだ。ある意味でかれは現在の地位を自ら勝ち取ったのであり、だからこそ現在のような力をかれは持ち得ている。
ぼくも知らなかったことだが、ラーマ九世は実はアメリカのボストン地域生まれなのだった。もともとかれの父は王位からはかなり遠く、ボストン留学時に結婚して誕生した兄弟の弟のほうがプミボンだ。折しも当時のシャム王国では、王の圧政に対して台頭してきた市民階級がクーデターを起こし、王様が亡命政府を興して云々といったきわめてきな臭い状況となっていた。各種駆け引きのなかで王はかつての権限や財産をほとんどすべて失い、王室は完全に形骸化していた。
プミボン王子は、そんな状況とは比較的無縁のまま、自由なアメリカ生活を満喫し、ミュージシャンになろうとかレーサーになろうなどと夢見ていたのだけれど（そして自動車事故を起こしたりもしている）、なんだかんだでこの一家に玉座のお鉢がまわってきてしまった。そしてこれまた知らなかったことだが、まず玉座についたのは兄アナンダなのだった。だが、アナンダ王は在位わずか一ヶ月で謎の死をとげる。ピストル自殺なのか、あるいは暗殺かは、未だにわからない。かくてプミボン王子が一九四六年にタイの玉座につく。兄の死後、プミボン王は公式の場では一切笑わなくなったという。本書の題名もそこからきている。
その後のタイの歴史――そしてラーマ九世の歴史――は波乱に満ちたものだ（いまだにそうだ）。十回以上にわたるクーデターの試み。近代化と共産主義勢力、アメリカを筆頭とする勢力の横やり。一時は王の地位すら失いかけ、冷戦期には無力なお飾りとしてバカにされていた。だが王様は、まず失われた王室の財産や地位を少しずつ回復する。さらに各種の地方開発や貧困開発プロジェクトの実施。なかには人工降雨技術を使って、王は雨を呼ぶ力があると無知な農民に思わせる、なんていうあざといのもあるけれど。そうやって信頼を勝ち得る一方で、各種勢力にうまく自分を利用させることで、常にキャスティングボートを握るような位置を確保。失敗や計算ミスもあった。でもそれを辛くも乗り越えた実績を経て、ラマ九世は現在の地位を自ら築き上げてきたのだ。
ただ伝記としての本書は凡庸。波瀾万丈とはいえ、それがしょせんはタイのローカルな事情の中だけに終始し、これだけの素材を扱いつついま一つ広がりがないのは残念。特に、他の王家との比較が少ない。ときどき引き合いに出されるのは、まったく外部との接触がなく、完全なお飾りでしかない日本の天皇家くらいだ。
でも、ぼくはもっと適切な比較対象があると思うのだ。同じインドシナで、類似の勢力にさらされ、アメリカの援助と共産勢力と国の発展と王室維持というパズルに挑んだ別の王家。この欄の読者ならおわかりだろう。カンボジアのシアヌークだ。シアヌークが目指したのは、ある意味でまさにいまのタイ王家のような立場だった。各種反対勢力の仲裁者として、実質的に最高権力を目指す立場。だが自分が目立つことばかりを重視し、感情にまかせて手下の蛮行を自ら奨励し、奥の手として温存すべき絶対権力を気楽に行使しすぎて仲裁すべき勢力そのものをつぶしてクメールルージュの台頭を許し、国を壊滅させてしまった愚かな君主。玉座についてからはアメリカで満喫した自由を封印したプミボン王の節制とバランス感覚の一部でもシアヌークにあれば――本書にはなぜか、シアヌークもカンボジアも一度たりとも登場しないのだけれど、この二人を比べたとき、王様というものの意義とその危うさについて人それぞれ思うところがあるはずだ。
そして本書の問題提起でもあるんだけれど、やはり王室の今後は問題になるだろう。最終的には反民主的な存在である王室、そして結局は既存の（決して腐敗していないとは言い難い）産軍権益との結びつきで成立している王室が、社会の成熟の中で今後どうたちまわるのか？ ある意味で世界でも有数の成功した王室たるタイ王室はの抱える課題は、世界のその他王室にとっても大きな問題として立ちはだかるのだ。この点の踏み込みは甘いのだけれど――それは読者が考えるべきこと、かな。この日本社会の課題としても。
なお、タイ政府は本書の刊行にあまりいい顔をせず、ブッシュ大統領に文句を言ったり、版元のイェール大学出版に抗議したり、出版を阻止せんとあの手この手を尽くしたとか。タイではいまも、王室は絶対無謬であると法律で決まっており（！！）、したがって王室批判は禁止されているそうな。本書がそんなに悪いとは思わないんだがなあ。王がときに民主主義より秩序を優先するというのがアレらしいんだが、王室が完全に民主的なわけないのは定義上明らかなんだから、だれもそれで驚いたりしないと思うんだが。
前号 次号 「一冊の本」レビューインデックス YAMAGATA Hirooトップに戻る
前号 次号 「一冊の本」レビューインデックス YAMAGATA Hirooトップに戻る
YAMAGATA Hiroo
http://cruel.org/onebook/theking.html
(『一冊の本』2007 年 11 月号 pp.26-7)
山形浩生
要約： 一見、揺るぎない王制を敷いているかに見えるタイの王さまも、実はかなり波瀾万丈の生涯を送っており、もともと王位がめぐってくるはずがなかったのが各種の事故で現職に至る。兄の謎の死、各種クーデターによる失脚と復位の連続、権力の控えめな利用によるキャスティングボート保持戦略などが有効に機能してかれの現在の不動の地位がある。隣国カンボジアのシアヌークとは大違いだ。だがこれからは？
民主主義の世の中にあって、王さまや皇帝や天皇の位置づけはとてもむずかしく、その愛憎半ばするような人気の一端も、そのいかにもあいまいなポジショニングにもあるのだろう。なぜ王様は王様なの？ なぜ天皇は天皇なの？ そう言われて、まともに答えられる人はいない。だってまともな答えってないんだもの。昔なら、戦乱の世を平定したとかいう実績があって、その実績（および各種神話的な正当化）をもとにした一族の統治能力への期待がある。それが、王様を王様たらしめているものだ（建前上は）。だけれど、いまの世界各地に残る王家や皇帝一族にはその意味での「実績」がなかなかない。王様がお飾りやシンボル以上の存在であるところはまれだ。君主が本当の意味で統治しているのは、ブータンやアラブ首長国連邦の首長たちくらいかな。
その中で、タイの王家というのはがんばっている。国内のタイレストランに行くだけでも、現在のラーマ九世王がいかに敬愛されているかは感じられるだろう。それは決してお人柄とかそんなものだけではない。政治的にも大きな存在感を持ち、また各種の慈善や貧困開発プロジェクトなどを通じ、国民ともかなりの直接的な接触を持って「治めている」王様だ。タイで数年ごとに風物詩のように繰り返されるクーデターもどきにおいても、最後は王さまが出てきて沙汰を下す。法律や民主主義のお題目がどうあれ、実質的な意味での最終的な主権は明らかに王さまにある。
この本は、そのラーマ九世ことプミボン・アドゥンヤデート王の伝記となる。そしてこの本でわかることは、ラーマ九世は単に世襲で玉座についただけの存在ではないということだ。ある意味でかれは現在の地位を自ら勝ち取ったのであり、だからこそ現在のような力をかれは持ち得ている。
ぼくも知らなかったことだが、ラーマ九世は実はアメリカのボストン地域生まれなのだった。もともとかれの父は王位からはかなり遠く、ボストン留学時に結婚して誕生した兄弟の弟のほうがプミボンだ。折しも当時のシャム王国では、王の圧政に対して台頭してきた市民階級がクーデターを起こし、王様が亡命政府を興して云々といったきわめてきな臭い状況となっていた。各種駆け引きのなかで王はかつての権限や財産をほとんどすべて失い、王室は完全に形骸化していた。
プミボン王子は、そんな状況とは比較的無縁のまま、自由なアメリカ生活を満喫し、ミュージシャンになろうとかレーサーになろうなどと夢見ていたのだけれど（そして自動車事故を起こしたりもしている）、なんだかんだでこの一家に玉座のお鉢がまわってきてしまった。そしてこれまた知らなかったことだが、まず玉座についたのは兄アナンダなのだった。だが、アナンダ王は在位わずか一ヶ月で謎の死をとげる。ピストル自殺なのか、あるいは暗殺かは、未だにわからない。かくてプミボン王子が一九四六年にタイの玉座につく。兄の死後、プミボン王は公式の場では一切笑わなくなったという。本書の題名もそこからきている。
その後のタイの歴史――そしてラーマ九世の歴史――は波乱に満ちたものだ（いまだにそうだ）。十回以上にわたるクーデターの試み。近代化と共産主義勢力、アメリカを筆頭とする勢力の横やり。一時は王の地位すら失いかけ、冷戦期には無力なお飾りとしてバカにされていた。だが王様は、まず失われた王室の財産や地位を少しずつ回復する。さらに各種の地方開発や貧困開発プロジェクトの実施。なかには人工降雨技術を使って、王は雨を呼ぶ力があると無知な農民に思わせる、なんていうあざといのもあるけれど。そうやって信頼を勝ち得る一方で、各種勢力にうまく自分を利用させることで、常にキャスティングボートを握るような位置を確保。失敗や計算ミスもあった。でもそれを辛くも乗り越えた実績を経て、ラマ九世は現在の地位を自ら築き上げてきたのだ。
ただ伝記としての本書は凡庸。波瀾万丈とはいえ、それがしょせんはタイのローカルな事情の中だけに終始し、これだけの素材を扱いつついま一つ広がりがないのは残念。特に、他の王家との比較が少ない。ときどき引き合いに出されるのは、まったく外部との接触がなく、完全なお飾りでしかない日本の天皇家くらいだ。
でも、ぼくはもっと適切な比較対象があると思うのだ。同じインドシナで、類似の勢力にさらされ、アメリカの援助と共産勢力と国の発展と王室維持というパズルに挑んだ別の王家。この欄の読者ならおわかりだろう。カンボジアのシアヌークだ。シアヌークが目指したのは、ある意味でまさにいまのタイ王家のような立場だった。各種反対勢力の仲裁者として、実質的に最高権力を目指す立場。だが自分が目立つことばかりを重視し、感情にまかせて手下の蛮行を自ら奨励し、奥の手として温存すべき絶対権力を気楽に行使しすぎて仲裁すべき勢力そのものをつぶしてクメールルージュの台頭を許し、国を壊滅させてしまった愚かな君主。玉座についてからはアメリカで満喫した自由を封印したプミボン王の節制とバランス感覚の一部でもシアヌークにあれば――本書にはなぜか、シアヌークもカンボジアも一度たりとも登場しないのだけれど、この二人を比べたとき、王様というものの意義とその危うさについて人それぞれ思うところがあるはずだ。
そして本書の問題提起でもあるんだけれど、やはり王室の今後は問題になるだろう。最終的には反民主的な存在である王室、そして結局は既存の（決して腐敗していないとは言い難い）産軍権益との結びつきで成立している王室が、社会の成熟の中で今後どうたちまわるのか？ ある意味で世界でも有数の成功した王室たるタイ王室はの抱える課題は、世界のその他王室にとっても大きな問題として立ちはだかるのだ。この点の踏み込みは甘いのだけれど――それは読者が考えるべきこと、かな。この日本社会の課題としても。
なお、タイ政府は本書の刊行にあまりいい顔をせず、ブッシュ大統領に文句を言ったり、版元のイェール大学出版に抗議したり、出版を阻止せんとあの手この手を尽くしたとか。タイではいまも、王室は絶対無謬であると法律で決まっており（！！）、したがって王室批判は禁止されているそうな。本書がそんなに悪いとは思わないんだがなあ。王がときに民主主義より秩序を優先するというのがアレらしいんだが、王室が完全に民主的なわけないのは定義上明らかなんだから、だれもそれで驚いたりしないと思うんだが。
前号 次号 「一冊の本」レビューインデックス YAMAGATA Hirooトップに戻る
前号 次号 「一冊の本」レビューインデックス YAMAGATA Hirooトップに戻る
YAMAGATA Hiroo
http://cruel.org/onebook/theking.html
FROM asia sentinel ----The King Never Smiles: Book Excerpt
The King Never Smiles: Book Excerpt
Written by Paul Handley
FRIDAY, 08 SEPTEMBER 2006
The Asia Sentinel is privileged to print this chapter from “The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej” by Paul Handley.
Handley reported from Bangkok for many years for the Far Eastern Economic Review. The chapter below describes the bloody 1992 attempts to suppress dissent and the king’s largely unwritten role, which was both different and more ominous than what the public perceived.
Asia Sentinel is grateful to Yale University Press for permission to publish this excerpt
18 May 1992: October 1976 Redux
Related Links:
Royal Maneuvers
Revival, Renewal and Reinvention:
The Complex Life of Thailand’s
Monarch Thai King Bhumibol’s intervention on behalf of the NPKC constitution meant Suchinda and the generals of Class 5 would be able to control government for years. With changing the constitution nearly impossible, their opponents in the democracy movement could do nothing but prepare for the elections. Already the big parties were in full gear as 1992 opened, spending heavily to buy members of parliament and the public’s votes. The main question was whether Suchinda would take the premiership for himself or allow someone else to warm the seat first.
To dominate the March 22 polls, the NPKC-controlled Sammakitham and Chart Thai parties both shamelessly courted the most powerful and corrupt politicians in the country to join them. Sammakitham recruited as party leader the northern Thailand mafioso-politician Narong Wongwan, patron of a large bloc of MPs. Allied by their opposition to NPKC power but not much else, were Chavalit’s New Aspiration, the Democrats led by Chuan Leekpai, and Bangkok governor Chamlong Srimuang’s Palang Dharma. The three campaigned on the need for greater democracy and less military control, stressing that the prime minister should come from among the elected MPs. That put the focus on noncandidate Suchinda, who still denied wanting the job.
Before the election results were known, the NPKC named the new senate. As expected, it was filled with military and police officers. Only 116 of 270 senators were civilians, mostly businessmen and bureaucrats with ties to the military. In a meeting with them at the Supreme Command a week after the election, Suchinda instructed them to vote with one voice—presumably the same as his own. In the lower house election, the generals’ parties barely came out on top. That evening, NPKC chiefs Sunthorn and Kaset summoned the leaders of Sammakitham, Chart Thai, Social Action, and veteran rightist Samak Sunthornvej’s small Prachakorn Thai to air force headquarters to form a government. The Nation wrote that the meeting before military leaders, as well as the location, were ‘‘unbecoming of important political leaders in a democratic system. It sent the generals a message that they could continue to interfere in the parliamentary system
at will.’’
The parties nominated Sammakitham’s Narong for prime minister. Three days later, the U.S. embassy let on that Narong had earlier been denied a visa for suspicion of involvement in heroin trafficking. It fit Narong’s reputation and his huge, unaccountable fortune. Now with a convenient excuse, on April 3 the NPKC generals and the party leaders substituted Suchinda as nominee. Many people believed Narong’s nomination had been Suchinda’s clever subterfuge. Still, even if it was long anticipated, Suchinda’s nomination came as almost a second coup. As the four opposition parties attacked the government, students draped the Democracy Monument in black to symbolize the death of democracy. But there wasn’t much else they could do. On April 7, General Sunthorn and Arthit Urairat, the new speaker of the lower house, submitted Suchinda’s name to the king. Absolving himself, Arthit insisted that Sunthorn made the nomination alone as NPKC chairman. Ignoring the public outcry, King Bhumibol signed off on Suchinda’s appointment. The next day, the former Democratic MP Chalard Vorachart sat down in front of parliament and announced a fast to the death if Suchinda refused to step down.
Chalard, who years before had undertaken a similar protest against Prem, ignited the opposition. Other activists immediately joined him in fasting, even as they endured harassment and threats by Red Guard-type toughs.
The protesters’ numbers grew daily, and when on April 16 parliament opened, the opposition could be seen on national television wearing black in protest. The next day the new cabinet roster said much about Suchinda’s view of himself as a new Prem. While retaining the defense portfolio for himself and naming several Class 5 generals and allies in key positions, he chose technocrat veterans of the Prem and Anand governments for the main economic policy posts. The cabinet included 11 MPs from the Chatichai government whom the NPKC had accused of corruption. It also included political scientist Thinnapan Nakata, a political adviser to Prem for eight years who, sounding much like the king, insisted that neither elected politicians nor the bureaucracy worked effectively for the people. Just before joining Suchinda’s cabinet he said he did not believe in fussing over the principles and methods of democracy. The focus should be the people’s quality of life, not theory. ‘‘Democratic theorists must think of principles that are people-oriented . . . [I am] for the majority of the people. The royal institution is also for the majority of the people.’’
With more than 40 hunger strikers now together with Chalard, on April 20 the opposition political parties organized an anti-Suchinda protest of 50,000 people in front of parliament. Chuan and Chavalit demanded constitutional amendments that would require an elected prime minister, give greater power to the lower house, and shrink the senate. Although the government prohibited broadcast media from reporting the rally, the newspapers were full of the controversial events. Chalard finally collapsed on April 30 and was sent unconscious to a hospital. He lived, and the protesters began to run out of gas.
A presumed last big rally against Suchinda was organized for Sanam Luang on May 4, the day before the Coronation Day holiday. That evening about 60,000 Thais listened to opposition politicians and activists denounce the military and Suchinda, and demand the constitutional amendments. The demonstrators were peaceful and appeared resigned that the fight would be consigned to parliamentary politics as in the Prem years. Then everything changed, when Palang Dharma leader Chamlong read his melodramatic ‘‘last letter from Chamlong Srimuang.’’
He declared that he too was going on a hunger strike, but unlike Chalard he would take only water and no glucose or other aids. ‘‘I have considered it thoroughly and decided to put my life on the line. . . . If I have to leave the world in a few days, I will not regret it. Goodbye.’’ The crowd was deeply moved, and the government and the palace were shocked. Chamlong, a Class 7 graduate of Chulachomklao Military Academy who now lived a fairly ascetic life, was seen by some critics as bizarre and eccentric, while others considered him a potent demagogue. His declaration of a fast to the death seemed to confirm to the establishment that he had a very non-Thai way of thinking and acting.
During Coronation Day rites the next day, as was customary, the king gave an audience to the top members of government and awarded royal decorations to 120 public figures. Leading the list were most of the members of the NPKC and their wives, which many in the pro-democracy camp called an insult. That evening, at a garden party at Government House, the atmosphere was edgy and defensive.
Suchinda told reporters menacingly, ‘‘It’s not difficult to gather a mass of people. I can gather five million tomorrow. Do you want to see that?’’
The government tried to stifle Chamlong’s challenge by censoring media reports. Television reported only on cabinet ministers and a senior monk criticizing
Chamlong’s behavior as destructive to nation, religion, and king. The king’s media adviser Piya Malakul had his Jor Sor 100, the capital’s popular talk-format radio station, run a barrage of denunciations of Chamlong and the protesters. Callers who criticized the government were cut off.
The next day in parliament, just as Suchinda began to deliver his formal policy statement with television cameras broadcasting live, the opposition walked out. Now people saw it was not just a fringe movement against Suchinda. That evening an estimated 80,000 people peacefully protested near parliament as Chamlong’s wife and several others joined his fast. At this point the king was petitioned to intervene by a group of worried academics led by Dr. Prawase Wasi, a respected Buddhist ethicist whom Bhumibol had known since the late 1950s. They told the king that the military had betrayed the people’s trust by turning the 1991 coup into permanent political power, undermining democracy. They fretted that if Chamlong died, the result would be bloody chaos. The king made no official response.
In fact, the military had already taken a key step toward that conclusion. On the day of the opposition walkout, May 6, new army commander Issarapong, Suchinda’s brother-in-law, convened the police and military generals of the capital security committee to set in motion a tactical plan named Pairee Pinat: Destroy the Enemy. More than a thousand heavily armed jungle combat fighters and paratroopers were moved into central Bangkok and put on full alert.
The next day in parliament, the opposition criticized Suchinda’s policy statement point by point. Then Suchinda mounted the podium and delivered, on live television, a furious five-minute denunciation attacking Chamlong as bent on destroying Buddhism, and Chavalit as a communist and republican. Suchinda declared it was his job to defend the nation, Buddhism, and the monarchy against such threats.
All of Bangkok froze at the premier’s harsh language. The stock market immediately plunged and parliament was adjourned in pandemonium. Suchinda had drawn the line for a fight, and with a large force of well-armed troops at hand, he had already determined how it would go.
Pairee Pinat was a tactical approach for fighting a communist-backed insurgency and leftist urban terrorism. It didn’t involve police controls or modern riot equipment. The point was methodical suppression by methods including assassination of key figures, beating and shooting protesters, and mass arrests. It was devised by the United States and taught to allies like South Korea and Thailand in the 1970s. It clearly didn’t work well in Vietnam, nor in South Korea against a pro-democracy uprising in Kwangju in 1980—likewise a year after a military coup—in which more than 200 Koreans were massacred.
When Pairee Pinat was initiated, the troops were issued live ammunition and were told that pro-democracy protesters threatened the country and the holy monarchy itself. Both the king and Prem knew about the operation: Suchinda and Issarapong communicated regularly with palace officials and Prem, who also had his own sources of information in the military. There is no sign that the palace institutionally or the king personally questioned this posture, even though the atmosphere on the streets evoked that of the days before the massacres of October 14, 1973, and October 6, 1976.
Suchinda’s coarse parliamentary attack galvanized about 70,000 Thais to join a protest on May 7, ignoring Kaset’s announcement of a strict ban on demonstrations. They remained entirely peaceful and cooperated with the small contingent of police standing by. The next day more than 200 university academics petitioned the king to dissolve parliament or push Suchinda to step down. Protest leaders found most palace channels closed to them, but Chamlong and Chavalit had direct lines to Prem, ensuring that the throne heard their point of view.
Suchinda maintained the theme that he was protecting the palace. He received a Buddhist group and told them he was fighting political and religious fanaticism. Army-controlled radio and television pressed the idea that Chamlong and Chavalit were communist, republican, anti-Buddhism, and, essentially, un-Thai, and refused to acknowledge the popular foundations of the anti-Suchinda movement.
The king finally responded, cautiously. While he declined to meet anyone from the demonstrators’ side, he called in Suchinda and the military commanders. What was said wasn’t clear, but afterward Suchinda announced on television that he wouldn’t resign, but also would not order a crackdown on the demonstrators. At the same time, however, the military announced that Sanam Luang would have to be cleared for a Buddhist ceremony involving Princess Sirindhorn on Sunday, May 10, and the royal plowing ceremony, scheduled for May 14. This seemed to be the main result of his royal audience.
Early that Friday evening, well over 100,000 protested at Sanam Luang. Still fasting, Chamlong arrived and told the demonstrators to march toward parliament. Before they had gone a kilometer down the broad Rajadamnoen Road, they were halted at Panfah Bridge by a barbed-wire barricade. Behind it were deep ranks of combat-clad troops with automatic weapons, blocking off approaches to parliament and Chitrlada Palace. The next morning, a weakened Chamlong succumbed to what he said were the crowd’s wishes for him to give up his fast. The government gave no ground, however, and instead threatened to forcibly clear the streets by Monday morning.
Bhumibol now intervened openly, pushing the political parties to compromise on amending the constitution. They agreed on amendments that included requiring the prime minister to be an elected MP, making the head of the lower house the president of parliament, and other procedural changes making the lower house more powerful. But because the government parties didn’t commit precisely to when the changes would take place, some 25,000 protesters remained on the street the next day, Sunday. That afternoon the favorite princess Sirindhorn was scheduled to drive down Rajadamnoen for the five o’clock ceremony at Sanam Luang to launch Buddhism Promotion Week.
This became the focus of competing claims of allegiance to the throne. The government said the demonstrators, by not clearing out altogether, were interfering with the princess, and so offended the monarchy. Piya Malakul’s Jor Sor 100 broadcast that the Chamlong-led demonstrators were blocking the path of the princess. To the contrary, under Chamlong’s direction the demonstrators cleaned up the broad avenue and posted portraits of the princess and her parents at curbside hours before her arrival. The street was completely open and secure, like whenever the royal motorcade passed.
But the princess never came. Instead of traversing Rajadamnoen, under military guidance her motorcade took a long evasive detour to Sanam Luang. Demonstrators were confused: Did their princess not trust them? Or had the generals prevented her from coming? Slowly dismay turned to anger, and again the protest crowd began to swell, until late that Sunday night, finally, the government parties committed themselves to a fast amendment process. Just hours before the military moved on the demonstrators, they dispersed.
The king-brokered compromise was short-lived. By Monday evening government party heads Banharn and Kaset reversed themselves and declared there had been no agreement. They had refused, in effect, the king’s demand. As they did, Suchinda threatened hard military retaliation if the demonstrators turned violent. Yet it was the week of the Buddhist holy celebration of Vishaka Puja, and the protest leaders had already decided to reduce their activities and soften their rhetoric.
Thursday, May 14, was the annual observance of the royal plowing ceremony, and the democracy movement stayed quiet as King Bhumibol, Prince Vajiralongkorn, and Princess Sirindhorn attended the rites at Sanam Luang. When the royals traveled to the Temple of the Emerald Buddha in the Grand Palace that Saturday to perform rituals for Vishaka Puja, protesters again stayed away out of respect.
But with the government having reneged on amending the constitution, the protests resumed on Sunday, May 17, now guided by a new organization, the Confederation for Democracy. The confederation was led by a committee of nongovernmental organization directors, labor and student leaders, and political party heads, including Chamlong and Chavalit. They made the point that they were a broad-based movement and not simply a tool for Chamlong’s and Chavalit’s ambitions. When they resumed their demands for the amendments and Suchinda’s resignation, Suchinda assigned a Class 5 police general with a brutal reputation to handle the protests, instead of the more moderate chief of police. The army deployed some 40,000 troops around the capital and established military checkpoints all around Chitrlada Palace. The palace gates were further blockaded by well-armed paratroopers. To some it appeared as if the military was cutting the palace’s access to outside, rather than protecting it.
By eight in the evening on May 17, the crowd at Sanam Luang had reached about 150,000, a cross-section of Bangkok: poor workers, middle-class civil servants and shop owners, and wealthy yuppies. They were much angrier than before. The Confederation for Democracy leadership had earlier decided to march to Government House, where the prime minister and his cabinet worked. Again they were halted at Panfah Bridge, where a brigade of disorganized traffic police waited behind razor wire. Behind them was a phalanx of combat troops with machine guns. Most people remained calm, but some in the crowd began throwing rocks and bottles, some of them clearly trying to provoke a violent confrontation. Over several hours they managed to tear down the razor wire and disable a fire truck that sprayed water on the crowd. Deliberately deployed without riot-control equipment, the police fled in disarray. This provided the military an excuse to step in, a modus operandi of both 1973 and 1976.
As the government declared a state of emergency, the military regrouped at another line farther down Rajadamnoen, with heavier equipment and armored vehicles. But the demonstrators didn’t follow. Most remained at Panfah Bridge, where a small group of men burned a handful of cars and a vacated police station.
They were organized provocateurs, both sides later agreed, though whose has never been established. Still no weapons were used, and injuries were minimal. By two in the morning three-quarters of the protesters had gone home, and at Chamlong’s urging the rest sat down peacefully at the bridge, talking, singing, and dozing in the calm. Wholly unprovoked and without warning, at four o’clock the troops marched on the crowd and began shooting into it. As they scattered, a number lay dead and many more were injured. By the time the sun rose, the blood was being hosed off the street. On television, announcers reported that the protesters had tried to attack Chitrlada Palace. The military claimed the demonstrators had fired first. Both were lies. There was no shooting from demonstrators, and no guns or even knives were found. Nobody went near the palace, and no one had intended to. Nor was there any need to clear the street. Monday was a holiday, and no one was going to work on Rajadamnoen Road.
The palace spent that Monday morning collecting information. Prem talked to all the military men. The other privy councilors talked to their contacts. But prodemocracy groups said they were mostly brushed off. It did not appear that the king was getting a full view of the situation, other than what Suchinda announced on television, that Chamlong’s demonstrators had guns and threatened the throne.
Early Monday afternoon, after Chamlong and several thousand people returned to sit in protest on Rajadamnoen, combat troops descended to arrest them. They mostly fired blanks in the air, but down side streets, away from cameras, more people were shot with live ammunition.
That evening the crowd swelled anew at Sanam Luang, its composition now younger and wilder. The protesters were prevented from marching down Rajadamnoen by new barricades, and as darkness fell, brigades of combat troops encircled the area. The military pointed machine guns at them through the razor wire, and there were sharpshooters on rooftops. They began firing when the protesters set alight several buses and began pushing them toward the barricades. Assassinlike, the rooftop marksmen cut down people at the front of the lines. The ground troops fired into the crowd, several times stopping for a break and then starting again. Scores of protesters were hit, with several dozen killed.
In the early morning hours, finally the military cleared the entire area, issuing arrest orders for leaders of the Confederation for Democracy. As news of the killing spread across Bangkok, people began to ask quietly, where is the king? Why hasn’t he stopped this? Was he behind Suchinda, or was he prevented by the troops and armored cars around the palace from interceding? The questions came from average Thais on the street and from business leaders and members of parliament.
Rumors spread that the king was being held prisoner by the military, or that he had fled the capital with Prem to Nakhon Ratchasima, as in 1981, to muster troops against Suchinda. All of the rumors presumed the king could not have supported Suchinda. But meanwhile the army itself prepared for battle, apparently believing that Chavalit and Chamlong would call on their own loyal army troops to fight back.
All through that Tuesday, May 19, there was no evidence where the royal family stood. In a well-protected motorcade commanded by Kaset, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn went to the airport and left for South Korea. Princess Sirindhorn had left for Paris with Princess Galyani the previous week on an official trip. There were pleas from all around to stop the violence and for the king to intervene. Phra Yanasangworn led the sangha council in a public call for all sides to stop ‘‘killing each other,’’ although no one from the government side had been killed.
Sirindhorn made a taped statement from Paris calling for calm and unity. She said she had tried to call her family but couldn’t get through. This was normal; international telephone lines to Bangkok were usually poor, and at the time they were swamped with calls. But people took it to mean she was prevented from speaking to her father. After that, Suchinda came on television to deny that either he or the royal family had fled Bangkok. He again denounced Chavalit and Chamlong as bent on destroying Buddhism and the monarchy.
The next day, as more rumors spread of coming fighting between military factions, there was still no indication of the king’s position. Suchinda’s forces had blocked off all of the old city center and there was sporadic gunfire. Suchinda made another short televised announcement, mainly to say that he had things under control. With him were governing coalition party leaders Narong, Banharn, and Samak. Samak, as in the 1970s, insisted that shooting the people had been acceptable because they were communists.
That evening, several tens of thousands of demonstrators massed at Ramkhamhaeng University in eastern Bangkok, and the military began to move troops in their direction. Just after ten o’clock, televisions flickered with a grainy picture, the sound almost inaudible. It showed King Bhumibol on a chair with privy councilors Prem and Sanya kneeling at his side, like temple guardians. On the floor in front, their legs tucked behind them in near-prostration, were Chamlong and Suchinda. The king spoke. ‘‘It may not be a surprise as to why I asked you to come to this meeting. . . . But it may be a surprise as to why General Suchinda Kraprayoon and Major General Chamlong Srimuang have been invited, when there may be many other performers and actors involved. However, the two of you have been invited because at the beginning there was a situation in which the two of you were confronting each other, and at the end it has become a confrontation or a struggle on a larger scale.’’ Whatever the issue at stake, if the confrontation continued, he
said, ‘‘It would only lead to the utter destruction of Thailand.’’
To solve the problem, he said, some people had proposed dissolving parliament and holding new elections. But he claimed that the political parties almost unanimously rejected the idea, and so he couldn’t do that. Another solution was to amend the constitution, which, he said, was exactly what he had already recommended in his December 4 speech. Although the constitution was already ‘‘reasonable,’’ he said, this was still a good solution. He then said: ‘‘When I met with General Suchinda, General Suchinda concurred that the constitution should be first promulgated and it could be amended later; that was a possible alternative. And even lately General Suchinda has affirmed that it can be amended. It can be gradually amended so that it will eventually be improved in a ‘democratic’ way. . . . Therefore, I think that if possible, we should consider the alternative suggested in my address of the 4th December to solve the original problem, with a view to solving the present problem.’’
With the country headed toward collapse, he requested that Suchinda and Chamlong ‘‘sit down and face the facts together in a conciliatory manner, and not in a confrontational manner, to find a way to solve the problem, because our country does not belong to any one or two persons, but belongs to everyone. . . .What is the point of anyone feeling proud of being the winner, when standing on a pile of ruins and rubbles?’’ He ended with a Buddhist-like invocation to work together and rebuild the country: ‘‘You personally will feel much better, knowing that you have done the right thing. How you will achieve this will depend on your joint cooperative efforts. These are my observations.’’
Because the sound on television was so bad, for the public the main message was visual, simply that Bhumibol had Chamlong and Suchinda at his feet, with Prem and Sanya alongside as enforcers. ‘‘No man can argue on his knees,’’ wrote Bagehot of a monarch’s power. Not many noted the nucleus of the king’s remarks.
He squarely placed the blame for the eruption on Chamlong and the prodemocracy movement, because they had not acquiesced to his December recommendation to patiently seek the amendments—which, he implied, were of dubious necessity anyway. Suchinda, on the other hand, had generously accepted the king’s position, and he had recently reaffirmed that he was prepared to accept amendments.
The king appeared to be asking, so why were people in the streets fighting?
Rather than recognize truly popular sentiment and acknowledge Suchinda’s government’s refusal to change the charter—and the impossibility of amending it against the military-controlled senate’s will—Bhumibol had rendered it all as Chamlong’s personal vendetta.
The next day, the world was in awe at Bhumibol’s intervention. The violence and protests stopped, although troops remained on the streets. Chamlong was ordered, presumably by Prem in the king’s name, to call off the protests, Suchinda to resign, and the political parties to amend the constitution. While Chamlong disappeared from view, the generals didn’t. Suchinda, Kaset, and Issarapong defended their actions as legal and necessary acts of self-defense against protesters attacking with guns, grenades, and firebombs. There was no truth to it. Suchinda insisted on holding on to the premiership until parliament amended the constitution.
He also demanded an amnesty to protect himself and his military cohorts. Although this outraged the democracy movement, the king went ahead and granted the amnesty. Finally, near noon on Sunday, June 24, after a private audience with Supreme Patriarch Yanasangworn at Wat Bovornives, Suchinda resigned the premiership, declaring that he had fulfilled the king’s own wishes to bring about peace and reconciliation. The next day parliament opened with a longtime Prem and then NPKC legal adviser as acting premier. The lawmakers quickly passed the first and second readings of the desired constitutional amendments.
The final reading was scheduled for two weeks hence. Yet it was not all over. Suchinda remained as minister of defense, and Kaset, Issarapong, and the others kept their military positions. The parties that backed Suchinda still controlled parliament, with the support of the NPKC-appointed senate. Unrepentant, the generals defended themselves in several different forums, including one with incredulous foreign diplomats, declaring they had been protecting the king and country from seditious communist elements. When the
pro-democracy groups called for rescinding the amnesty, they countered with coup threats.
A few days later the five government parties nominated Chart Thai’s Air Chief Marshal Somboon Rahong as prime minister. But when house leader Arthit Urairat submitted the nomination, the palace silently stalled. While nothing was made clear, people understood that the king wanted the constitution amended first.
Some perceived that he recognized that Somboon would cause more problems. After Somboon’s nomination was unofficially reviewed a second time at the beginning of June, Prem declared that the king wanted a premier acceptable to all people.
There were strong rumors that the king wanted his own privy councilor, Chirayut Isarangkul. But the government coalition, still directed by Suchinda and Kaset, insisted on Somboon.
Everyone waited tensely for June 10, the date of the final reading of the constitution. After the amendments were passed, Arthit again went to the palace to submit Somboon’s name. At his home with champagne on ice and surrounded by hundreds of supporters, Somboon waited for the phone call confirming his appointment.
When it came, suddenly his face sank in disbelief. As he said into the telephone, yes, I understand, so did everyone else, and cheers erupted from reporters: the king had again named Anand Panyarachun interim prime minister.
Over the next months Anand smoothed over tensions and stabilized the economy. He dissolved parliament and set national polls for September. They went off
fairly well, with the field of parties polarized as devils—the NPKC-tied parties—and angels, the opposition. The latter came out in front to form a coalition government led by the Democrats, and Chuan Leekpai was made prime minister. It was seen as a new beginning for Thai politics.
Anand’s other delicate responsibility was an accounting of the military’s actions that May. General Pichit Kullavanich, a favorite of Prem and the king (and soon to be made privy councilor), undertook the confidential white-paper review over six weeks. The Pichit report was not released, but Anand revealed that it faulted the military for fundamentally misunderstanding the nature of the demonstrations.
There was no broader analysis of why the Thai military produced such corrupt and ambitious cliques that assumed they had a right to hold power.
Nervously, Anand transferred all the top generals involved in bloody May to powerless posts, effectively ending their careers. They took the transfers unrepentantly, still arguing that the demonstrators were a communist-like front bent on destroying the enduring pillars of nation, religion, and king.
Bhumibol’s regal intervention, shown on television screens and newspaper pages around the world, quickly became a landmark act of great kingship. This was the same year as Queen Elizabeth’s annus horribilis, when her family turmoil, acts of god, the uncontrollable London press, and, most of all, a downturn in public affection conspired to wreck the British monarchy’s majesty. Rama IX’s deft peacemaking provided new evidence for the monarchy’s enduring value near the end of the 20th century.
Not only romanticists felt so. Pundits and scholars wrote paeans to Bhumibol as a Solomonic king who thinks beyond partisan politics and personal wealth to the people. Georgetown University’s David Steinberg, an expert on Burma and a critic of its military junta, bemoaned the lack of a monarch in Rangoon to lessen the suffering of the Burmese. For many Thais, it was yet another confirmation of their sovereign’s greatness. Even Anand, never a man given to hyperbole or promotion, said: ‘‘The King is a sole personality who can tell all sides to stop fighting, to stop the confrontation. There is no place in the world where a civil war raged and then someone could come up and ask everyone to end the fight.’’
There is little doubt that Bhumibol’s intervention on May 20 cut short what could have been a much greater slaughter. Beyond acting as a symbol of unity, the modern constitutional king’s most important role is to mediate in insoluble circumstances and take up leadership when it is absent. Bhumibol did this with unquestionable skill, by reducing the entire episode to a personal feud between two ambitious men and then stopping it. He avoided alienating the demonstrators, his loyal subjects, and condemning the military, the men who protected him. He also skirted the real issues of the constitution.
But how things reached such a point is another question. Europe’s modern sovereigns have overseen great efforts to develop other institutions and the rule of law to avoid such tragedies and to sidestep interventions that put at risk the throne’s prestige. Bhumibol to the contrary had consistently undermined the development of other permanent institutions. He saw them as competitors to his prestige, and not as shields to protect it. This exacerbated the dysfunctional state of government that required his regular intercession. Bagehot spoke precisely to this issue in The English Constitution: ‘‘So long as parliament thinks it is the sovereign’s business to find a government, it will be sure not to find a government itself.’’ As long as the sovereign assumes such business, the deeper he is enmeshed in politics and the more at risk his own power becomes.
May 1992 was a manifestation of the faults in Bhumibol’s ideal of a royal government, of his unrelenting prejudice against politicians, and his miscomprehension of the social changes that had occurred during his long reign. Despite the popularity of politicians like Chamlong and Chatichai, the king remained committed to his generals. They weren’t even the best generals: the corrupt and mercenary Arthit, Chavalit, and Suchinda all rose under Prem while professional, nonpolitical soldiers fell by the wayside. Yet the king and queen preferred them to even clean politicians. When Bhumibol expressed his preference for soldiers in December 1990, it provided Suchinda justification to seize power.
The king’s defenders say that Bhumibol had no choice but to accept the NPKC takeover, while also insisting it was a popular coup. Neither is exactly true. There was a widespread swing of public sentiment against Chatichai—fomented by both the military and the king’s own remarks—but it didn’t represent a popular call for a military takeover. At the time Bhumibol made no point of standing for a constitution-based transition that might have denied Suchinda power. Moreover, he declined to exercise his prerogative to dissolve parliament and set elections. Such royal powers are not inconsequential simply because they are seldom used. They are specifically for political emergencies.
After the coup, a few well-worded comments for constitutional and democratic principles would have left the junta on warning. Instead, following a year that exposed the generals’ venality, in December 1991 Bhumibol generously endorsed Suchinda’s leadership when he said there was no need to stick to theoretical principles or rule books. His intervention on the constitution, too, was premature: he did not wait until after the parliament voted. As the eruption five months later showed, the king’s habitual interventions left parliament dependent on the sovereign to make its decisions. Responsibilities for controlling the military, changing the charter, and choosing a new prime minister were ceded to the king.
Bhumibol’s skill in saving the day after the bloody convulsion of May 18–20 helped to hide his consistent bias against protesters and popular movements. But all the markers were there, from his silence on the Pairee Pinat preparations to the route change of the princess’s motorcade, to the shrill propaganda in media controlled by palace agents like Piya Malakul. With practiced deftness, however, as in October 1973, the king reserved just enough distance from the generals to emerge still the people’s king. When he appeared to blame Suchinda and Chamlong personally, the protesters could understand that he wasn’t saying the people were wrong. Because the constitution was finally to be amended, they could believe that Bhumibol was on their side.
Even so, there is the problem that Bhumibol acted only three days after the first demonstrators were killed. Aware of this gap in time and credibility, the palace’s defenders afterward insisted that Bhumibol didn’t like Suchinda but, unable to control the general, had to wait until Suchinda’s clique discredited themselves. It was almost an official argument, given how many people around the palace repeated it. One palace intimate explained: ‘‘When the king intervenes, he must succeed. He must know the territory he is charting. This explains the delay.’’
A senior prince called it the ‘‘silver bullet principle’’: the king has but one chance to intervene, and it has to hit the bull’s-eye. He couldn’t even risk declaring a dissolution of parliament, for fear Suchinda would ignore it. His prestige would have been exposed as lacking substance.
Interestingly, the palace agents never claimed the king was out of touch or misinformed, which could have explained the three-day gap. That argument could have dented his omniscient image, and it also would not have been true. Early on he assigned Prem to take charge of the whole situation, and Prem communicated constantly with the generals and many others, and kept Bhumibol briefed. The other privy councilors worked their own networks of informants. There was no real sign that Bhumibol was held hostage inside Chitrlada. If one accepts the silver bullet argument, it suggests a deep fault in his preference for the military, for clearly Suchinda and the NPKC generals were not more loyal, disciplined, or obedient than other Thais. And if Suchinda and his Class 5 cohorts were an exception, a rogue operation, how did they ever get so far?
Moreover, why then did the king pin most of the blame on Chamlong on May 20? Chamlong was rebuked for ignoring his December advice on the constitution, while Suchinda was praised for having agreed that amendments could be made. To assign guilt in this way, Bhumibol ignored the fact that the constitution and parliament were structured to defeat any amendment opposed by the generals. He also ignored Suchinda’s broken promises to amend the charter.
In the same way, the king avoided the conclusion, widely accepted among respected Thais like Anand, foreign diplomats, and academics, that there was a massive institutional problem in the Thai military. This was clear in the generals’ continuing defiance over the months after the May crisis. On the same day that Suchinda resigned, the army commanders held a meeting to declare their unity and defend the assault on the demonstrators. In July, Kaset threatened that a coup was still possible. Even after Anand sidelined the generals, the military openly assisted at least two parties in the election campaign, mobilizing the Red Gaur, Village Scouts, and ISOC to justify the May massacre to voters, insisting it was about a communist threat to nation, religion, and king.
Indeed, Bhumibol himself defended the military in those months. At the end of October, he received in audience 256 newly promoted senior colonels and generals. He made no critical reference to May and instead took to task the military’s critics. The Far Eastern Economic Review had repeated long-standing criticisms of the Thai military, that it remained incapable of convincingly defending its own borders, and yet maintained perhaps the most bloated officers corps in the world, with one general for every 300–350 troops, ten times the level of the West. Of the 600 generals in the army and supreme command headquarters, only half had identifiable jobs, the magazine noted. Bhumibol denied this, arguing that critics had counted retired generals—which they hadn’t. The very number of newly promoted generals in front of him was clear evidence, but still he insisted: ‘‘It has been widely said today that we have too many generals. If so, then there would be no point in bestowing the rank of general on about 200 officers today. The criticism may hurt your feelings but as a matter of fact we have a lower number of generals than foreign countries, in the West or the East. . . . The number of generals in Thailand is not that high and our armed forces are not top-heavy as was said. In fact, [the number] is small.’’
In December Bhumibol again placed the blame on Chamlong, Chavalit, and the protesters. He told the parable of a child who, confronted by a specific problem, ignored ready solutions to instead stir up an elephant, sending the elephant into a fury, setting off a violent chain reaction that finally resolved the original problem, only after much unnecessary chaos. ‘‘The situation nowadays is like the story, confused. On any subject, one person says something, another comes to refute it, using irreconcilable arguments. And how can the country be governed, how can work be done, how can we have anything done, if everything is out of tune? . . . In the end, the obstinate, dogmatic one will win the argument; but that is not good, that is not right. . . . [O]ne must not stipulate too many conditions. Any action must be constructive and everyone will be happy.’’
The audience understood that the message was for the pro-democracy movement, those the king felt unnecessarily pestered the blameless military elephant until all turmoil broke loose.
Even after the dust of May 1992 settled, the king still rejected the conclusions of numerous Thai and foreign scholars, politicians, and businessmen, that the upheaval was the result of an undeveloped political system, one excessively reliant on the monarchy and military to govern and manage development. Bhumibol’s stubborn hold on his own views was clear in an astonishing episode in early 1993. While Thailand was struggling with democratic processes and ambitious generals, neighboring Burma suffered the misrule of a paranoid and brutal military junta, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or Slorc. They had crushed a popular revolt in 1988 and jailed members of the political opposition, including their leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Still under house arrest, in October 1991 Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of their struggle.
In February 1993 eight previous Nobel Peace laureates visited Thailand, as Burma’s closest neighbor, to demonstrate their solidarity. Oscar Arias, the former president of Costa Rica, South Africa’s Desmond Tutu, the Dalai Lama of Tibet, and five others were invited by Thai social activists, to the great consternation of the Thai military. After visiting the destitute Burmese refugee camps on the northern Thai border, the group was received by King Bhumibol. They were astounded to hear him lecture them on how Aung San Suu Kyi should give up her fight and return to England to raise her children, and let Slorc run the country. Military governments were good for developing countries, the king insisted, and there was no need to support the Burmese opposition. Suu Kyi was only a troublemaker.
It wasn’t the only time the king said such things. He lobbied American diplomats and foreign academics to accept Slorc as bringing stability to Burma. Like the Slorc generals, he argued from his palace chambers that because Suu Kyi was married to a foreigner and had been educated abroad, she didn’t represent traditional Burmese values, so she ought to return to England and her family there.
Outside Chitrlada Palace, however, a new generation of Thais was cheering for Suu Kyi, and the official policy of the newly elected government of Chuan Leekpai was to support her pro-democracy movement.
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Censorship of Thai translations
written by anonymous user, March 10, 2007
Several sections of the book have been anonymously translated into Thai.
Some royalist editors on Thai Wikipedia insist on deleting links to partial translations of The King Never Smiles on the grounds that they are political propaganda.
The Wikipedia article stub is here, the stub discussion page is here.
The translated introduction is available here: http://www.geocities.com/kingn...ntro.html.
The translated 15th chapter is available here: http://tknsthai.googlepages.com.
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=155&Itemid=34
Written by Paul Handley
FRIDAY, 08 SEPTEMBER 2006
The Asia Sentinel is privileged to print this chapter from “The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej” by Paul Handley.
Handley reported from Bangkok for many years for the Far Eastern Economic Review. The chapter below describes the bloody 1992 attempts to suppress dissent and the king’s largely unwritten role, which was both different and more ominous than what the public perceived.
Asia Sentinel is grateful to Yale University Press for permission to publish this excerpt
18 May 1992: October 1976 Redux
Related Links:
Royal Maneuvers
Revival, Renewal and Reinvention:
The Complex Life of Thailand’s
Monarch Thai King Bhumibol’s intervention on behalf of the NPKC constitution meant Suchinda and the generals of Class 5 would be able to control government for years. With changing the constitution nearly impossible, their opponents in the democracy movement could do nothing but prepare for the elections. Already the big parties were in full gear as 1992 opened, spending heavily to buy members of parliament and the public’s votes. The main question was whether Suchinda would take the premiership for himself or allow someone else to warm the seat first.
To dominate the March 22 polls, the NPKC-controlled Sammakitham and Chart Thai parties both shamelessly courted the most powerful and corrupt politicians in the country to join them. Sammakitham recruited as party leader the northern Thailand mafioso-politician Narong Wongwan, patron of a large bloc of MPs. Allied by their opposition to NPKC power but not much else, were Chavalit’s New Aspiration, the Democrats led by Chuan Leekpai, and Bangkok governor Chamlong Srimuang’s Palang Dharma. The three campaigned on the need for greater democracy and less military control, stressing that the prime minister should come from among the elected MPs. That put the focus on noncandidate Suchinda, who still denied wanting the job.
Before the election results were known, the NPKC named the new senate. As expected, it was filled with military and police officers. Only 116 of 270 senators were civilians, mostly businessmen and bureaucrats with ties to the military. In a meeting with them at the Supreme Command a week after the election, Suchinda instructed them to vote with one voice—presumably the same as his own. In the lower house election, the generals’ parties barely came out on top. That evening, NPKC chiefs Sunthorn and Kaset summoned the leaders of Sammakitham, Chart Thai, Social Action, and veteran rightist Samak Sunthornvej’s small Prachakorn Thai to air force headquarters to form a government. The Nation wrote that the meeting before military leaders, as well as the location, were ‘‘unbecoming of important political leaders in a democratic system. It sent the generals a message that they could continue to interfere in the parliamentary system
at will.’’
The parties nominated Sammakitham’s Narong for prime minister. Three days later, the U.S. embassy let on that Narong had earlier been denied a visa for suspicion of involvement in heroin trafficking. It fit Narong’s reputation and his huge, unaccountable fortune. Now with a convenient excuse, on April 3 the NPKC generals and the party leaders substituted Suchinda as nominee. Many people believed Narong’s nomination had been Suchinda’s clever subterfuge. Still, even if it was long anticipated, Suchinda’s nomination came as almost a second coup. As the four opposition parties attacked the government, students draped the Democracy Monument in black to symbolize the death of democracy. But there wasn’t much else they could do. On April 7, General Sunthorn and Arthit Urairat, the new speaker of the lower house, submitted Suchinda’s name to the king. Absolving himself, Arthit insisted that Sunthorn made the nomination alone as NPKC chairman. Ignoring the public outcry, King Bhumibol signed off on Suchinda’s appointment. The next day, the former Democratic MP Chalard Vorachart sat down in front of parliament and announced a fast to the death if Suchinda refused to step down.
Chalard, who years before had undertaken a similar protest against Prem, ignited the opposition. Other activists immediately joined him in fasting, even as they endured harassment and threats by Red Guard-type toughs.
The protesters’ numbers grew daily, and when on April 16 parliament opened, the opposition could be seen on national television wearing black in protest. The next day the new cabinet roster said much about Suchinda’s view of himself as a new Prem. While retaining the defense portfolio for himself and naming several Class 5 generals and allies in key positions, he chose technocrat veterans of the Prem and Anand governments for the main economic policy posts. The cabinet included 11 MPs from the Chatichai government whom the NPKC had accused of corruption. It also included political scientist Thinnapan Nakata, a political adviser to Prem for eight years who, sounding much like the king, insisted that neither elected politicians nor the bureaucracy worked effectively for the people. Just before joining Suchinda’s cabinet he said he did not believe in fussing over the principles and methods of democracy. The focus should be the people’s quality of life, not theory. ‘‘Democratic theorists must think of principles that are people-oriented . . . [I am] for the majority of the people. The royal institution is also for the majority of the people.’’
With more than 40 hunger strikers now together with Chalard, on April 20 the opposition political parties organized an anti-Suchinda protest of 50,000 people in front of parliament. Chuan and Chavalit demanded constitutional amendments that would require an elected prime minister, give greater power to the lower house, and shrink the senate. Although the government prohibited broadcast media from reporting the rally, the newspapers were full of the controversial events. Chalard finally collapsed on April 30 and was sent unconscious to a hospital. He lived, and the protesters began to run out of gas.
A presumed last big rally against Suchinda was organized for Sanam Luang on May 4, the day before the Coronation Day holiday. That evening about 60,000 Thais listened to opposition politicians and activists denounce the military and Suchinda, and demand the constitutional amendments. The demonstrators were peaceful and appeared resigned that the fight would be consigned to parliamentary politics as in the Prem years. Then everything changed, when Palang Dharma leader Chamlong read his melodramatic ‘‘last letter from Chamlong Srimuang.’’
He declared that he too was going on a hunger strike, but unlike Chalard he would take only water and no glucose or other aids. ‘‘I have considered it thoroughly and decided to put my life on the line. . . . If I have to leave the world in a few days, I will not regret it. Goodbye.’’ The crowd was deeply moved, and the government and the palace were shocked. Chamlong, a Class 7 graduate of Chulachomklao Military Academy who now lived a fairly ascetic life, was seen by some critics as bizarre and eccentric, while others considered him a potent demagogue. His declaration of a fast to the death seemed to confirm to the establishment that he had a very non-Thai way of thinking and acting.
During Coronation Day rites the next day, as was customary, the king gave an audience to the top members of government and awarded royal decorations to 120 public figures. Leading the list were most of the members of the NPKC and their wives, which many in the pro-democracy camp called an insult. That evening, at a garden party at Government House, the atmosphere was edgy and defensive.
Suchinda told reporters menacingly, ‘‘It’s not difficult to gather a mass of people. I can gather five million tomorrow. Do you want to see that?’’
The government tried to stifle Chamlong’s challenge by censoring media reports. Television reported only on cabinet ministers and a senior monk criticizing
Chamlong’s behavior as destructive to nation, religion, and king. The king’s media adviser Piya Malakul had his Jor Sor 100, the capital’s popular talk-format radio station, run a barrage of denunciations of Chamlong and the protesters. Callers who criticized the government were cut off.
The next day in parliament, just as Suchinda began to deliver his formal policy statement with television cameras broadcasting live, the opposition walked out. Now people saw it was not just a fringe movement against Suchinda. That evening an estimated 80,000 people peacefully protested near parliament as Chamlong’s wife and several others joined his fast. At this point the king was petitioned to intervene by a group of worried academics led by Dr. Prawase Wasi, a respected Buddhist ethicist whom Bhumibol had known since the late 1950s. They told the king that the military had betrayed the people’s trust by turning the 1991 coup into permanent political power, undermining democracy. They fretted that if Chamlong died, the result would be bloody chaos. The king made no official response.
In fact, the military had already taken a key step toward that conclusion. On the day of the opposition walkout, May 6, new army commander Issarapong, Suchinda’s brother-in-law, convened the police and military generals of the capital security committee to set in motion a tactical plan named Pairee Pinat: Destroy the Enemy. More than a thousand heavily armed jungle combat fighters and paratroopers were moved into central Bangkok and put on full alert.
The next day in parliament, the opposition criticized Suchinda’s policy statement point by point. Then Suchinda mounted the podium and delivered, on live television, a furious five-minute denunciation attacking Chamlong as bent on destroying Buddhism, and Chavalit as a communist and republican. Suchinda declared it was his job to defend the nation, Buddhism, and the monarchy against such threats.
All of Bangkok froze at the premier’s harsh language. The stock market immediately plunged and parliament was adjourned in pandemonium. Suchinda had drawn the line for a fight, and with a large force of well-armed troops at hand, he had already determined how it would go.
Pairee Pinat was a tactical approach for fighting a communist-backed insurgency and leftist urban terrorism. It didn’t involve police controls or modern riot equipment. The point was methodical suppression by methods including assassination of key figures, beating and shooting protesters, and mass arrests. It was devised by the United States and taught to allies like South Korea and Thailand in the 1970s. It clearly didn’t work well in Vietnam, nor in South Korea against a pro-democracy uprising in Kwangju in 1980—likewise a year after a military coup—in which more than 200 Koreans were massacred.
When Pairee Pinat was initiated, the troops were issued live ammunition and were told that pro-democracy protesters threatened the country and the holy monarchy itself. Both the king and Prem knew about the operation: Suchinda and Issarapong communicated regularly with palace officials and Prem, who also had his own sources of information in the military. There is no sign that the palace institutionally or the king personally questioned this posture, even though the atmosphere on the streets evoked that of the days before the massacres of October 14, 1973, and October 6, 1976.
Suchinda’s coarse parliamentary attack galvanized about 70,000 Thais to join a protest on May 7, ignoring Kaset’s announcement of a strict ban on demonstrations. They remained entirely peaceful and cooperated with the small contingent of police standing by. The next day more than 200 university academics petitioned the king to dissolve parliament or push Suchinda to step down. Protest leaders found most palace channels closed to them, but Chamlong and Chavalit had direct lines to Prem, ensuring that the throne heard their point of view.
Suchinda maintained the theme that he was protecting the palace. He received a Buddhist group and told them he was fighting political and religious fanaticism. Army-controlled radio and television pressed the idea that Chamlong and Chavalit were communist, republican, anti-Buddhism, and, essentially, un-Thai, and refused to acknowledge the popular foundations of the anti-Suchinda movement.
The king finally responded, cautiously. While he declined to meet anyone from the demonstrators’ side, he called in Suchinda and the military commanders. What was said wasn’t clear, but afterward Suchinda announced on television that he wouldn’t resign, but also would not order a crackdown on the demonstrators. At the same time, however, the military announced that Sanam Luang would have to be cleared for a Buddhist ceremony involving Princess Sirindhorn on Sunday, May 10, and the royal plowing ceremony, scheduled for May 14. This seemed to be the main result of his royal audience.
Early that Friday evening, well over 100,000 protested at Sanam Luang. Still fasting, Chamlong arrived and told the demonstrators to march toward parliament. Before they had gone a kilometer down the broad Rajadamnoen Road, they were halted at Panfah Bridge by a barbed-wire barricade. Behind it were deep ranks of combat-clad troops with automatic weapons, blocking off approaches to parliament and Chitrlada Palace. The next morning, a weakened Chamlong succumbed to what he said were the crowd’s wishes for him to give up his fast. The government gave no ground, however, and instead threatened to forcibly clear the streets by Monday morning.
Bhumibol now intervened openly, pushing the political parties to compromise on amending the constitution. They agreed on amendments that included requiring the prime minister to be an elected MP, making the head of the lower house the president of parliament, and other procedural changes making the lower house more powerful. But because the government parties didn’t commit precisely to when the changes would take place, some 25,000 protesters remained on the street the next day, Sunday. That afternoon the favorite princess Sirindhorn was scheduled to drive down Rajadamnoen for the five o’clock ceremony at Sanam Luang to launch Buddhism Promotion Week.
This became the focus of competing claims of allegiance to the throne. The government said the demonstrators, by not clearing out altogether, were interfering with the princess, and so offended the monarchy. Piya Malakul’s Jor Sor 100 broadcast that the Chamlong-led demonstrators were blocking the path of the princess. To the contrary, under Chamlong’s direction the demonstrators cleaned up the broad avenue and posted portraits of the princess and her parents at curbside hours before her arrival. The street was completely open and secure, like whenever the royal motorcade passed.
But the princess never came. Instead of traversing Rajadamnoen, under military guidance her motorcade took a long evasive detour to Sanam Luang. Demonstrators were confused: Did their princess not trust them? Or had the generals prevented her from coming? Slowly dismay turned to anger, and again the protest crowd began to swell, until late that Sunday night, finally, the government parties committed themselves to a fast amendment process. Just hours before the military moved on the demonstrators, they dispersed.
The king-brokered compromise was short-lived. By Monday evening government party heads Banharn and Kaset reversed themselves and declared there had been no agreement. They had refused, in effect, the king’s demand. As they did, Suchinda threatened hard military retaliation if the demonstrators turned violent. Yet it was the week of the Buddhist holy celebration of Vishaka Puja, and the protest leaders had already decided to reduce their activities and soften their rhetoric.
Thursday, May 14, was the annual observance of the royal plowing ceremony, and the democracy movement stayed quiet as King Bhumibol, Prince Vajiralongkorn, and Princess Sirindhorn attended the rites at Sanam Luang. When the royals traveled to the Temple of the Emerald Buddha in the Grand Palace that Saturday to perform rituals for Vishaka Puja, protesters again stayed away out of respect.
But with the government having reneged on amending the constitution, the protests resumed on Sunday, May 17, now guided by a new organization, the Confederation for Democracy. The confederation was led by a committee of nongovernmental organization directors, labor and student leaders, and political party heads, including Chamlong and Chavalit. They made the point that they were a broad-based movement and not simply a tool for Chamlong’s and Chavalit’s ambitions. When they resumed their demands for the amendments and Suchinda’s resignation, Suchinda assigned a Class 5 police general with a brutal reputation to handle the protests, instead of the more moderate chief of police. The army deployed some 40,000 troops around the capital and established military checkpoints all around Chitrlada Palace. The palace gates were further blockaded by well-armed paratroopers. To some it appeared as if the military was cutting the palace’s access to outside, rather than protecting it.
By eight in the evening on May 17, the crowd at Sanam Luang had reached about 150,000, a cross-section of Bangkok: poor workers, middle-class civil servants and shop owners, and wealthy yuppies. They were much angrier than before. The Confederation for Democracy leadership had earlier decided to march to Government House, where the prime minister and his cabinet worked. Again they were halted at Panfah Bridge, where a brigade of disorganized traffic police waited behind razor wire. Behind them was a phalanx of combat troops with machine guns. Most people remained calm, but some in the crowd began throwing rocks and bottles, some of them clearly trying to provoke a violent confrontation. Over several hours they managed to tear down the razor wire and disable a fire truck that sprayed water on the crowd. Deliberately deployed without riot-control equipment, the police fled in disarray. This provided the military an excuse to step in, a modus operandi of both 1973 and 1976.
As the government declared a state of emergency, the military regrouped at another line farther down Rajadamnoen, with heavier equipment and armored vehicles. But the demonstrators didn’t follow. Most remained at Panfah Bridge, where a small group of men burned a handful of cars and a vacated police station.
They were organized provocateurs, both sides later agreed, though whose has never been established. Still no weapons were used, and injuries were minimal. By two in the morning three-quarters of the protesters had gone home, and at Chamlong’s urging the rest sat down peacefully at the bridge, talking, singing, and dozing in the calm. Wholly unprovoked and without warning, at four o’clock the troops marched on the crowd and began shooting into it. As they scattered, a number lay dead and many more were injured. By the time the sun rose, the blood was being hosed off the street. On television, announcers reported that the protesters had tried to attack Chitrlada Palace. The military claimed the demonstrators had fired first. Both were lies. There was no shooting from demonstrators, and no guns or even knives were found. Nobody went near the palace, and no one had intended to. Nor was there any need to clear the street. Monday was a holiday, and no one was going to work on Rajadamnoen Road.
The palace spent that Monday morning collecting information. Prem talked to all the military men. The other privy councilors talked to their contacts. But prodemocracy groups said they were mostly brushed off. It did not appear that the king was getting a full view of the situation, other than what Suchinda announced on television, that Chamlong’s demonstrators had guns and threatened the throne.
Early Monday afternoon, after Chamlong and several thousand people returned to sit in protest on Rajadamnoen, combat troops descended to arrest them. They mostly fired blanks in the air, but down side streets, away from cameras, more people were shot with live ammunition.
That evening the crowd swelled anew at Sanam Luang, its composition now younger and wilder. The protesters were prevented from marching down Rajadamnoen by new barricades, and as darkness fell, brigades of combat troops encircled the area. The military pointed machine guns at them through the razor wire, and there were sharpshooters on rooftops. They began firing when the protesters set alight several buses and began pushing them toward the barricades. Assassinlike, the rooftop marksmen cut down people at the front of the lines. The ground troops fired into the crowd, several times stopping for a break and then starting again. Scores of protesters were hit, with several dozen killed.
In the early morning hours, finally the military cleared the entire area, issuing arrest orders for leaders of the Confederation for Democracy. As news of the killing spread across Bangkok, people began to ask quietly, where is the king? Why hasn’t he stopped this? Was he behind Suchinda, or was he prevented by the troops and armored cars around the palace from interceding? The questions came from average Thais on the street and from business leaders and members of parliament.
Rumors spread that the king was being held prisoner by the military, or that he had fled the capital with Prem to Nakhon Ratchasima, as in 1981, to muster troops against Suchinda. All of the rumors presumed the king could not have supported Suchinda. But meanwhile the army itself prepared for battle, apparently believing that Chavalit and Chamlong would call on their own loyal army troops to fight back.
All through that Tuesday, May 19, there was no evidence where the royal family stood. In a well-protected motorcade commanded by Kaset, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn went to the airport and left for South Korea. Princess Sirindhorn had left for Paris with Princess Galyani the previous week on an official trip. There were pleas from all around to stop the violence and for the king to intervene. Phra Yanasangworn led the sangha council in a public call for all sides to stop ‘‘killing each other,’’ although no one from the government side had been killed.
Sirindhorn made a taped statement from Paris calling for calm and unity. She said she had tried to call her family but couldn’t get through. This was normal; international telephone lines to Bangkok were usually poor, and at the time they were swamped with calls. But people took it to mean she was prevented from speaking to her father. After that, Suchinda came on television to deny that either he or the royal family had fled Bangkok. He again denounced Chavalit and Chamlong as bent on destroying Buddhism and the monarchy.
The next day, as more rumors spread of coming fighting between military factions, there was still no indication of the king’s position. Suchinda’s forces had blocked off all of the old city center and there was sporadic gunfire. Suchinda made another short televised announcement, mainly to say that he had things under control. With him were governing coalition party leaders Narong, Banharn, and Samak. Samak, as in the 1970s, insisted that shooting the people had been acceptable because they were communists.
That evening, several tens of thousands of demonstrators massed at Ramkhamhaeng University in eastern Bangkok, and the military began to move troops in their direction. Just after ten o’clock, televisions flickered with a grainy picture, the sound almost inaudible. It showed King Bhumibol on a chair with privy councilors Prem and Sanya kneeling at his side, like temple guardians. On the floor in front, their legs tucked behind them in near-prostration, were Chamlong and Suchinda. The king spoke. ‘‘It may not be a surprise as to why I asked you to come to this meeting. . . . But it may be a surprise as to why General Suchinda Kraprayoon and Major General Chamlong Srimuang have been invited, when there may be many other performers and actors involved. However, the two of you have been invited because at the beginning there was a situation in which the two of you were confronting each other, and at the end it has become a confrontation or a struggle on a larger scale.’’ Whatever the issue at stake, if the confrontation continued, he
said, ‘‘It would only lead to the utter destruction of Thailand.’’
To solve the problem, he said, some people had proposed dissolving parliament and holding new elections. But he claimed that the political parties almost unanimously rejected the idea, and so he couldn’t do that. Another solution was to amend the constitution, which, he said, was exactly what he had already recommended in his December 4 speech. Although the constitution was already ‘‘reasonable,’’ he said, this was still a good solution. He then said: ‘‘When I met with General Suchinda, General Suchinda concurred that the constitution should be first promulgated and it could be amended later; that was a possible alternative. And even lately General Suchinda has affirmed that it can be amended. It can be gradually amended so that it will eventually be improved in a ‘democratic’ way. . . . Therefore, I think that if possible, we should consider the alternative suggested in my address of the 4th December to solve the original problem, with a view to solving the present problem.’’
With the country headed toward collapse, he requested that Suchinda and Chamlong ‘‘sit down and face the facts together in a conciliatory manner, and not in a confrontational manner, to find a way to solve the problem, because our country does not belong to any one or two persons, but belongs to everyone. . . .What is the point of anyone feeling proud of being the winner, when standing on a pile of ruins and rubbles?’’ He ended with a Buddhist-like invocation to work together and rebuild the country: ‘‘You personally will feel much better, knowing that you have done the right thing. How you will achieve this will depend on your joint cooperative efforts. These are my observations.’’
Because the sound on television was so bad, for the public the main message was visual, simply that Bhumibol had Chamlong and Suchinda at his feet, with Prem and Sanya alongside as enforcers. ‘‘No man can argue on his knees,’’ wrote Bagehot of a monarch’s power. Not many noted the nucleus of the king’s remarks.
He squarely placed the blame for the eruption on Chamlong and the prodemocracy movement, because they had not acquiesced to his December recommendation to patiently seek the amendments—which, he implied, were of dubious necessity anyway. Suchinda, on the other hand, had generously accepted the king’s position, and he had recently reaffirmed that he was prepared to accept amendments.
The king appeared to be asking, so why were people in the streets fighting?
Rather than recognize truly popular sentiment and acknowledge Suchinda’s government’s refusal to change the charter—and the impossibility of amending it against the military-controlled senate’s will—Bhumibol had rendered it all as Chamlong’s personal vendetta.
The next day, the world was in awe at Bhumibol’s intervention. The violence and protests stopped, although troops remained on the streets. Chamlong was ordered, presumably by Prem in the king’s name, to call off the protests, Suchinda to resign, and the political parties to amend the constitution. While Chamlong disappeared from view, the generals didn’t. Suchinda, Kaset, and Issarapong defended their actions as legal and necessary acts of self-defense against protesters attacking with guns, grenades, and firebombs. There was no truth to it. Suchinda insisted on holding on to the premiership until parliament amended the constitution.
He also demanded an amnesty to protect himself and his military cohorts. Although this outraged the democracy movement, the king went ahead and granted the amnesty. Finally, near noon on Sunday, June 24, after a private audience with Supreme Patriarch Yanasangworn at Wat Bovornives, Suchinda resigned the premiership, declaring that he had fulfilled the king’s own wishes to bring about peace and reconciliation. The next day parliament opened with a longtime Prem and then NPKC legal adviser as acting premier. The lawmakers quickly passed the first and second readings of the desired constitutional amendments.
The final reading was scheduled for two weeks hence. Yet it was not all over. Suchinda remained as minister of defense, and Kaset, Issarapong, and the others kept their military positions. The parties that backed Suchinda still controlled parliament, with the support of the NPKC-appointed senate. Unrepentant, the generals defended themselves in several different forums, including one with incredulous foreign diplomats, declaring they had been protecting the king and country from seditious communist elements. When the
pro-democracy groups called for rescinding the amnesty, they countered with coup threats.
A few days later the five government parties nominated Chart Thai’s Air Chief Marshal Somboon Rahong as prime minister. But when house leader Arthit Urairat submitted the nomination, the palace silently stalled. While nothing was made clear, people understood that the king wanted the constitution amended first.
Some perceived that he recognized that Somboon would cause more problems. After Somboon’s nomination was unofficially reviewed a second time at the beginning of June, Prem declared that the king wanted a premier acceptable to all people.
There were strong rumors that the king wanted his own privy councilor, Chirayut Isarangkul. But the government coalition, still directed by Suchinda and Kaset, insisted on Somboon.
Everyone waited tensely for June 10, the date of the final reading of the constitution. After the amendments were passed, Arthit again went to the palace to submit Somboon’s name. At his home with champagne on ice and surrounded by hundreds of supporters, Somboon waited for the phone call confirming his appointment.
When it came, suddenly his face sank in disbelief. As he said into the telephone, yes, I understand, so did everyone else, and cheers erupted from reporters: the king had again named Anand Panyarachun interim prime minister.
Over the next months Anand smoothed over tensions and stabilized the economy. He dissolved parliament and set national polls for September. They went off
fairly well, with the field of parties polarized as devils—the NPKC-tied parties—and angels, the opposition. The latter came out in front to form a coalition government led by the Democrats, and Chuan Leekpai was made prime minister. It was seen as a new beginning for Thai politics.
Anand’s other delicate responsibility was an accounting of the military’s actions that May. General Pichit Kullavanich, a favorite of Prem and the king (and soon to be made privy councilor), undertook the confidential white-paper review over six weeks. The Pichit report was not released, but Anand revealed that it faulted the military for fundamentally misunderstanding the nature of the demonstrations.
There was no broader analysis of why the Thai military produced such corrupt and ambitious cliques that assumed they had a right to hold power.
Nervously, Anand transferred all the top generals involved in bloody May to powerless posts, effectively ending their careers. They took the transfers unrepentantly, still arguing that the demonstrators were a communist-like front bent on destroying the enduring pillars of nation, religion, and king.
Bhumibol’s regal intervention, shown on television screens and newspaper pages around the world, quickly became a landmark act of great kingship. This was the same year as Queen Elizabeth’s annus horribilis, when her family turmoil, acts of god, the uncontrollable London press, and, most of all, a downturn in public affection conspired to wreck the British monarchy’s majesty. Rama IX’s deft peacemaking provided new evidence for the monarchy’s enduring value near the end of the 20th century.
Not only romanticists felt so. Pundits and scholars wrote paeans to Bhumibol as a Solomonic king who thinks beyond partisan politics and personal wealth to the people. Georgetown University’s David Steinberg, an expert on Burma and a critic of its military junta, bemoaned the lack of a monarch in Rangoon to lessen the suffering of the Burmese. For many Thais, it was yet another confirmation of their sovereign’s greatness. Even Anand, never a man given to hyperbole or promotion, said: ‘‘The King is a sole personality who can tell all sides to stop fighting, to stop the confrontation. There is no place in the world where a civil war raged and then someone could come up and ask everyone to end the fight.’’
There is little doubt that Bhumibol’s intervention on May 20 cut short what could have been a much greater slaughter. Beyond acting as a symbol of unity, the modern constitutional king’s most important role is to mediate in insoluble circumstances and take up leadership when it is absent. Bhumibol did this with unquestionable skill, by reducing the entire episode to a personal feud between two ambitious men and then stopping it. He avoided alienating the demonstrators, his loyal subjects, and condemning the military, the men who protected him. He also skirted the real issues of the constitution.
But how things reached such a point is another question. Europe’s modern sovereigns have overseen great efforts to develop other institutions and the rule of law to avoid such tragedies and to sidestep interventions that put at risk the throne’s prestige. Bhumibol to the contrary had consistently undermined the development of other permanent institutions. He saw them as competitors to his prestige, and not as shields to protect it. This exacerbated the dysfunctional state of government that required his regular intercession. Bagehot spoke precisely to this issue in The English Constitution: ‘‘So long as parliament thinks it is the sovereign’s business to find a government, it will be sure not to find a government itself.’’ As long as the sovereign assumes such business, the deeper he is enmeshed in politics and the more at risk his own power becomes.
May 1992 was a manifestation of the faults in Bhumibol’s ideal of a royal government, of his unrelenting prejudice against politicians, and his miscomprehension of the social changes that had occurred during his long reign. Despite the popularity of politicians like Chamlong and Chatichai, the king remained committed to his generals. They weren’t even the best generals: the corrupt and mercenary Arthit, Chavalit, and Suchinda all rose under Prem while professional, nonpolitical soldiers fell by the wayside. Yet the king and queen preferred them to even clean politicians. When Bhumibol expressed his preference for soldiers in December 1990, it provided Suchinda justification to seize power.
The king’s defenders say that Bhumibol had no choice but to accept the NPKC takeover, while also insisting it was a popular coup. Neither is exactly true. There was a widespread swing of public sentiment against Chatichai—fomented by both the military and the king’s own remarks—but it didn’t represent a popular call for a military takeover. At the time Bhumibol made no point of standing for a constitution-based transition that might have denied Suchinda power. Moreover, he declined to exercise his prerogative to dissolve parliament and set elections. Such royal powers are not inconsequential simply because they are seldom used. They are specifically for political emergencies.
After the coup, a few well-worded comments for constitutional and democratic principles would have left the junta on warning. Instead, following a year that exposed the generals’ venality, in December 1991 Bhumibol generously endorsed Suchinda’s leadership when he said there was no need to stick to theoretical principles or rule books. His intervention on the constitution, too, was premature: he did not wait until after the parliament voted. As the eruption five months later showed, the king’s habitual interventions left parliament dependent on the sovereign to make its decisions. Responsibilities for controlling the military, changing the charter, and choosing a new prime minister were ceded to the king.
Bhumibol’s skill in saving the day after the bloody convulsion of May 18–20 helped to hide his consistent bias against protesters and popular movements. But all the markers were there, from his silence on the Pairee Pinat preparations to the route change of the princess’s motorcade, to the shrill propaganda in media controlled by palace agents like Piya Malakul. With practiced deftness, however, as in October 1973, the king reserved just enough distance from the generals to emerge still the people’s king. When he appeared to blame Suchinda and Chamlong personally, the protesters could understand that he wasn’t saying the people were wrong. Because the constitution was finally to be amended, they could believe that Bhumibol was on their side.
Even so, there is the problem that Bhumibol acted only three days after the first demonstrators were killed. Aware of this gap in time and credibility, the palace’s defenders afterward insisted that Bhumibol didn’t like Suchinda but, unable to control the general, had to wait until Suchinda’s clique discredited themselves. It was almost an official argument, given how many people around the palace repeated it. One palace intimate explained: ‘‘When the king intervenes, he must succeed. He must know the territory he is charting. This explains the delay.’’
A senior prince called it the ‘‘silver bullet principle’’: the king has but one chance to intervene, and it has to hit the bull’s-eye. He couldn’t even risk declaring a dissolution of parliament, for fear Suchinda would ignore it. His prestige would have been exposed as lacking substance.
Interestingly, the palace agents never claimed the king was out of touch or misinformed, which could have explained the three-day gap. That argument could have dented his omniscient image, and it also would not have been true. Early on he assigned Prem to take charge of the whole situation, and Prem communicated constantly with the generals and many others, and kept Bhumibol briefed. The other privy councilors worked their own networks of informants. There was no real sign that Bhumibol was held hostage inside Chitrlada. If one accepts the silver bullet argument, it suggests a deep fault in his preference for the military, for clearly Suchinda and the NPKC generals were not more loyal, disciplined, or obedient than other Thais. And if Suchinda and his Class 5 cohorts were an exception, a rogue operation, how did they ever get so far?
Moreover, why then did the king pin most of the blame on Chamlong on May 20? Chamlong was rebuked for ignoring his December advice on the constitution, while Suchinda was praised for having agreed that amendments could be made. To assign guilt in this way, Bhumibol ignored the fact that the constitution and parliament were structured to defeat any amendment opposed by the generals. He also ignored Suchinda’s broken promises to amend the charter.
In the same way, the king avoided the conclusion, widely accepted among respected Thais like Anand, foreign diplomats, and academics, that there was a massive institutional problem in the Thai military. This was clear in the generals’ continuing defiance over the months after the May crisis. On the same day that Suchinda resigned, the army commanders held a meeting to declare their unity and defend the assault on the demonstrators. In July, Kaset threatened that a coup was still possible. Even after Anand sidelined the generals, the military openly assisted at least two parties in the election campaign, mobilizing the Red Gaur, Village Scouts, and ISOC to justify the May massacre to voters, insisting it was about a communist threat to nation, religion, and king.
Indeed, Bhumibol himself defended the military in those months. At the end of October, he received in audience 256 newly promoted senior colonels and generals. He made no critical reference to May and instead took to task the military’s critics. The Far Eastern Economic Review had repeated long-standing criticisms of the Thai military, that it remained incapable of convincingly defending its own borders, and yet maintained perhaps the most bloated officers corps in the world, with one general for every 300–350 troops, ten times the level of the West. Of the 600 generals in the army and supreme command headquarters, only half had identifiable jobs, the magazine noted. Bhumibol denied this, arguing that critics had counted retired generals—which they hadn’t. The very number of newly promoted generals in front of him was clear evidence, but still he insisted: ‘‘It has been widely said today that we have too many generals. If so, then there would be no point in bestowing the rank of general on about 200 officers today. The criticism may hurt your feelings but as a matter of fact we have a lower number of generals than foreign countries, in the West or the East. . . . The number of generals in Thailand is not that high and our armed forces are not top-heavy as was said. In fact, [the number] is small.’’
In December Bhumibol again placed the blame on Chamlong, Chavalit, and the protesters. He told the parable of a child who, confronted by a specific problem, ignored ready solutions to instead stir up an elephant, sending the elephant into a fury, setting off a violent chain reaction that finally resolved the original problem, only after much unnecessary chaos. ‘‘The situation nowadays is like the story, confused. On any subject, one person says something, another comes to refute it, using irreconcilable arguments. And how can the country be governed, how can work be done, how can we have anything done, if everything is out of tune? . . . In the end, the obstinate, dogmatic one will win the argument; but that is not good, that is not right. . . . [O]ne must not stipulate too many conditions. Any action must be constructive and everyone will be happy.’’
The audience understood that the message was for the pro-democracy movement, those the king felt unnecessarily pestered the blameless military elephant until all turmoil broke loose.
Even after the dust of May 1992 settled, the king still rejected the conclusions of numerous Thai and foreign scholars, politicians, and businessmen, that the upheaval was the result of an undeveloped political system, one excessively reliant on the monarchy and military to govern and manage development. Bhumibol’s stubborn hold on his own views was clear in an astonishing episode in early 1993. While Thailand was struggling with democratic processes and ambitious generals, neighboring Burma suffered the misrule of a paranoid and brutal military junta, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or Slorc. They had crushed a popular revolt in 1988 and jailed members of the political opposition, including their leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Still under house arrest, in October 1991 Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of their struggle.
In February 1993 eight previous Nobel Peace laureates visited Thailand, as Burma’s closest neighbor, to demonstrate their solidarity. Oscar Arias, the former president of Costa Rica, South Africa’s Desmond Tutu, the Dalai Lama of Tibet, and five others were invited by Thai social activists, to the great consternation of the Thai military. After visiting the destitute Burmese refugee camps on the northern Thai border, the group was received by King Bhumibol. They were astounded to hear him lecture them on how Aung San Suu Kyi should give up her fight and return to England to raise her children, and let Slorc run the country. Military governments were good for developing countries, the king insisted, and there was no need to support the Burmese opposition. Suu Kyi was only a troublemaker.
It wasn’t the only time the king said such things. He lobbied American diplomats and foreign academics to accept Slorc as bringing stability to Burma. Like the Slorc generals, he argued from his palace chambers that because Suu Kyi was married to a foreigner and had been educated abroad, she didn’t represent traditional Burmese values, so she ought to return to England and her family there.
Outside Chitrlada Palace, however, a new generation of Thais was cheering for Suu Kyi, and the official policy of the newly elected government of Chuan Leekpai was to support her pro-democracy movement.
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Censorship of Thai translations
written by anonymous user, March 10, 2007
Several sections of the book have been anonymously translated into Thai.
Some royalist editors on Thai Wikipedia insist on deleting links to partial translations of The King Never Smiles on the grounds that they are political propaganda.
The Wikipedia article stub is here, the stub discussion page is here.
The translated introduction is available here: http://www.geocities.com/kingn...ntro.html.
The translated 15th chapter is available here: http://tknsthai.googlepages.com.
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=155&Itemid=34
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